What Australians think of China and the US in the Trump era

share_windows This article appeared in The Diplomat on November 19 2025.

Australia’s longstanding foreign policy challenge of managing the United States as its principal security partner while relying on China as its largest trading partner remains the central framework shaping Australian public attitudes. This year, however, the UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2025 shows a shift in how Australians view both powers. 

Public sentiment toward China has moderated, but Australians remain fundamentally wary. They support rebuilding ties with Beijing, but few are under any illusion about the challenges it presents. At the same time, scepticism toward the US has risen more abruptly than at any point in the survey’s five-year history. This is not a pivot toward China, but rather reflects pragmatic engagement without restored trust, balanced by growing insistence on autonomy from both major powers.

Just over seven in 10 Australians (71 percent) now believe the country should continue building a stronger relationship with Beijing, a ten-point jump and the highest level recorded across the poll’s five iterations. Recognition of the relationship’s benefits also climbed to 72 percent, reflecting a broad acceptance that stabilized trade and renewed diplomacy serve Australia’s interests. 

Yet this warmer shift overlays a deeper and more enduring coolness. Mistrust of the Chinese government remains high at 64 percent, even after several years of gradual decline, and 54 percent still express concern about the bilateral relationship. Australians are more open to engagement but remain cautious, likely shaped by recent memories of coercive trade measures and diplomatic freezes, as well as China’s ongoing assertiveness in the region – not least the dangerous interactions between People’s Liberation Army aircraft and Australian surveillance planes.

This caution is reinforced by views on regional security. Nearly three-quarters of Australians (71 percent) still regard China as a security threat and half (50 percent) consider conflict with China within three years a serious possibility, numbers that have barely changed despite the political thaw. 

Concern about China’s regional behaviour is also clear in the new South China Sea items introduced in 2025. Seventy-two percent of Australians view China’s actions there as a threat to Australia’s interests and 65 percent support joint patrols with partners including the United States, Japan, and the Philippines. These results provide a one-year snapshot, but they indicate strong public backing for coordinated regional responses to, and emphatic concern about, China’s maritime activities. 

This broader sense of strategic risk is also reflected in defence spending attitudes: support for increasing defence expenditure has risen to 72 percent, the highest level in the poll’s five years. Even when respondents were presented with trade-offs, such as potential cuts to health, education, or welfare, 55 percent still backed higher spending on defence. 

Support for the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS has also edged upward over three consecutive years (44 percent in 2023; 48 percent in 2024; 50 percent in 2025), suggesting a modest but discernible increase in confidence in the program, even as views remain divided. 

Taken together, the defence-related findings point to a public increasingly prepared to invest in long-term capability, but still wary of steps that could draw Australia into conflict.

Attitudes toward Taiwan show a more established pattern. Thirty-seven percent of Australians support sending troops to defend Taiwan if China launches an attack, a figure that has remained stable within a narrow range since 2022. Views on a broader China-US conflict over Taiwan also point to consistent caution: in that scenario, 50 percent of Australians favor neutrality and 47 percent support providing military assistance to the United States. 

A separate question on non-military engagement adds further detail. In 2025, 52 percent agreed Australia should deepen economic and political engagement with Taiwan even if this created tension with Beijing, while only 12 percent disagreed. This contrast suggests Australians are more comfortable with political and economic support for Taiwan than with direct military involvement.

Where sentiment has changed more dramatically is in perceptions of the United States. The 2025 poll reveals the steepest decline in confidence in Washington recorded to date. For the first time, more Australians believe the US will eventually force Australia to choose sides than believe China will. Concerns about American economic pressure have surged by 36 points in a single year (from 36 percent in 2024 to 72 percent in 2025), just surpassing concerns about China’s use of economic coercion (70 percent). 

Perceptions of relative influence in Australia’s regional neighbourhood have also shifted markedly. Agreement that the US has more influence than China fell from 65 percent in 2021 to 38 percent in 2025, a 27-point decline, including a 17-point drop in the past year alone. Disagreement rose from 9 percent to 29 percent over the same period, with more respondents now seeing influence as either contested or unclear. These results point to a pronounced weakening in perceptions of clear US regional dominance.

And the return of Donald Trump to the White House has intensified fears about entrapment, with nearly two-thirds of respondents (64 percent) saying a second Trump presidency makes it more likely Australia will be drawn into a conflict with China. The alliance remains valued, but Australians are now scrutinizing the conduct and predictability of the US with more intensity.

Rather than weakening support for the United States, this sharper scepticism has translated into a stronger demand for policy independence. A resounding 77 percent of Australians believe their country should make its own China policy decisions even when these diverge from US preferences. Support for pursuing good relations with both powers has reached its highest level at 65 percent. 

The public is not rejecting the alliance, nor is it moving closer to China. Instead, Australians are asserting a clear preference for navigating between the two without being compelled to take sides. The poll results suggest that the idea of Australia as a dependent actor in a China-US rivalry is at odds with public expectations.

On economic matters, pragmatism remains the dominant instinct. Concern about Australia’s overreliance on China has eased from 80 percent in 2021 to 66 percent this year – still substantial, but declining. Support for Australian companies pursuing opportunities in China has steadily increased, and views on Chinese tourism, education, and trade agreements have generally improved. 

Yet the public continues to favour strict oversight of strategic assets and sensitive sectors. Seventy-five percent of respondents support ending the current lease of the Port of Darwin to a Chinese-owned company, and 66 percent support limiting foreign investment in Australia’s critical minerals sector from all countries, rising to 74 percent when the investment comes specifically from China. This indicates that while some engagement with China is acceptable, Australians insist on safeguards to protect national resilience and reduce exposure to political leverage.

Australians also take a measured view of cooperation with China across different sectors. Many support working with China on practical issues such as climate change and global health (78 percent) and on regional challenges such as ending malaria in the Pacific (78 percent). Support for scientific collaboration is similarly high, with agreement that partnerships between Australian and Chinese scientists are beneficial (72 percent). 

At the same time, Australians back efforts to strengthen ties with regional partners to balance China’s influence, including building closer relationships with Southeast Asian nations (71 percent) and with Pacific Island countries (77 percent). Overall, the public is comfortable with selective cooperation where interests align and expects Canberra to set clear limits where Australia may be exposed to strategic or political risk.

The 2025 poll shows a public neither drifting toward China nor drifting away from the United States, but instead charting an increasingly confident middle course, one that is consistently cautious about Beijing, more sceptical of aspects of Washington’s conduct and firmly committed to Australian autonomy. The challenge for policymakers is whether they can maintain this balance in a region where great power rivalry is becoming more volatile. 

For now, the message is clear. Australians welcome stability with China, value the US alliance and reject the notion that the country must choose between the two. But they also expect Canberra to act with an independence that reflects Australia’s interests rather than those of either major power.

In a contested Indo-Pacific, this blend of engagement, caution and autonomy is shaping a distinct Australian approach to navigating Washington and Beijing, one that is pragmatic and wary, as well as increasingly self-assured.