• Posted on 16 Nov 2026
  • 9-minute read

By James Curran

This article appeared in UTS:ACRI's Perspectives on November 16 2026. Perspectives is the commentary series of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI), offering research-informed viewpoints on developments and debates in the Australia-China relationship.


 

When Charles Garrard (Garry) Woodard, Australia’s second ambassador to China (1976-80), passed away earlier this year, the country lost a rare talent. Even in his 90s, and almost blind, he retained his wit and intelligence. His overriding concern was war with China.

Woodard was concerned, he often said, that the Albanese government had ‘no stomach for an open debate or inclination to slow the rapid growth of Australian-American military cooperation deepening the moral commitment to fight alongside the Americans wherever or whenever conflict breaks out in Asia’. He added, ‘the Albanese government has never clarified the question of how Australian sovereignty is to be maintained in the event of such a conflict. The first quarter of the twenty-first century will be remembered as a time when Australia progressively, almost unwittingly, gave up its agency’.

As Woodard saw it, Prime Minister Albanese ‘would have entered into a commitment all of his predecessors had avoided. The long-term implications for Australia of fighting alongside the US in a war between the US and China over Taiwan would be horrendous and impossible to overstate’, Woodard argued. ‘If, as is likely, the US had to resort to nuclear weapons to avoid defeat, Australia, which would not have been consulted, would be condemned as a white country participating in the second nuclear conflict, both against Asian countries’.

Woodard lamented to this author on one occasion that ‘Australia is criminally slack about learning from its history, in contrast to America and Britain, and above all, China’. [1]

Woodard’s abilities bring to mind the tribute that former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid to the distinguished American diplomat and strategist George Kennan on his passing in 2005 – he had the ‘gift for seeing around corners’, understood the ‘tectonic forces of history moving beneath the surface of political events’ and could ‘discern the underlying patterns of human affairs where others saw only disconnected shards’. [2] As an official US State Department portrait said of Woodard at the time of his appointment to Beijing, he ‘has a keen and inquiring mind and is able to view world developments with a depth and perspective which is unusual for an Australian diplomat’. [3] When Woodard later offered some preliminary reflections on how Australian governments had dealt with China from the moment of official recognition under Whitlam in 1972 to the mid-1980s, he confessed to an ‘unusual compulsion’ to come at the subject ‘in what is frequently described as a uniquely Chinese time-frame or flow, but which is probably put best in the lines of T.S. Eliot:

Time present and time past,

Are both perhaps present in time future,

And time future contained in time past.

That passage stands as a coda, of sorts; to Woodard’s worldview and thinking about policy and strategy. A lawyer by training, he spent much of his diplomatic career in Asia. When members of his 1953 intake in the then-Department of External Affairs were asked to nominate their preferences for postings, Woodard put down three Asian posts: the rest of his class asked to be sent elsewhere. Woodard duly served in Malaysia, South Korea and Singapore. He was ambassador to Burma (1973-75). His other postings were in London and Washington, both at critical times – when Britain applied for the first time to join the European Economic Community (EEC) (1961-3) and when the Vietnam War was at its height, respectively. Woodard was also appointed the first head of the National Assessment Staff in the Joint Intelligence Organisation in the early 1970s.

Woodard never lost sight of the importance of understanding the Australian national character in facing up to the world. ‘In dealing with China’, he wrote in 1985, ‘no less in dealing with a patronising Britain or an over-bearing United States, the challenge is to avoid being overawed and to strike the right balance in giving due weight to the other side’s comparative advantage while confidently asserting one’s interests without seeming insensitivity or brashness’. While on posting in Beijing, Woodard found Chinese officials willing to see Australia as more than ‘a quarry and a granary.’ Making something of the relationship in the future, he argued, would take ‘imagination and staying power.’ None of this, however, meant that ‘we will have to see the world in China’s terms – any more than we have to take it now on another country’s terms’. [4] But Australia had been given a blank slate, of sorts, when its relations with China developed in the 1970s. The Chinese had told him that there were ‘no problems left over from history’. Australia, therefore, ‘was not included in the interventionist foreign powers which had inflicted China’s “century of humiliation”’. [5]

It was this distinctively Australian view of the region and the world, informed by a deep grasp of history, that lent Woodard’s judgments a weight and gravitas all their own. After his retirement from the department in the early 1980s, he wrote important studies based on archival research into Australia’s Cold War foreign policy, especially in Asia, with a particular focus on the China policies of successive governments. His book, Asian Alternatives: Australia’s Vietnam Decision and Lessons on Going to War (2004), should be distributed to every current and future employee of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. [6] He also wrote for prestigious, peer-reviewed Australian and international journals. A 2001 article on the development of national intelligence assessment in Australia traced how the approach to intelligence estimates here shifted over time from British models towards American practice. That was natural, he concluded, given the course of Australian reliance on the great powers. But it did not make him blind to distinctive Australian characteristics – in particular those relating to receptivity and bureaucratic politics. He did, however, lament that for the preceding 15 years, the system in Canberra had ‘faced, and failed to resolve, the universal dilemma contributed to by information overload and short attention spans of current intelligence crowding out longer-term and more unorthodox forecasting’. Woodard had been given a freer rein earlier in his career when, in 1963, the secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Arthur Tange, asked him to set up a policy planning unit, as Woodard remembered it, ‘to think dangerously about the mid to long term’. [7] How great is that need in Australia at this moment? It is pressing.

Later, the creation of a national intelligence body – the forerunner of the Office of National Assessments (now the Office of National Intelligence), meant that Australia was ‘contributing to the international community not as a servant but as a respected and interesting partner’, producing assessments inter alia on OPEC and international oil, the extent of American dependency on the Middle East, Japan’s future and the prospects for a post-independence Papua New Guinea. It was, he concluded, a ‘significant role for a small country which must live by its wits and pursue its national interests through persuasion’. He wondered, though, whether Australia’s future in this realm was beginning to resemble that predicted by one of the UK’s foremost experts in intelligence and public administration, Professor Peter Hennessy. Speaking in Canberra in 1997, Hennessy pointed to the risks of succumbing to ‘an era when the Armani clad minds in the penumbra of fad and fashion prone think tanks can be preferred (especially if their advice comes gift wrapped and suitably politically tinted) to that more sober, sometimes inconvenient, fare served up by the tweed-clad minds in the career bureaucracy’. As Woodard intoned solemnly afterwards, ‘the indicators are there’. [8]

Woodard also made a special study of the decision-making processes of the Menzies government in committing an Australian battalion to Vietnam. It was a shock, he wrote in 2023, ‘to see from the full record released how perfunctory the discussion had been on what our leaders habitually claim to be the most important decision they can take, to send our troops into harm’s way in an overseas conflict’. He drew from his inquiries – which combined deep archival research and personal recollections with a forensic examination of the existing historical literature – important lessons that resonate today. These concerned the risks of dependency on the United States and of placing blind faith in Washington; the lack of a strategic appreciation – incorporating foreign policy and defence views – to help inform the Cabinet’s decision-making; and the problem of the dominance of the prime minister in making the call. Menzies was ‘exercising the historical divine right of kings to decide on war’, an issue that resurfaced 37 years later in John Howard’s early decision in principle to follow George W Bush into conflict in the Middle East. Woodard worried, too, that Menzies’ misreading of nationalism in Asia ‘led many Australians into disastrously oversimplifying what superior American firepower could achieve’. [9]

Woodard was thinking about these deep strategic problems to the end. He shared many of his thoughts with this author in long telephone conversations and emails, as he did with a select group of others.

In a paper shared with this author in late 2022, he asked a critical question: whether the great Australian post-war foreign policy dilemma, ‘namely the dynamic of reconciling its geography, situated in a fast-developing Asia, with its deeply rooted psychological attachment to an external protector, had reached a dénouement.’ [10] If so, he stressed that ‘the implications for Australia’s place in the world and its national self-confidence will necessarily be profound’.

How, he asked, ‘could this turning point have crept up on us?’

Woodard knew the cause: China. Especially its ‘return to traditional one-person rule and the revitalisation and streamlining of the vast supporting Party structure’. He described Xi Jinping as ‘ruthless … seemingly ready to go for broke in preying on the humiliations suffered by the Han, a civilisation and a culture resting on the ius sanguinis: that allegiance to China wherever resident is to be secured by fear or favour’.

Australian governments, Woodard noted, particularly those led by Malcolm Turnbull and Scott Morrison, ‘became early subscribers to this view of China as a central threat. They could have opened a debate, normal in a democracy, but instead chose actions which amounted to a direct challenge to Xi and which accepted the inevitability of retribution’. He questioned the ‘wisdom or otherwise of this policy, the architects of which were the faceless men of Canberra, the personal advisers and the intelligence community responsible to the Prime Minister personally, and through him venturing into policy, [thereby] breaking the golden rule’ regarding the critical separation between intelligence and policymaking.

Woodard recognised too that ‘Intelligence has at the same time reverted to its origins as an arm of the Defence bureaucracy’. He did not dispute its critical importance, pointing out that intelligence had given the US the edge over actual or potential enemies. And he believed intelligence cooperation would survive a conflict even if the US fought alone. ‘It is a good tool’, he added, ‘but should never be the master of policy or policymakers’.

In that paper, Woodard was particularly interested in the implications of Australia’s policy turn on Taiwan, a recognised flashpoint since the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang fled there in 1949.

He made the important point that ‘for 16 years the Menzies government followed a consistent policy of not being drawn into a revival of the Chinese Civil War, whether sparked by either side or by the US. While it came to accept that the US had a veto on recognising the People’s Republic of China, it rejected numerous American pressures and stratagems to draw Australia into sharing its responsibilities for Taiwan or entering into a wider Northeast Asian defence treaty’.

And he asked: ‘Has the opportunity to maintain this policy of strategic ambiguity in the area come to an end?’

Woodard should be measured above all not parochially but by the highest standards of the crafts he practised: diplomat, ambassador, strategic analyst and historian. And his great wish; for Australia to accept the facts of its geography – remains in play.


 

Author

James Curran is Professor of Modern History at Sydney University and the author, most recently, of Grand Ambition: Paul Keating’s Global Vision for Australia (Simon & Schuster, 2026).


 

[1] Garry Woodard, ‘Albo’s dilemma’, unpublished paper, November 10 2022, author’s collection.

[2] Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Statement on the death of George F. Kennan, US Department of State, March 19 2005 <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43640.htm>.

[3] US State Department Cable, Canberra A-93, , ‘Biographic information on Australia’s New Ambassador to the PRC: C. G. Woodard’, April 12 1963.

[4] Garry Woodard, ‘Reflections on dealing with China’, unpublished paper, 1985.

[5] Garry Woodard, ‘Australia’s China policy of strategic ambiguity: navigating between big fish’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 72(2), 2018, p. 144.

[6] Garry Woodard, Asian Alternatives: Australia’s Vietnam Decision and Lessons on Going to War, (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2004).

[7] Garry Woodard, ‘Enigmatic variations: The development of national intelligence assessments in Australia’, Intelligence and National Security, 16(2), 2001, pp. 1,10.

[8]Ibid, p. 20.

[9] Garry Woodard, ‘Notes on the Australian decision of December 17 1964 for an ABC interview for a three-part series in August 2023 on the Vietnam War’, author’s collection.

[10] Garry Woodard, ‘Albo’s dilemma’, author’s collection. See also, James Curran, ‘Groupthink means no one is thinking about China’, The Australian Financial Review, April 16 2023 <https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/curran-20230412-p5czyl>.

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AUTHOR

James Curran

Professor of Modern History, University Sydney

 

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