• Posted on 22 Nov 2026
  • 12-minute read

By Michael Clarke and James Laurenceson

Nuclear-powered submarines offer Australia only limited protection for its maritime trade, and the cost of acquiring them crowds out better economic-security investments.

This article appeared in the Royal United Services Institute's newsbrief on October 21 2026.


 

Australia is making the largest and most consequential security investment in its history through AUKUS. Its centrepiece is the acquisition, with US and UK support, of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). An increasingly prominent justification for AUKUS and SSN acquisition reads as straightforward: Australia is an island nation with the worldʼs third-largest Exclusive Economic Zone, its economic security depends on maritime trade, and SSNs are needed to keep trade routes open.

In 2023, Defence Minister Richard Marles described SSNs as a capability that would give an adversary ʻpause for thoughtʼ before disrupting Australiaʼs trading routes. Senator Raff Ciccone, Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, argued in June this year that Australiaʼs economy and ʻour capacity to defend ourselves depend on secure access to the seaʼ and anyone dismissing the protection of maritime trade as insignificant was ʻnegligentʼ. Former Prime Minister and ambassador to the US, Kevin Rudd, similarly presented AUKUS in an address to the National Press Club on 10 September as based on the ʻimmutable factsʼ that Australia was ʻ100% dependent on freedom of navigation for our trade sectorʼ. Prominent commentators outside of government too have reinforced this narrative. Former Royal Australian Navy officer Jennifer Parker, for example, has asserted that AUKUS is ʻfirst and foremost about protecting a vital national interest: maritime tradeʼ.

However, acknowledging that maritime trade matters for Australiaʼs economic security does not establish that SSNs are the optimal response. This article uses a capability-threat-vulnerability framework to interrogate the causal chain from SSN acquisition to economic security through three tests. First, can Australian SSNs deter trade-disrupting conflict from occurring? Second, if deterrence fails, can they materially constrain the forces and mechanisms that would disrupt maritime trade? Third, is Australiaʼs economic security as sensitive and vulnerable to maritime trade disruption as the above narrative implies?

The advantage of this approach is that it does not assume the superior operational utility of SSNs over conventional diesel-electric submarines automatically establishes their value for protecting Australiaʼs economic security. In each test we find that SSNs provide only limited threat remediation. For some specific risk vectors, they provide none. Meanwhile, Australiaʼs economic security can be bolstered through a range of alternative investments. Yet the iron law of scarcity means that the budgetary and human resource cost of SSN acquisition will inevitably crimp the pursuit of these alternatives. A greater proportion of aggregate income spent on defence means less spent on other initiatives impacting economic security such as addressing climate change, bolstering diplomacy or the provision of foreign aid, let alone domestic health and education. A vast bureaucracy focused on submarines is not one available to identify and design workarounds to supply chain chokepoints in partnership with Australian industry. A skilled technical worker constructing a shipyard or submarine componentry is not one available to build sovereign production capacity that makes a critical import unnecessary.

Not every conflict can be deterred

The Deterrence Test

The claim that acquiring SSNs will protect maritime trade by deterring conflict needs to be bounded at the outset. Not every conflict can be deterred. If Beijing concluded that peaceful unification with Taiwan had become impossible, the expert consensus is that it would accept unusually high costs to prevent permanent separation. Deterrence also depends on credible and correctly understood signals about the circumstances and extent when force would be used. Yet for a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea contingency, it is not clear that even Canberra, Washington and other allied capitals have themselves settled on the answers to these questions, let alone clearly communicated them to Beijing.

Where there is purchase, the AUKUS logic is one of ʻcollective deterrenceʼ. Here, Australian boats operating with US and allied forces would raise the expected costs to Beijing of initiating conflict. Indeed, AUKUS has been presented by Washington think-tankers as a response to a military balance moving in Chinaʼs favour, while its champion in the Biden administration, Kurt Campbell, spoke of the pact creating ʻfundamentally new realitiesʼ in Asian waters. Naval historian Richard Dunley has argued that US and Australian SSNs operating from the HMAS Stirling base near Perth in Western Australia would have a ʻvery significant deterrent effectʼ on vessels contemplating offensive operations against Australian territory or shipping.

This line of argument however contains two distinct mechanisms that deserve attention. The first is what we could term a force-generation effect as AUKUS – in theory – increases aggregate allied undersea combat power. The second is a force-posture effect as the AUKUS submarine component could make existing allied power more dispersed, sustainable or operationally useful. The force-generation effect of AUKUS is however weak in relevant timeframes. Australia is expected to receive three Virginia-class submarines from the existing US inventory in 2032, 2035 and 2038. Transferring a boat from US to Australia does not increase allied hull numbers. Nor is there evidence that US production of SSNs has risen at the pace required to replace transferred boats while expanding its own fleet, despite Australian funding for the US industrial base. This matters because, according to Mike Pezzullo, a former Australian Deputy Secretary of Defence, the PLA has been tasked with being ready for a Taiwan invasion by 2027, and with April of that year ʻthe optimal time for such an operationʼ if Beijing were to pull the trigger.

Rudd, on the other hand, has put forced unification as a ʻone-in-three riskʼ by 2028. Both dates are well before Australia is scheduled to receive a single SSN. Transfer of Virginias could, in fact, weaken collective deterrence if it reduces the number of submarines Washington can reliably commit to a China contingency. Marles has said Australia has ʻabsolutely notʼ guaranteed that transferred SSNs would be made available in a conflict over Taiwan.

Elbridge Colby, third in the Trump administrationʼs Pentagon hierarchy, raised this concern during his confirmation process and subsequently sought clarity on allied commitments and roles.

China has proceeded to rapidly develop the capabilities to deny the ability of the US (and its allies) to intervene

The force-posture effect of AUKUS is however more plausible. Forward support and rotational presence in Western Australia could improve dispersal, maintenance and availability while complicating Chinese surveillance and targeting. Analyst Ross Babbage has estimated that rotations through Australia could, by 2028, produce a 50–63 per cent increase in allied SSN capability available in the ʻWestern Pacific and Indian Oceansʼ from ʻDay 5ʼ of a conflict breaking out. Yet this estimate assumes the maximum four US Virginias envisaged by the AUKUS ʻoptimal pathwayʼ are present in Australia, and that these are additional to existing US regional deployments. The forward deployment of a UK Astute-class SSN is also assumed, despite reports that none of the UKʼs inventory are currently at sea. Further, there is an arbitrary element to the mooted geographic availability. Even if HMAS Stirling is closer than some other US naval bases to a potential conflict zone such as the South China Sea, the distance remains at around 5,500km. The Australian government has yet to announce the location of a long-touted submarine base on the east coast of Australia, let alone begun building it.

Any posture benefit must also be placed within the wider military balance. Since the end of the Cold War, US troop and equipment levels in Asia have hardly changed. In 2011, a US ʻpivot to Asiaʼ was announced that would purportedly address the deterioration but this has failed to materialise. This year instead saw the redeployment of critical assets like air-defence systems and aircraft carriers out of the Western Pacific to meet operational requirements in other theatres, such as the Middle East. Meanwhile, China has proceeded to rapidly develop the capabilities to deny the ability of the US (and its allies) to intervene in what Beijing considers to be its immediate security environment in East Asia and the western Pacific through heavy investment in the Peopleʼs Liberation Armyʼs (PLA) anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and expansion of its diverse ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear triad. This, as prominent PLA expert M. Taylor Fravel has noted, means ʻmilitary competition between the United States and China will likely create a contested zone in maritime East Asia into which both sides can project power but neither may be able to dominateʼ. AUKUS may thus make allied undersea power more resilient and operationally useful, but it cannot by itself reverse this structural trend. The deterrence test therefore supports a limited conclusion that in the near term the force-generation effect is weak, while the posture effect is potentially valuable but contingent.

The Operational Test

If deterrence fails, AUKUS proponents contend that SSNs could protectmaritime trade indirectly by threatening forces capable of interdicting shipping. Their stealth, speed, endurance and lethality make them powerful instruments of sea denial. Even a small number can operate as a ʻfleet in beingʼ, asymmetrically influencing an adversaryʼs behaviour beyond the waters they physically occupy. SSNs can also assist in sea control. By constraining hostile submarines and surface forces, conducting surveillance and supporting an integrated maritime campaign, they can help create local or temporary conditions in which shipping can move.

In a conflict in which Australia aligned against China, Chinese suppliers could simply suspend sales. Australian SSNs could not compel them to deliver supply

The distinction that matters here, however, is between SSNs contributing to a layered, allied system of maritime control and the stronger proposition that Australia acquiring SSNs can itself be justified as a means of protecting its trade. Australian SSNs would operate with US and allied submarines, aircraft, surface combatants, sensors and intelligence networks. That larger system of maritime control may be capable of making adversary interdiction significantly more difficult. The protection produced, however, cannot simply be attributed to the Australian SSN component. AUKUS advocates must identify what would be lost without the Australian SSN component and why no other capability could deliver similar effects sooner or at lower cost.

In any case, the question of scale remains important. Even if Australia receives the full complement of SSNʼs the optimal pathway envisages by 2056, only two are likely to be ʻconsistently availableʼ. Meanwhile, those boats will face simultaneous demands including intelligence collection, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, long-range strike, defence of Australian approaches and tasks associated with commercial shipping. The asymmetric value of an SSN means effects are not proportional to hull numbers, but neither are numbers and availability irrelevant.

The problem is broader still because Australiaʼs economic security can be threatened through multiple mechanisms. SSNs may help to suppress the military forces capable of threatening maritime supply and contribute to the sea control advantageous for broader ship movements. Yet a 2021 study by the Australian governmentʼs Productivity Commission identified 292 ʻvulnerable inputsʼ that were from concentrated sources of global supply. Of these, two-thirds came from China. In a conflict in which Australia aligned against China, Chinese suppliers could simply suspend sales. Australian SSNs could not compel them to deliver supply. The appropriate risk response includes measures like supplier and market diversification, production input substitution, stockpiling, contingent contracts and so on – all measures that the Productivity Commission were broadly bullish would strengthen supply chain resilience.

The Vulnerability Test

An assessment of the threat to maritime trade and economic security must also distinguish between sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity is the immediate cost of disruption to normal trade patterns. Vulnerability, meanwhile, is the cost that remains after adaptations. Some adaptations, such as the rerouting of trade, could plausibly be implemented in the space of hours and days rather than months and years. Australia could therefore be highly sensitive to a maritime shock without being equally vulnerable to it.

Conversely, it could be vulnerable to the loss of imports needed for essential production even when ships could still sail.

Some previous assessments of the sensitivity of maritime trade to conflict, such as references to ʻtwo-thirds of Australiaʼs tradeʼ or ʻtwo-thirds of Australian exportsʼ transiting potential ʻflashpointsʼ like the South China Sea, are simply wrong. As former Royal Australian Navy Commodore Sam Bateman observed, such estimates are ʻway off the markʼ. Moreover, much of the Australian trade that does pass through the South China Sea is with China itself. If Australia and China were opposing belligerents, most of this trade would never be shipped in the first place.

Conventional military assessments may overestimate the extent to which conflict disrupts maritime trade while underestimating the capacity of market incentives to sustain shipping operations

The vulnerability of maritime trade is also reduced by shipping routes being flexible, not fixed like roads or rail. Conflict might increase travel times, insurance premiums and freight costs as vessels are rerouted and commercially requisitioned, but higher transport costs should not be equated with the cessation of supply. The implication here is that conflict may not necessarily halt commercial shipping but instead substantially increase transportation costs, reflecting heightened risks, insurance premiums and crew wages. The example of oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz during the ongoing US war with Iran illustrates this dynamic.

Despite reported attacks on vessels, shipping continues, with daily tanker charter rates reportedly increasing 26-fold, from $50,000 to $1.3 million. This suggests that conventional military assessments may overestimate the extent to which conflict disrupts maritime trade while underestimating the capacity of market incentives to sustain shipping operations. Maritime trade during conflict may thus be constrained more by escalating costs than by the complete unavailability of shipping. Past analysis suggests these costs, relative to the value of goods traded, can be overstated, particularly for a high-income country like Australia with the fiscal capacity to cushion temporary shocks. Recent measures pursued by Canberra to successfully secure fuel supplies during the Iran conflict illustrate the role that government support can play.

Australia would also not be alone in wanting to keep essential trade moving. Japan and other Asian allied partners would have strong national-interest incentives to preserve access to Australian energy and raw materials. A major regional conflict would redirect flows, increasing east–west trade with the US and west–east trade through the Indian Ocean. Such adjustment would be costly and uneven, but it complicates the assumption that conflict in Northeast Asian waters would simply sever Australia from essential maritime supply and broader global commerce. Geography, too, increases the military difficulty of interdiction. Australia has multiple maritime approaches and ports distributed around a vast coastline. As analyst Sam Roggeveen argues, this creates a large gap between a Chinese objective of imposing severe economic pressure and the effort required to achieve it.

Conclusion

That Australiaʼs economic security is intimately connected to maritime trade is undisputed. The capability-threat-vulnerability framework employed here nevertheless yields a more qualified assessment around the proposition that Australia acquiring AUKUS SSNs is the optimal response. Given the scale of public expenditure involved in AUKUS, the burden of proof should rest with those advocating that Australia acquiring SSNs is necessary to protect the countryʼs economic security.

They must demonstrate not merely that SSNs are militarily useful relative to conventional diesel-electric submarines, but that the magnitude of the additional protection they provide to Australiaʼs maritime trade compares favourably with plausible alternative investments in military capability and economic resilience. Treating AUKUS as irreversible simply because, as Deputy Prime Minister Marles puts it, ʻAUKUS is happening, itʼs not in questionʼ skirts that burden and shows every sign of succumbing to the ʻsunk cost fallacyʼ.

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AUTHOR

Michael Clarke

Adjunct Associate Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, UTS and Associate Professor, Deakin Centre for Future Defence and National Security, Deakin University

AUTHOR

James Laurenceson

Director, Australia-China Relations Institute And Professor, DVC (International & Development)

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