PERSPECTIVES | Managing great power rhythms: Assessing the Albanese-Trump meeting

This article appeared in UTS:ACRI's Perspectives on October 21 2025. Perspectives is the commentary series of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS:ACRI), offering research-informed viewpoints on developments and debates in the Australia-China relationship.

The just-concluded October 21 2025 meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and US President Donald Trump delivered two messages pertinent to Australia’s policy with respect to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and for the broader US-PRC balance. 

First, Trump affirmed that AUKUS is proceeding ‘full steam ahead’, providing Australia with some measurable reassurance on doubts stoked by the Pentagon’s recent review of the agreement. Second, the two leaders unveiled a critical minerals framework agreement that commits to coordinating on building mining and processing capability outside the PRC. Also announced, as a complement to the framework agreement, both governments will each provide at least US$1 billion toward an US$8.5 billion pipeline of priority critical minerals projects in Australia and the US over the next six months. 

For Albanese, the timing of the meeting itself was politically delicate. In Australia, he had been under sustained criticism for the delay in securing a meeting with Trump, accused by some of ‘comprehensive mismanagement’ of Trump. Commentators questioned whether he would be able to navigate the mercurial president without embarrassment or loss of leverage. Optics therefore mattered as much as policy substance. By emerging from Washington with both a high-profile minerals deal and an explicit reaffirmation of AUKUS, Albanese can argue that his approach has been politically and diplomatically vindicated, at least for now.

The diplomatic backdrop was complicated by an increasingly familiar flashpoint. Only days earlier, on October 19, a People’s Liberation Army-Air Force (PLA-AF) fighter jet released flares near an Australian surveillance aircraft over the South China Sea, an incident Canberra described as ‘unsafe and unprofessional’. The episode, the latest in a series of such encounters, underscored that regional security risks remain a constant constraint on Australia’s economic and political agenda. In that context, the minerals deal inevitably carries strategic weight. Beijing will likely interpret it less as commercial cooperation than as part of a coordinated effort to blunt its leverage over global supply chains.

The minerals agreement seeks to address a critical vulnerability in the Western industrial ecosystem – the concentration of processing and refining of rare earths and related inputs in the PRC. Japan’s involvement in at least one venture points toward the formation of a broader network of ‘trusted’ suppliers and customers across the Indo-Pacific. Even with fast-tracked approvals, completion will take years. In the near term, the deal provides breathing space for both countries to begin building capacity before system fragility is again tested. 

In the security domain, Trump’s reaffirmation of AUKUS helps calm political anxiety but leaves industrial and logistical challenges unresolved. When asked whether the US would expedite delivery of the submarines promised under AUKUS, Trump replied, ‘We’re doing that’, but declined to offer a timeline, underscoring the gap between rhetorical commitment and operational capacity. US shipyards remain stretched, and in Australia, defence officials acknowledge that workforce shortages, from nuclear engineers to welders, poses the program’s most serious domestic constraint. Unless those bottlenecks are resolved, ‘full steam ahead’ may remain rhetorical.

Notably, Trump did not raise the issue of Australia’s defence spending, a point of contention in recent months after his Defence Secretary urged Canberra to lift outlays to at least 3.5 percent of GDP. The omission may reflect a desire to keep the meeting focused on deliverables rather than demands, or simply a recognition that the alliance currently benefits more from cohesion than confrontation over numbers.

Looking ahead, the prospective meeting between Trump and PRC President Xi Jinping later this month adds another layer of uncertainty to an ever-present variable. A sharp deterioration in US-PRC trade talks could reinforce Canberra’s strategic alignment with Washington but trigger new economic retaliation from Beijing. Conversely, if Trump and Xi strike a temporary bargain, perhaps exchanging tariff relief for concessions in other areas, Australia’s diversification agenda could be briefly deprioritised in Washington. Trump fuelled that uncertainty, telling reporters, ‘I think we’re going to end up having a fantastic deal with China. It’s going to be a great trade deal.’ Either outcome would demonstrate how dependent Canberra’s strategic environment remains on the rhythm of great power bargaining over which it has little control.

The triangular dynamic among Australia, the US and the PRC is therefore entering a more complex phase. For Washington, the minerals deal is an instrument of leverage, reducing exposure to PRC supply disruptions while demonstrating progress on its industrial strategy. For Beijing, it represents an unwelcome but predictable step in a gradual process of decoupling, one it may seek to counter through selective economic or diplomatic pressure. For Australia, the arrangement offers both opportunity and risk: a path toward greater autonomy in critical supply chains but at the cost of heightened short-term exposure. 

This balancing act underscores why relationship management remains a central pillar of statecraft. Albanese’s critics often portray diplomacy as symbolic theatre, but in a context where Australia depends simultaneously on the US security umbrella and PRC markets, tone and timing are assets. The meeting’s cordial tone and tangible outcomes offered a measure of stability in the alliance without antagonising Beijing, enabling Albanese to return home projecting composure and practical resolve.

The coming months will test whether early momentum can be sustained amid financing hurdles, regional flashpoints, and shifting great power dynamics. Policymakers’ task will be to preserve flexibility, building capacity while avoiding entrapment in either superpower’s tactical swings.

The Albanese-Trump meeting emphasised that diplomacy remains the connective tissue of strategy. Albanese managed an unpredictable counterpart and reaffirmed ties with Washington while maintaining space for pragmatic engagement with Beijing. Yet his earlier criticism of Trump’s tariff policy as a ‘form of economic self-harm’ serves as a reminder that goodwill cannot erase underlying differences. Shared democratic values still lend cohesion, but the alliance now rests as much on convergent interests as on sentiment, both of which have shown signs of drift. Sustaining alignment will depend on the practical work of implementation amid an international environment that, as the looming Trump-Xi talks suggest, remains anything but settled.