Global governance with Chinese characteristics?

share_windows This article appeared in Global Policy Journal on July 16 2026.

Whatever you think about the People’s Republic of China, the government’s enthusiasm for issuing seemingly well-intentioned proposals to develop a ‘shared future for humanity’ cannot be doubted. Following the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative, we now have the most ambitious of all: the Global Governance Initiative (GGI).

Given China’s growing political, economic and strategic importance, perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the GGI is that its arrival has been studiously ignored by political leaders and media outlets in the ‘global north’. True, like its forebears, the GGI is not exactly a page turner, but it presents a series of ideas and policy proposals which, were they to be taken seriously and acted upon, might make a real difference to an international order increasingly characterised by avoidable conflicts, and startling levels of inequality and suffering.

In such circumstances, any ideas about problem-solving on a planetary scale ought to be welcome, no matter where they come from. One thing we can be confident about is that creative ideas about our collective future are unlikely to come from the reigning hegemonic power, as the Trump administration is characterised primarily by policy chaos and self-enrichment.

China’s big ideas

Interestingly and encouragingly, China argues that the ‘authority and status’ of the United Nations should be central to developing sustainable and broadly-based forms of global governance, and that the ‘international community’ is already expressing support for the reinvigoration of a more inclusive form of multilateralism. China rather improbably still sees itself as a developing country and consequently the leader of the global south; this is where its ideas are most enthusiastically received.

Given that China has become a major source of investment and development assistance through the roll-out of the green-tinged Belt and Road Initiative, this is perhaps unsurprising. More contentious and less convincing, by contrast, is China’s assertion that the international order can be safeguarded if it is based on international law. Perhaps so, but China’s refusal to recognise the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against it over its maritime dispute with the Philippines is not exactly a ringing endorsement of either the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or the role of an independent umpire.

Likewise, China’s suggestion that the ‘surge’ in global military spending and possible nuclear proliferation should be discouraged is rather undermined by the fact that its own defence spending and capabilities continue to grow. Given that China reserves the right to use force to resolve what it regards as a domestic problem and reunify Taiwan with the mainland, it is hardly surprising that some of its suggestions are met with scepticism. China justifies its actions as a response to the ‘hegemonism and unilateralism’ of what it delicately refers to as ‘certain countries’, and suggests that ramping up its own spending is necessary to maintain strategic stability.

Endorsing the sort of ‘realist’ view of the world that also characterises America’s justification for its ever-expanding defence budget doesn’t seem the most obvious route to peace, harmony or reduced military spending, something Xi Jinping seemed to realise in his recent meeting with Donald Trump in Beijing.

More convincing is the GGI’s claim that ‘some countries erect fences and barriers, pursue decoupling, sever industrial supply chains, and impose unilateral tariffs, disrupting the global economic order’. While it may be the case that the Trump administration is acting like ‘robber barons’, as Dani Rodrik claims, it is not obvious that China is in a position to end such behaviour or provide the sort of collective goods that an integrated global economic system is thought to need.

Indeed, American critics of China’s state-led form of capitalist development argue that the PRC has already transformed the norms and practices that underpin the international economic order: ‘Washington may have forged the open, liberal rules-based order, but China has defined its next phase: protectionism, subsidization, restrictions on foreign investment, and industrial policy.’ 

Even if such claims about China’s influence are exaggerated, the close control the state retains over domestic economic actors and their actions overseas rather undermines the idea that its version of global governance is primarily about fostering ‘a world-leading business environment that is based on market principles, governed by law, and up to international standards’. The US may be intent on weaponizing its own pivotally important place in the global economy, but it is China that is currently trying to offer an alternative and position itself as a champion of multilateralism. 

Given the historically unprecedented success of China’s state-dominated, tightly controlled, nationally-oriented developmental model, it is difficult to imagine the PRC leadership giving up the tools and strategies that underpinned this success in favour of propping un a rules-based, market-oriented economic order that even the US has abandoned.

Should we take China seriously?

Undoubtedly. China ticks all the boxes that distinguish great powers, from military and economic might to an ideological influence over countries that would like to emulate its remarkable success. China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific is largely a consequence of its economic importance and its ability to build ‘coalitions’ of dependent economic and political actors.

At one level the ability to cultivate sympathetic actors in neighbouring states is just what great powers do. Unlike the US, however, China has favoured carrots over sticks in winning local support, and this may prove a more enduring basis for cooperation than kidnapping local leaders or unilaterally starting ill-conceived and illegal wars. Indeed, as America lurches toward an increasingly authoritarian form of domestic and international behaviour, it is no longer clear which of the world’s two great powers offers the more likely path to stability or even democracy.

Indeed, the GGI argues that China’s vision ‘aligns with the growing trend towards greater democracy in international relations and bolsters international confidence in practicing multilateralism’. It is, of course, far from clear whether the international order is becoming more democratic, but China could conceivably match rhetoric with reality and play a useful role in making global governance more inclusive. The proposal to reform the UN so that it is no longer constrained by its anachronistic institutional architecture, especially the Security Council, would be a start.

Getting any great power to match words and deeds is always difficult. One of the things that makes powers ‘great’ is that they have the capacity to ignore rules, much less norms that don’t suit them, and use more coercive levers of power if they choose. The US is currently reminding the world of this possibility, and all of the disastrous consequences that may flow from unilateralism. In such circumstances, perhaps we should take China seriously and urge it to lead by good example. 

Interestingly, Finland’s president, Alexander Stubb, has recently proposed similar ideas to China’s, arguing that reforming the UN and treating the global south with inclusive dignity are important steps on the path to a more stable and equitable future. Clearly, unprecedented problems like climate change cannot be solved without equally unprecedented levels of international cooperation. 

Perhaps Presidents Xi and Stubb could meet to discuss possible modes of cooperation between east and west, north and south, as well as great and middle powers. Somone has to save the world, after all.