As Chinese-Australian politicians seize an anti-Hanson moment, some of their voters support her. Understanding why is complex

share_windows This article appeared in Crikey on July 2 2026.

In response to Pauline Hanson’s National Press Club speech, first-generation migrant Ben Wang published an open letter in his local newspaper, issuing this challenge to the One Nation leader: “Senator, I formally challenge you to an open, public debate. Let’s stand before the Australian people and talk about the facts. Are you ready?”

Wang felt personally affronted by Hanson’s remarks, which targeted Mandarin as a “growing language problem” in Australia, demanded a “monocultural” country, and labelled China as a “real big concern”. Speaking to Crikey, he says he came to Australia in 1997 as an IT graduate and built a career in the finance sector. He raised his son to become a doctor, who was now working in the ICU unit of St George Hospital. In his open letter, he said, “We don’t come here to take; we come to build, to innovate, and to contribute.”

But Wang is also an independent councillor for Southern Sydney’s Hurstville Ward, which, in 1996, Hanson singled out as an example of Australia being “swamped by Asians”. Today, approximately 47.1% of Hurstville has Chinese ancestry, and the area has considerable overlap with the broader Georges River region. It is one of the most culturally concentrated suburbs in Australia, with mainland China being the most common birthplace. It is clear, from Wang’s open letter, that he also wanted to project himself as a spokesperson for his electorate.

Other Chinese-Australian politicians are also seizing the moment to get their political messages across. Pierre Yang, a Labor MLC and parliamentary secretary in Western Australia, released a short video on WeChat. Speaking Mandarin, he challenged the widely used translation for “One Nation” — “yi guo dang” (literally “one nation party”) — saying that it should be translated as “yi zu tang” (“one tribe party”). Tribalism is more accurate, he argued, given Hanson’s politics are tribal and underscored by “discriminatory” and “exclusionary” politics.

Jason Li, a Labor MP in the NSW seat of Strathfield, also lost no time in voicing his strong condemnation of Hanson. Speaking in Mandarin, he reminded people of Hanson 1.0, and the fact that he became one of the founders of the Unity Party in 1997 to counter the One Nation leader’s rise. Li’s recent statements about Hanson have been widely circulated on WeChat and RedNote, a Chinese social networking app. His federal Labor colleague, MP for Reid Sally Sitou, also took to Chinese social media to warn her constituency of the dangers of One Nation.

Some Chinese-Australian community organisations have similarly issued statements and open letters, pledging their support for multiculturalism and criticising Hanson’s divisive politics. Individuals have written letters to editors in newspapers expressing their grave concerns for their children’s future.

But One Nation’s level of support among Chinese-Australians is still considerable. Among the more than 2,000 readers who have so far participated in an online poll conducted by the popular digital Chinese-language media outlet Sydney Today, 4.2% say “I’ve always been a loyal fan of Hanson”, while 10.4% say “I used to oppose Hanson, but I’ve recently changed my mind”. Another 9% say “I support Hanson only because I’m disappointed with the major parties.”

Nevertheless, roughly 66% say “I’ve never supported Hanson, nor will I ever do so in the future”, and 18.6% say they’re not sure but that they’re against racial prejudice. These figures reveal that the political cleavages in the Mandarin-speaking community more or less mirror the wider public.

Responses to Hanson’s speech on Chinese-language social media were swift, passionate and by no means monolithic. Only a few Australia-based WeChat groups have tended to focus on Australian politics, but since the One Nation leader’s Press Club speech, people from the left, right and centre have emerged with their two cents. Some debates in these WeChat groups are calm and respectful; others are emotional, even vitriolic.

To those outside this hyphenated community, it may be baffling why some Chinese-Australians still support Hanson, despite her long record of anti-Asian and anti-Chinese rhetoric.

A few explanations are worth considering.

Research shows that, traditionally speaking, many Chinese-Australians tend to vote conservatively. Even though recent Sinophobia has pushed some of them towards Labor in recent elections, many with socially conservative values find it hard to see Labor as their permanent political home.

Hanson’s remarks about Muslims and First Nations peoples, her staunch criticism of “mass migration”, and particularly her pro-business, anti-worker policies may resonate with some Chinese-Australians who hold similar views. This is despite the fact that they themselves may have benefited from a more open migration policy.

This tells us that, in multicultural polities, ethnic identity is often only one factor in shaping political allegiances. Issues such as frustration with the major parties, immigration, law and order, cost-of-living pressures and conservative — even right-wing — social values can prove more decisive than negative rhetoric directed at one’s own community. There are also some young Chinese-Australians who migrated in the past decade and aren’t haunted by the memory of “Hanson 1.0” and her famous “swamped by Asians” remark.

Further, with Hanson having recently shifted her rhetoric of exclusion to Muslims, some Chinese-Australians may believe her hostility no longer applies to them. It seems some Chinese-Australians want to cling to this illusion, even though Hanson recently singled out Mandarin and Arabic spoken in the home as examples of the undesirability of multiculturalism. One RedNote commentator found this perception risible, warning, “Once she’s sorted out the Muslims, she’ll come back for you. Just you wait.”

For some, it may be a case of wanting to distance themselves from a racially stigmatised group. After all, much research has established that racial minorities sometimes internalise or reproduce dominant racial hierarchies (often structured around whiteness), seeing themselves both through their own eyes and through the lens of a dominant white society. Responding to a Hanson supporter on RedNote who embodies this attitude, someone said sardonically, “I guess you’re fancying yourself as a white person.”

How these political differences will translate into voting preferences is uncertain. But it is clear that Pauline Hanson’s speech has brought forth a moment of reckoning: Chinese-Australians are forced to think long and hard about who they are (Chinese, Australians, or Chinese-Australians), where they feel a sense of belonging (to China or Australia, or both), whether to send their kids to Sunday school to learn Chinese, and how to position themselves vis-à-vis the wider Australian public.

They must also decide where they stand in relation to First Nations peoples and other “non-white” migrant communities who incur Hanson’s disapproval — some of whom have also been subject to prejudice from some Chinese-Australians. Equally, Chinese-Australians must decide how to position themselves in relation to Australian Muslims, particularly since the Chinese diaspora itself has always included Hui people who are by definition Muslims.