How Chinese diaspora voters reshape Australian and US politics

This article appeared in the East Asia Forum on July 26 2025.

Both Chinese Australians and Chinese Americans believe their nation’s relationship with China has negatively impacted their personal lives. They report feeling vulnerable to random racist attacks in public and fear being treated as potential agents of a hostile country. Whether this shared sense of political marginalisation shapes their voting decisions in similar ways remains unclear. Exploring how their experiences shape political engagements is both significant and timely.

The influence of Chinese Australian voters was evident in the last two federal elections. In May 2022, a swing to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s centre-left Labor Party in marginal seats with large Chinese Australian populations provided the support needed to win. In 2025 they again played a crucial role in key seats. Labor not only held their seats but also captured a few long-held Liberal seats with substantial Chinese Australian support.

In February 2025, the Liberal Party’s hope of winning back Chinese Australian voters through friendlier public rhetoric on China and the Chinese Australian community unravelled. Then opposition leader Peter Dutton attacked the government’s response to Chinese naval ships circumnavigating Australia.

Meanwhile, Pauline Hanson’s nativist One Nation party advised its voters to preference the Liberals second, a move partially reciprocated by Dutton. Prominent China hawks such as Liberal Senator James Paterson continued to stoke fears of Chinese interference. Senator Jane Hume’s remark about ‘Chinese spies’ proved the final straw, rapidly eroding the Liberals’ standing with Chinese Australian voters. After the election Sussan Ley, the newly elected leader of the Liberal Party, held a roundtable with members of Chinese Australian communities and admitted that ‘we did not get the tone right … [and] needed to change course’.

The so-called Chinese Australian community has never been a monolithic group. Chinese Australians don’t really have enough in common to form a cohesive interest group. Traditionally they favoured conservative parties because of their focus on family values and small business interests. But this pattern changed as geopolitical tension between Australia and China intensified. China’s rise fuelled a ‘China threat’ narrative in the West, shaping how political parties, the media and the public view Beijing’s posture in the world. Western countries, including Australia, have had to balance trade with China against relying on the United States for security.

Chinese diaspora communities in Australia and the United States have faced scrutiny over loyalty. In Australia, the message from Liberal politicians was clear — either become a ‘true Australian’ or remain an object of suspicion. Many Chinese Australian voters became increasingly wary of speaking out, fearing undue scrutiny. But they recognised one tool to express their views — voting.

Surveys of Chinese Australian voters in the last two federal elections suggest they now place greater emphasis on foreign policy than the public in general. Traditionally conservative and pro-business, they increasingly vote primarily on political as well as economic grounds. As their numbers grow, parties can no longer ignore their sentiments. Increasingly aware of their electoral power, they are ready to vote out any party they believe harms their interests.

In past US elections, Chinese American voters have tended to support the Democratic Party more than the Republican Party, though support fell slightly in the 2024 presidential election. Approximately 53 percent supported Kamala Harris while only around 39 percent supported Donald Trump.

Cross-national comparison between Australia and the United States is complicated by several factors. In Australia, both Labor and the conservative Liberal–National coalition have adopted securitisation policies towards China, but Labor has been more successful in managing tensions and avoiding offending Chinese Australian communities.

In the United States, concerned voters may not see much differentiation between the two major parties. Both Republicans, who created the China Initiative, and Democrats advocate policies to contain China’s rise. Plus, the United States has higher levels of socioeconomic inequality and political polarisation. In countries with high levels of socioeconomic inequality and political polarisation, voters may prioritise economic survival over political and foreign policy considerations.

Structural differences between the two countries also play a role. Chinese Australians comprise approximately 5.5 percent of Australia’s population, compared with 1.6 percent of the US population. Compulsory voting in Australia ensures turnout close to 100 percent among Chinese Australians. By contrast, voluntary voting in the United States means that if Chinese Americans are more or less motivated to vote than other citizens, their turnout might be very different from their share of the population.

This difference in voting systems likely exaggerates the impact of population size on electoral participation. Compulsory voting, compared with voluntary voting, boosts political participation and encourages broader representation across different socioeconomic, ethnic and age groups. As a result, Chinese Australians seem likely to have more impact on electoral outcomes than their US counterparts.

How the government is formed may also shape the relative power of Chinese voters. In Australia, the prime minister is chosen by the party that wins enough seats in the House of Representatives to form government. This makes electorates with high numbers of minority voters crucial, especially under preferential voting system when neither major party can command an outright majority. By contrast, ethnic minority voters in the United States can have an impact on national outcomes, but only if sufficient numbers of them live in a battleground state or a swing district.

Both Australia and the United States are favoured destinations for migrants of Chinese origin while maintaining complex relationships with China. These shared concerns suggest common challenges faced among Chinese diaspora communities, yet differences in political systems and social contexts may lead to distinct voting behaviours. This is an important and complex topic worthy of future research.