UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2025

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The UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2025 offers the latest insights into how Australians understand and evaluate the evolving relationship with China. Entering its fifth year, the survey continues to track shifts 
in public sentiment across security, economic, political and social dimensions, revealing a more settled but still cautious national outlook.

This year’s poll also introduces a new component examining the influences that shape Australians’ views of China and of Australia-China relations, broadening the analytical scope beyond attitudes to include the sources and channels through which those attitudes are formed.

Findings are based on an online survey of 2,045 Australian adults conducted nationwide.

Key findings below.

1. Overall views on the Australia-China relationship

• Building stronger connections and ties, and a strong relationship: Seven in ten Australians (71 percent) believe that Australia should continue to build stronger connections and ties, and a stronger relationship with China. Support for the sentiment had previously remained virtually unchanged from 2021 to 2024, hovering around 61 percent, before a pronounced rise of 10 points in 2025, the first clear upward break in the five-year trend.
• Concerns: Concern about Australia’s relationship with China has fallen to its lowest point in five years, though the sentiment continues to be held by a slim majority of Australians. In 2025, just over half (54 percent) expressed concern, a decline of 10 points from 2024 (64 percent) and 20 points since 2021 (74 percent).
• Benefits: Nearly three-quarters of Australians (72 percent) recognise the benefits of the relationship with China, a marked 10-point increase from 2024 (62 percent). Agreement had remained relatively stable between 2021 and 2024, fluctuating between 58 and 63 percent, before this clear upward shift in 2025.
• Mistrust of the Chinese government: The proportion of Australians expressing mistrust of the Chinese government has eased, falling from 76 percent in 2021 to 64 percent in 2025, a 12-point decline. While mistrust is still widespread, this marks a softening in sentiment. The decrease was gradual between 2021 and 2024 (71 percent), before a seven-point fall in 2025.
• The Australian government’s management of China relations: Satisfaction with the Australian government’s management of the China relationship has risen steadily, climbing from 32 percent in 2021 to 41 percent in 2025, a nine-point gain. The most significant improvement occurred between 2022 and 2023, with a five-point rise (34 to 39 percent), followed by smaller increases in subsequent years.
• A harder Australian government line on China: Support for a harder government line on China has softened over time, falling from 63 percent in 2021 to 51 percent in 2025 – its lowest level in five years. While views remained fairly steady until 2024, an eight-point drop in 2025 marks a clear easing in sentiment. Fewer Australians now favour a tougher stance, with more adopting neutral or undecided positions.
• Responsibility for improving the Australia-China relationship: Views on responsibility for improving the Australia-China relationship were stable from 2021 to 2024 before shifting modestly in 2025. This year, agreement that both countries share responsibility rose from 79 percent in 2024 to 84 percent, a five-year high, while the view that China alone is responsible fell 11 points, from 48 percent in 2024 to 37 percent in 2025. Belief that Australia alone bears responsibility remained steady at around 31 percent.
• Future outlook: Expectations for short- to medium-term improvement in relations between Australia and China have become slightly more positive, though most Australians remain cautious. Agreement that the relationship will improve over the next three years slowly rose from 27 percent in 2021 to 34 percent in 2025, while disagreement fell from 30 to 21 percent. Neutral views continued to dominate, hovering in the mid-40 percent range. Overall, optimism has edged upward, but the public remains largely in a wait-and-see stance.

2. Politics and political communication

• Political party best placed to handle Australia’s China policy: Since 2022, trust in the Australian Labor Party to manage Australia’s China policy has strengthened, rising from parity with the Liberal/National Coalition (35 percent versus 36 percent) to a consistent lead (49 percent versus 29 percent in 2023; 40 percent versus 34 percent in 2024; 48 percent versus 29 percent in 2025), signalling sustained, if qualified, approval of Labor’s approach.
• China policy and electoral impact: When asked after each federal election, an increasingly larger share of Australians said the government’s management of China policy influenced their vote, rising from 27 percent (2022 election) to 37 percent (2025 election), while those saying it had no impact fell from 56 percent to 24 percent.
  
  Although based on only two survey points, this shift suggests that foreign policy may be gaining modest importance in voting decisions. 
• Communication over areas of disagreement: Two-thirds (66 percent) continue to prefer that the government communicate disputes with China privately through diplomatic channels rather than publicly, indicating broad support for a restrained approach.

3. Military and security

• China as a security threat: Agreement that China poses a security threat to Australia decreased by five points from 71 percent in 2024 to 66 percent in 2025, the lowest recorded in the five-year series, after three years of stability in the low 70s. The shift points to a mild easing in perceptions of threat, though about
  two-thirds of Australians continue to see China as a security concern.
• The possibility of military conflict with China within three years: Views on the likelihood of military conflict with China remained steady, with about half of Australians seeing it as a serious possibility from 2023 (51 percent), when the question was first asked, to 2025 (50 percent). Views on the prospect of conflict seem to have consolidated, suggesting a durable sense of strategic risk within the public mindset.
• Support for an increase in Australia’s defence spending: Agreement that Australia is right to increase defence spending rose to a series high of 72 percent in 2025, an eight-point increase on the previous year after several years of decline. A related question introducing explicit trade-offs, such as cuts to health or education spending, showed lower but steadily increasing 
  support over time (50 percent in 2023; 53 percent in 2024;
  55 percent in 2025).
  
  Although the gap between the two measures has varied between 11 and 17 points, both indicate a gradual strengthening of public acceptance for higher defence spending as a sustained national 
  priority, even when balanced against competing budget pressures.
• AUKUS: Agreement that acquiring nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS will help keep Australia secure from a military threat from China rose from 48 percent in 2024 to 50 percent in 2025, continuing an upward trend since 2023 (44 percent). Neutrality eased to 26 percent after peaking in 2024 (31 percent), while disagreement declined from 33 percent in 2023 to 24 
  percent in 2025.
  
  A new 2025 question found limited support for reducing AUKUS involvement to ease tensions with China (25 percent agree,
  46 percent disagree). At the same time, 68 percent supported using AUKUS to deepen cooperation with the US and UK on advanced technologies such as cyber, AI and quantum computing under Pillar II. 
  
  Together, the data point to a gradual but still qualified strengthening of support for AUKUS.
• Forming trade and security blocs that exclude China: Agreement that Australia should form blocs deliberately excluding China fell from 43 percent in 2024 to 31 percent in 2025, the lowest level in five years, while disagreement rose to 32 percent and neutrality to 37 percent. The results suggest a softening in support for exclusionary groupings, though around one-third of Australians still back the idea.
• South China Sea: In 2025, about three-quarters of Australians (72 percent) viewed China’s actions in the South China Sea as a threat to Australia’s interests, while 68 percent agreed Australia should support backing Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines against China’s maritime activities and 65 percent backed joint patrols with partners including the US, Japan and the Philippines. The results show strong public backing for regional cooperation and a high baseline of concern over China’s maritime behaviour.
• Conflict over Taiwan: In 2025, 37 percent of Australians supported sending troops to defend Taiwan if attacked by China, a level that has remained stable within a narrow 35 to 39 percent 
  range since 2022. Neutral and opposing views divided the remainder of respondents in roughly equal measure, suggesting a settled but cautious public stance on direct military involvement.
  
  In a hypothetical US-China conflict over Taiwan, 50 percent favoured neutrality and 47 percent supported military assistance to the US, a near-even balance that reflects a return to the more cautious pattern of 2021 after several years of fluctuation.
  
  Overall, the data indicate enduring ambivalence rather than polarisation, with Australians more inclined toward neutrality or indirect support than to endorsing combat operations.
• Espionage: Concern that Chinese espionage is more troubling than that of other countries fell from 59 percent in 2024 to 53 percent in 2025, reflecting a moderate shift toward more neutral or less alarmed views. Broader comparisons show concern about espionage by China (66 percent) remains high and close to that for Russia (69 percent), both well above concern about the US (41 percent).
• Foreign interference: Agreement that foreign interference from China is more concerning than interference from other countries declined from 58 percent in 2024 to 54 percent in 2025, continuing a gradual easing trend from 67 percent in 2022. A separate set of comparative items shows that concern about interference from China and Russia has levelled around 64 percent, while concern about the US has risen steadily by 17 points – from 37 percent in 2021 to 54 percent in 2025 – narrowing perceived differences among the three.

4. The United States

• Balancing relations with the US and China: In 2025, 65 percent of Australians agreed that the country can maintain good relations with both Washington and Beijing, the highest level recorded, 
  while neutrality fell from 27 percent in 2024 to 19 percent and disagreement rose slightly to 15 percent.
  
  A majority (51 percent) continued to believe China will eventually force Australia to choose between the two powers, while the proportion expecting similar pressure from the US increased 
  steadily from 39 percent in 2021 to 57 percent in 2025 – an 18-point rise and the first instance in which perceived pressure from Washington exceeded that from Beijing.
• Risk of conflict under the second Trump presidency: Nearly two-thirds of Australians (64 percent) agreed that the country is more likely to be drawn into a conflict with China under President Donald Trump, with 22 percent neutral and 14 percent disagreeing. The result indicates a broad perception that US leadership under Trump increases regional tension.
• Independent policymaking: A new 2025 question found clear agreement (77 percent) that Australia should make its China policy decisions independently, even when they differ from US preferences. Seventeen percent were neutral and six percent disagreed, showing strong support for maintaining autonomy in foreign policy.
• Regional influence: Agreement that the US has more influence than China in Australia’s regional neighbourhood declined from 65 percent in 2021 to 38 percent in 2025, a 27-point drop overall, 
  including a 17-point fall between 2024 and 2025. Over the same period, disagreement rose from nine to 29 percent and neutrality
  from 26 to 33 percent, suggesting a significant reassessment of relative regional influence rather than a simple reversal of perceived dominance.
• Economic coercion: Between 2021 and 2025, agreement that China is willing to use trade and investment ties to punish Australia over political disagreements declined gradually from 77 to 70 percent.
  
  Over the same period, views of the US shifted significantly, with agreement rising from 36 percent in 2024 to 72 percent in 2025 –
  a 36-point increase and the largest year-on-year change in the dataset, overtaking China for the first time on this metric.
  
  The reversal suggests a rapid reassessment of public perceptions of economic leverage and coercive capacity, likely reflecting heightened sensitivity to US actions in the global trade and security environment.

5. Trade and investment

• Economic overreliance: Agreement that Australia is too economically reliant on China declined steadily across the series – from 80 percent in 2021 to 66 percent in 2025 – the lowest level recorded. Disagreement rose gradually from three to 10 percent and neutrality from 16 to 24 percent. The five-year pattern shows a clear, consistent easing in concern, even as two-thirds of Australians still view reliance as excessive.
• Economic risk and opportunity: Agreement that Australia’s economic relationship with China is more of a risk than an opportunity fell consistently from 53 percent in 2021 to 39 percent in 2025 – a 14-point decrease and a five-year low. Disagreement increased from 20 to 26 percent and neutrality from 27 to 35 percent, indicating a sustained reduction in perceptions of economic risk.
• Economic contribution: Views of engagement with China remained broadly positive but showed moderate fluctuation. Agreement that close engagement supports prosperity decreased from 63 percent in 2021 to 54 percent in 2024, before rising slightly to 59 percent in 2025.
  
  Agreement that trade with China creates jobs stayed stable within a narrow 61 to 65 percent range.
  
  Support for Australian companies pursuing business opportunities with China rose steadily from 61 percent in 2021 to 70 percent in 2025, reflecting growing endorsement of commercial ties.
• Trade agreements (ChAFTA and the CPTPP): Agreement that the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) has been beneficial increased from 53 percent in 2024 to 60 percent in 2025 – a five-year high, up from 52 percent in 2021.
  
  Support for China’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) rose gradually from 31 percent in 2022 to 38 percent in 2025, while support for Taiwan’s bid remained consistently higher, albeit declining slightly from 66 to 61 percent. The roughly 20-point gap between support for China’s accession and Taiwan’s accession indicates continued caution toward China’s participation despite generally favourable views of expanded trade frameworks.
• Tourism: Perceptions of Chinese tourism fluctuated modestly but remained positive. Agreement that Chinese tourists provide a major economic benefit ranged between 67 and 74 percent, returning to the five-year high of 74 percent in 2025.
  
  Support for maintaining Australia’s attractiveness to Chinese tourists rose from 58 to 69 percent between 2024 and 2025, an 11-point single-year increase and the highest result in the five-year series.
• Education: Attitudes toward Chinese international students’ economic contribution have been stable, with agreement remaining between 67 and 76 percent since 2021 and
  standing at 69 percent in 2025.
  
  Concern that universities are too financially reliant on Chinese students stayed consistently high, ranging from 73 to 81 percent and reaching 75 percent in 2025.
  
  The overall trend shows steady dual recognition of economic benefit and dependency, with little variation over five years.
• Foreign investment: Sentiment toward Chinese investment remained stable but slightly less negative over time. Agreement that such investment is more detrimental than beneficial hovered 
  between 48 and 51 percent from 2021 to 2024 before easing to 47 percent in 2025. Disagreement rose to 19 percent and neutrality to 35 percent.
  
  Agreement that Chinese investment has created jobs remained steady within 49 to 53 percent, ending at 50 percent in 2025.
  
  The data reflect long-term ambivalence rather than marked change.
• Port of Darwin: Support for government action on the Port of Darwin increased modestly before rising markedly after the Albanese  government announced it intended to terminate the lease. Agreement that the government should force Landbridge to sell the port rose from 60 percent in 2022 to 64 percent in 2023 and 62 percent in 2024, before climbing to 75 percent in 2025. The data show sustained majority support for restoring national control over strategic infrastructure, consolidating after government intervention.
• Critical minerals: Support for limiting foreign investment in Australia’s critical minerals sector rose steadily from 58 percent in 2023 to 66 percent in 2025. Agreement to specifically restrict Chinese investment remained higher but stable, moving slightly from 73 to 74 percent. The parallel trends since 2023 indicate growing support for tighter oversight across all investors, with heightened caution toward China’s involvement.
• Residential real estate: Concern about Chinese influence in the housing market remained high but fluctuated within a moderate range. Agreement that Chinese buyers drive up housing prices 
  fell from 82 percent in 2021 to 73 percent in 2023, rose to 80 percent in 2024, and eased to 76 percent in 2025. Agreement that Chinese investors have negatively affected the rental market stayed within 68 to 74 percent, ending at 69 percent in 2025. The five-year trend points to persistent but gradually softening concern, likely shaped more by wider affordability pressures and domestic market dynamics than by changes in the bilateral relationship.

6. Society

• Political discourse and social cohesion: In 2025, 54 percent of Australians agreed that political debates about China are increasing divisions within society, with 32 percent neutral and 
  13 percent disagreeing. Although new in 2025, the result indicates moderate concern about domestic polarisation on China issues.
  Agreement that Chinese government influence undermines Australian values stood at 44 percent in 2025, down slightly from
  46 percent in 2024 and 48 percent in 2022-23, indicating little substantive change over time and a broadly steady level of concern.
• Democratic values and the economic relationship: In 2025, 43 percent agreed that being a close economic partner with China is compatible with Australia’s democratic values, while 24 percent disagreed and 33 percent were neutral. With no prior trend data, the 2025 findings point to a cautiously mixed view – more Australians see compatibility than not, but a substantial share remain uncertain.
• Australian-Chinese communities: Between 2021 and 2024, agreement that political tensions with China negatively affect Australians of Chinese origin declined from 63 to 49 percent, while neutrality rose from 27 to 37 percent and disagreement from 10 to 14 percent, indicating a gradual easing of concern. In 2025, a reframed question on discrimination risk found 58 percent 
  concerned, 26 percent neutral, and 16 percent disagreeing, broadly consistent with earlier awareness of social pressures.
  
  In 2025, six in 10 Australians (60 percent) agreed that Australians of Chinese origin play an important role in fostering bilateral understanding (30 percent neutral, 10 percent disagree).
  
  Eighty-two percent said their views of the Chinese government are separate from their views of people of Chinese origin, with four percent disagreeing, the strongest consensus finding in the 
  2025 survey.
  
  Agreement that Australians of Chinese origin could be influenced by Beijing to undermine Australia’s interests remained relatively stable across the five years, rising from 39 percent in 2021 to around 43 percent in 2023 and 24 before easing to 38 percent in 2025. Disagreement increased to 28 percent in 2025, but these
  shifts are modest and within normal sampling variation. Overall, concern persists: around four in ten Australians continue to view some degree of Chinese government influence on Chinese-Australian communities as possible.
• Human rights policy: Support for imposing sanctions on Chinese officials or entities involved in human rights violations remained consistently high and stable across the series – 65 percent in 
  2022, 68 percent in 2023 to 2024 and 66 percent in 2025.
  
  A new 2025 question found a large majority (77 percent) supported Australia working with other democracies to hold China accountable for abuses in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong (17 percent neutral, six percent disagree), showing strong alignment with cooperative approaches to human rights enforcement.
• Personal safety and travel perceptions: Concern about arbitrary detention when travelling to China eased from 73 percent in 2024 to 65 percent in 2025, the lowest level recorded. Earlier readings ranged between 66 and 72 percent from 2021 to 23, indicating fluctuations within a high band rather than a continuous decline. Despite the moderation, roughly two-thirds of Australians still view arbitrary detention as a credible risk when considering travel to China.

7. University and research

• Academic freedom concerns: Agreement that Australian university ties with China compromise freedom of speech declined from a high of 50 percent in 2022 to 44 percent, reflecting a five-year low.
  
  In a new 2025 question, 58 percent agreed that Australian universities can collaborate with Chinese institutions while protecting academic freedom if proper safeguards are in place, with 28 percent neutral and 14 percent disagreeing. The result indicates broad but conditional support for structured engagement.
• Research collaboration – General: Agreement that academic partnerships with China make Australia more competitive internationally increased from 48 percent in 2021 to 58 percent in 2025, a five-year high.
  
  Support for continuing joint research projects rose slightly from 61 percent in 2022 to 63 percent in 2025, following a temporary dip in 2024 (54 percent).
• Research collaboration – Science: Agreement that collaboration between Australian and Chinese scientists benefits Australia rose from 64 percent in 2021 to 72 percent in 2025, with similar  support (73 percent) for maintaining individual research connections. Over the five-year period, views of Australia-China scientific cooperation have remained generally positive, with minor year-to-year variation but an overall upward trajectory.

8. Competition and cooperation

• Regional partnerships to counter China’s influence: Agreement that building closer relationships with Southeast Asian nations is beneficial for countering China’s influence was 68 percent in 2023 
  and 71 percent in both 2024 and 2025.
  
  Support for engagement with Pacific Island nations rose from 74 percent in 2023 to 77 percent in 2025, the highest level recorded in the three-year series.
  
  These results show consistently strong endorsement of regional cooperation, with only minor year-to-year variation.
• Cooperation on global and regional issues: Agreement that working with China on global issues such as climate change and global health is beneficial increased from 69 percent in 2022 to 78 
  percent in 2025 – a nine-point rise and the highest level since data collection began.
  
  Support for regional cooperation on issues such as ending malaria in the Pacific followed a similar path, rising from 69 percent in 2024 to 78 percent in 2025.
  
  The data indicates broadening confidence that collaboration with China on transnational challenges can complement, rather than contradict, strategic competition.
• Cooperation on technology and governance: In 2025, 70 percent agreed that Australia should work with China on developing low-emissions technologies such as green hydrogen and green steel even when political tensions exist.
  
  Sixty percent supported cooperation on international artificial intelligence safety rules and digital governance.
  
  These single-year findings show substantial openness to technical collaboration, accompanied by more caution where governance or security implications are greater.

9. Influences shaping views on China and Australia-China relations

• Most influential group shaping views on China: In 2025, most Australians (55 percent) said their views of China are shaped mainly by the Chinese government, including its leadership and political system.
  
  Smaller shares nominated Australians of Chinese heritage (12 percent), Chinese citizens (nine percent), Chinese companies such as Huawei, TikTok, or Alibaba (five percent), and Chinese state 
  media (two percent). Seventeen percent selected ‘other’. The findings indicate that perceptions are anchored primarily to views of the Chinese government, with other influences playing a secondary and more complementary role.
• Broader sources influencing overall views of China: Traditional media, including newspapers, television and radio, were the most frequently cited influences on Australians’ overall views of 
  China (29 percent).
  
  Personal interactions with people of Chinese heritage (18 percent) followed, then social media (14 percent) and information from friends or family and academic or professional experience (both 13 percent). Travel in China was cited by 11 percent, and two percent selected ‘other’.
  
  Traditional media therefore play a leading role in shaping attitudes, with other informational and interpersonal sources contributing to a more diffuse pattern of influence.
• Information sources on Australia-China relations: When asked which sources they rely on most for news about Australia-China relations, 31 percent of respondents cited public broadcasters such as ABC and SBS.
  
  Nine Entertainment media were selected by 14 percent, international outlets other than Chinese state media by 13 percent, and other Australian commercial outlets such as Seven Network, Network Ten or commercial radio by 13 percent.
  
  News Corp Australia outlets were mentioned by 12 percent, social media by 11 percent, Chinese state media by two percent and Chinese-language media in Australia by one percent. Three percent nominated other outlets.
  
  Public broadcasters were the most commonly relied-on source overall, ahead of commercial and international media, indicating their relatively prominent position in how Australians access information on the bilateral relationship.
• Social media platforms used for information on Australia-China relations: Among respondents who used social media for news on Australia-China relations, Facebook was the most cited platform (49 percent), followed by TikTok (19 percent) and X (formerly Twitter) (16 percent). Smaller shares used Instagram (seven percent), YouTube (three percent), WeChat (three percent) or Reddit (two percent). Three percent named other platforms such as Spotify, Substack, Bluesky, Xiaohongshu (RedNote) and LinkedIn.

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