PERSPECTIVES | Ten years after the South China Sea award

This article appeared in UTS:ACRI's Perspectives on June 30 2026. Perspectives is the commentary series of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI), offering research-informed viewpoints on developments and debates in the Australia-China relationship.

July 12 2026 marks 10 years since the arbitral tribunal, administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, issued its award in the Philippines’ case against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The ruling rejected the legal basis for the PRC’s expansive maritime rights claims where they exceeded entitlements under UNCLOS and found that aspects of Chinese conduct had violated the Philippines’ rights.

A decade on, that legal baseline still matters. It contributes to Manila’s basis for protest and for cooperation with partners. Beijing’s response has been to limit the award’s practical and political use.

The past month shows how. On June 11, the PRC sanctioned Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro and his immediate family, barring them from mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau and prohibiting Chinese individuals and entities from ‘transactions, cooperation or other activities’ with them. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs called the move an ‘unfriendly act’.

Beijing has targeted Filipino critics before, but Teodoro’s case marks an escalation. In 2019, former foreign secretary Albert del Rosario and retired Supreme Court associate justice Conchita Carpio-Morales were separately denied entry to Hong Kong after filing a communication at the International Criminal Court against PRC officials over conduct in the South China Sea. Del Rosario was also closely tied to the arbitration case that produced the 2016 award.

In July 2025, the PRC sanctioned former senator Francis Tolentino after his term had ended, barring him from mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau. Tolentino was the principal author and sponsor of legislation codifying the Philippines’ maritime zones and archipelagic sea lanes and had pursued inquiries into alleged PRC espionage and interference. In February 2026, China went further down the chain of government, barring 16 local officials from Kalayaan, Palawan after the municipality declared the PRC’s ambassador persona non grata.

Now, the target is now a sitting Cabinet minister, not a former government figure, ex-lawmaker or local official. The target of Beijing’s pressure has shifted from voices around Philippine policy to an official responsible for implementing it.

The same approach is visible at sea. In September 2025, the PRC approved a national nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal, presenting the move as environmental protection. Manila called it ‘patently illegal’ and a ‘clear pretext towards eventual occupation.’

In June 2026, Philippine authorities confirmed the presence of a floating platform with what appeared to be an antenna at Scarborough Shoal. Beijing maintained that its activities were legitimate scientific research under its claimed sovereignty. The platform was later removed. but temporary structures can still generate ambiguity and show Beijing how Manila and its partners respond to new forms of activity.

Beijing’s diplomatic language serves the same end. On June 29, the PRC Chinese Embassy in Manila again rejected the 2016 award as ‘illegal, null and void’. The exchange was familiar, but repetition is part of the pressure as the PRC continues to try to make a legal defeat into a diplomatic problem Manila must manage.

On the same day, Malacañang insisted that relations with the PRC were ‘still considered to be good’. Manila has reason to avoid making rupture the official framing of bilateral relations as it needs channels for diplomacy. The reassurance works only as part of a two-track approach, keeping communication open while continuing to contest PRC activity.

Since 2016, Philippine use the award have ebbed and flowed with domestic politics, alliance management and PRC pressure at sea. The Aquino administration initiated and pursued the case, while the Duterte administration often downplayed the ruling while seeking a warmer relationship with Beijing. Marcos Jr has shifted back toward public attribution and allied cooperation.

That shift is visible in expanded access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US, the Philippines’ transparency campaign exposing Chinese grey-zone activity, and a denser pattern of maritime cooperative activities with the US and other partners. Most recently, on June 22, the US transferred four naval drones to the Philippine military to strengthen maritime domain awareness. On June 27-28 Philippine and US forces conducted another bilateral maritime cooperative activity, with previous activities in June, May, March and January 2026.

Canberra is not a South China Sea claimant, but it has a direct stake in whether maritime entitlements under UNCLOS remain meaningful. It has repeatedly stated that the 2016 arbitral award is final and binding. It has also backed that position by building closer defence ties with Manila. Australia will not decide the outcome in the contested waters but its repeated presence complicates efforts to isolate Manila and easier for the Philippines to treat its legal position as a basis for action rather than grievance.

Filipino public opinion supports that direction. A May 2026 Pulse Asia survey found that 86 percent of respondents favoured working with like-minded countries to defend the West Philippine Sea. Asked which countries the Philippines should work with, 84 percent chose the US, 67 percent Japan and 57 percent Australia. Beijing’s preferred narrative is that Philippine resistance is externally driven. These figures suggest that many Filipinos see partnerships as instruments of a Philippine position, not substitutes for one.

The award’s 10^th anniversary remains a test of whether legal entitlement can still shape conduct when one party rejects it. Beijing has improved its position in parts of the dispute. But Manila and its partners have also given the award more practical effect. The contest remains unresolved, even if the PRC has tried to make its gains look settled.