Right-sizing research security: A survey of Chinese-background scientists in Australian universities

Executive Summary

This report examines how Chinese-background researchers working in STEM fields at Australian universities experience the changing environment for China-related research collaboration¹. It draws on 109 complete survey responses collected in July and August 2026 from academic and professional research staff who were working, or had worked, within the previous five years, at an Australian university. Nearly all respondents (96%) reported being born in mainland China, while 94% were Australian citizens or permanent residents. The sample was relatively senior and experienced.

The composition is relevant because respondents are firmly established in Australia's research system while many also bring direct experience of, and continuing professional connections with, China. Their perspectives are particularly significant given China’s position as one of the world’s largest research systems and a major source of global R&D activity.

These findings sit within a research system that is both highly internationalised and important to Australia’s wider innovation performance.

Australian higher education organisations performed $16.4 billion of R&D in 2024, postgraduate research students accounted for 52% of R&D effort within higher education, and 90% of Australia’s 50 most-cited papers between 2013 and 2023 involved international co-authors. China is a major part of these networks, with China-based collaborators involved in around 52% of Australian top-decile cited STEM publications since 2020. Changes affecting collaboration, research talent, mobility and funding may therefore have implications beyond individual research projects.

A companion qualitative report, Right-Sizing Research Security in Practice: Interviews with Chinese-Background Scientists in Australian Universities (October 2026), published by the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney, draws on extended interviews with a smaller group of researchers to examine in greater depth how these issues are experienced and navigated in practice.

Key survey findings:

• China-related research collaboration remained extensive, although some more structured forms were reported less frequently than five years earlier. Ninety-three percent of respondents had current or previous experience of China-related research collaboration and 63% were currently collaborating. Co-authorship and informal scholarly exchange were broadly stable, while joint grants, research projects, co-supervision, researcher visits and infrastructure sharing were reported less frequently. These retrospective comparisons do not definitively establish that research security policy caused the changes but they are consistent with it. Policy is now also moving to more tightly regulate co-authorship and informal scholarly exchange.
• Respondents near-unanimously saw important benefits to Australia from China-related collaboration. They also generally supported research security safeguards in principle, but were less likely to regard China-related collaboration itself as presenting distinctive risks. Twenty-six percent agreed that some China-related collaboration can raise national security risks for Australia, while 19% considered those risks different in nature or degree from collaboration with many other countries. Sixty-two percent agreed that Australia needs policies to manage national security risks in international research collaboration and 57% supported a legitimate role for universities in managing such risks. At the same time, 96% agreed that China-related collaboration provides important benefits to Australia’s research system and 73% favoured case-by-case assessment.
• Perceptions of increased security attention were substantially more widespread than perceptions that the underlying risk had increased. Thirty percent considered the national security risks associated with China-related collaboration to have increased over the previous five years. By comparison, 64% said China-related collaboration was viewed through a national security lens to a greater extent, 69% said universities had become more cautious and 69% said government and university policies required greater consideration of security risk.
• The strongest concerns related to clarity, differentiation and proportionality. Seventy-five percent disagreed that policies were applied consistently across countries according to the specific risks of each collaboration; 72% disagreed that current policies protected national security without unnecessarily restricting academic freedom; 71% disagreed that government guidance was clear and practical; and 70% disagreed that policies adequately distinguished lower- from higher-risk collaboration. Eighty-four percent considered the overall level of scrutiny applied to China-related research collaboration too strict.
• Research security requirements were reported to have affected research practice. Seventy-three percent said security-related requirements had affected their research at least moderately, including 45% who reported a significant or very significant effect. Fifty-seven percent agreed that they had avoided, changed, delayed or ended China-related collaboration because of research security policies, procedures or related institutional expectations. The most commonly reported changes concerned collaborator selection (74%), grant applications (63%), supervision, hosting or recruitment (62%), research topics (59%) and international co-authorship (54%). Sixty-one percent said they considered security implications often or very frequently when making research decisions.
• Respondents also reported effects on professional comfort and belonging. Fifty-two percent did not feel comfortable discussing China-related collaborations within their university, 55% were not confident that aspects of their personal background did not inappropriately influence how their collaborations were perceived, and 61% reported that current debates had negatively affected their sense of belonging within Australian academia. Half did not feel comfortable maintaining visible connections with China related research networks, topics or public discussion.
• Respondents strongly endorsed the potential bridging role of Chinese-background researchers but were less positive about whether current conditions enabled it. Seventy-seven percent agreed that Chinese-Australian and Chinese-background researchers could play a constructive bridging role between Australia and China, while 59% disagreed that current conditions allowed that role to be played effectively. Seventy-two percent considered reduced institutional understanding of China a somewhat or very likely potential outcome of current research security settings.
• Career effects were reported by a minority and were generally one factor among several. Twenty-three percent reported either uncertainty about continuing their academic career in Australia or no longer being based at an Australian institution, with research security concerns at least one factor.
• Respondents’ preferred changes focused primarily on implementation rather than removing safeguards. The highest priorities were more transparent, predictable and timely review processes (83%), clearer written guidance distinguishing higher- from lowerrisk collaboration (80%) and greater dialogue between government, universities and Chinese-background researchers (78%). Majorities also prioritised more accessible advice, clearer appeal mechanisms, greater transparency around evidence and reasoning, and additional training.

Respondents generally accepted the need to manage legitimate risks while questioning whether current settings consistently distinguish higher-risk activity from routine academic collaboration. Their responses point particularly to clarity, case-specific assessment, proportionality, procedural transparency and predictability.

The survey was conducted before the new foreign research project requirements introduced by the 2026 amendments to the Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act took effect. As such, it provides a snapshot of the preceding research security environment and a baseline for assessing subsequent changes. The survey was voluntary and self-selected and is not statistically representative of all Chinese-background researchers at Australian universities. As such, the findings should be interpreted as reflecting the experiences and views of respondents rather than as estimates of their prevalence across the wider population.

_{1  For the purposes of the survey, Chinese-background researchers were defined as researchers of Chinese heritage, including Chinese-Australian researchers and Chinese nationals working in Australia. In practice, the respondent group was more specific with 96% reporting being born in mainland China. China-related research collaboration was defined in the survey as research involving researchers, institutions or partners in mainland China, Hong Kong or Macau.}