Australia-China Weekly Brief: August 2026 issues

The Australia-China Weekly Brief by the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI) tracks key developments in Australia-China relations over each week.

July 30 - August 6 2026

1. Canberra examines joint iron ore bargaining against CMRG

The Australian government is reportedly considering whether mining companies such as BHP, Rio Tinto and Fortescue could be authorised to coordinate negotiations with the state-owned China Mineral Resources Group (CMRG). Such coordination would ordinarily require protection from Australian anti-monopoly legislation.

Speaking on the sidelines of a mining conference, former federal treasurer Joe Hockey expressed his support for such a plan, saying, ‘I’ve dealt with China previously, and you can’t allow yourself to be bullied.’

The takeaway: CMRG derives leverage from centralised Chinese purchasing power confronting Australian miners that negotiate separately. Joint bargaining would help address that asymmetry, although it would not necessarily produce a cohesive Australian seller bloc.

CMRG’s conduct has pushed a pricing dispute into the realm of Australian competition policy. Formal authorisation would mark a shift from company-level resistance to a state-enabled response to concentrated Chinese buying power. It would also represent Australia’s most direct countermeasure against CMRG since the group was established in 2022.

2. China codifies exit restrictions with implications for Chinese citizens in Australia

Beijing issued new exit and entry administration regulations on July 31, effective September 15. The 19-article regulation expands authorities’ power to impose exit bans of up to three years for national security violations, including for conduct deemed to have ‘harmed national security’ while overseas.

For Chinese citizens, the rules authorise exit bans where overseas conduct is deemed unlawful or criminal and harmful to the PRC’s national security or interests. Separate restrictions may apply for breaches of export control or technology transfer rules. Authorities may withhold notice where disclosure could affect national security or a criminal investigation.

For foreign nationals, individuals on the PRC’s countermeasures, unreliable entity or malicious entity lists may be denied entry. Foreigners already in the PRC remain subject to existing exit ban powers, with limited transparency in national security cases.

Australian journalist Cheng Lei noted that Chinese-Australian communities were ‘already afraid’ – with diaspora members declining to be photographed at social gatherings for fear association with known advocates could be construed as harming national interests before family visits to the PRC.

The takeaway: The regulations tighten the link between the PRC’s border controls and its national security and counter-sanctions systems.

For Chinese nationals abroad, the possibility that lawful overseas speech, association or professional activity could later attract penalties may further entrench self-censorship and deter broader civic participation.

For foreign nationals, the significance is not a new power of exclusion, but its more explicit and systematic application.

3. Australia targets technologies for regional deterrence

Defence Minister Richard Marles launched the 10-year 2026 Defence Innovation, Science and Technology Strategy on August 4. It identifies six priorities: long-range fires and hypersonic weapons, high-energy lasers, autonomous systems, quantum technology, artificial intelligence and undersea warfare.

The strategy does not name the PRC and also draws lessons from conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. But it explicitly aligns technological investment with the 2026 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program. Several of its six capability priorities also reflect capabilities the PLA has publicly showcased and prioritised as part of President Xi Jinping's push for ‘leapfrog development’ in military modernisation.

The takeaway: These capabilities are intended to complicate force projection against Australia and across its maritime approaches. The PRC’s military scale and expanding reach make the PLA the clearest regional benchmark for this investment.

4. TikTok and Alibaba reportedly explore Australian data centres

The Australian reported on August 5 that TikTok and Alibaba were considering Australian data centre projects and had explored filing applications with FIRB.

TikTok had reportedly examined using an established Australian operator, with AirTrunk identified as a possibility. Alibaba had sounded out energy suppliers for a prospective facility, potentially in Queensland, the Northern Territory or Western Australia.

Neither company has confirmed the plans.

The takeaway: The interest comes as the Albanese government seeks to expand Australia’s computing capacity and position the country more deeply within allied AI supply chains.

The proposals would test whether Australia can expand computing capacity without weakening its push for a trusted, allied-facing AI ecosystem. Data localisation may reduce some exposure, but it does not resolve risks arising from corporate control or foreign legal obligations. Any FIRB decision would therefore set a broader precedent for the terms on which Chinese-linked firms can participate in Australia’s critical digital infrastructure.