What national conservatism and Trump’s America mean for Australia’s relationship with China

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Ms Amy Ma:

Good afternoon, members of the audience and special guests. Before we begin the proceedings and on behalf of all those present, I would like to acknowledge that this webinar is hosted on the lands of the Gadigal People of the Eora Nation. I would also like to pay respects to the Elders past, present, and emerging, acknowledging them as the traditional custodians of knowledge for this land.

This session will now be recorded. We will record, audio, screen share, and our presenters. We will not be recording any video or audio input from the audience. Welcome to all, students, staff, and all friends of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney.

My name is Amy Ma and I'm the Events and Communications Officer at UTS:ACRI. UTS:ACRI is an independent, non-partisan research institute established in 2014 by the University of Technology Sydney. UTS:ACRI is Australia's first and only research institute devoted to studying the Australia-China bilateral relationship. UTS seeks to inform Australia's engagement with China through research, analysis and dialogue grounded in scholarly rigor. More details are available on UTS.edu.au/ACRI.

Today, UTS:ACRI hosts a webinar featuring Mr. Dan Ryan, Executive Director of the National Conservative Institute of Australia. He will detail the origins, influence and future impact of national conservatism and what this means for Australia's relationship with China.

UTS:ACRI Director, Professor James Laurenceson will be moderating this discussion. Audience questions are welcome at the end, so please remember to submit your questions using the Q&A tab along the bottom panel of this webinar.

Now, a little bit about our speaker. Dan Ryan is the executive director of the National Conservative Institute of Australia. He's a commercial and technology lawyer with over 20 years of high level advisory and transactional experience. He has worked as general consult for technology companies based across the globe and has particular expertise in China and tech in the Asian region. He speaks Mandarin and is a former board member of the Australia-China Council.

Our moderator for today's discussion is Professor James Laurenceson, Director of UTS:ACRI. His research interests relate to the Chinese economy and the Australia-China economic and broader relationship. He has previously held appointments at the University of Queensland and Shandong University. His academic research has been published in leading scholarly journals, including China Economic Review, China Economic Journal, and Australian Journal of International Affairs. I will now hand it over to Professor James Laurenceson to begin today's discussion.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Thanks very much, Amy. Look, I'm delighted to be hosting today's webinar. I think the topic in the terrain we're going to be covering today is critically important for Australia. But I've got to admit, in some ways, ACRI is not an obvious host for a good chunk of the train that will be traversing today. The mission of ACRI, as Amy just said, was to inform Australia's engagement with China. And look, we'll certainly be getting to that. And our gust today certainly has plenty of experience and expertise relating to China. But before moving to that, we'll be spending a fair amount of time talking about the US, Australia's security ally and our most important strategic partner.

When I was preparing for today's webinar, it came as somewhat as a surprise, to be honest, just how little attention other US-orientated Australian University research centers and think tanks, the United States Studies Centre, the Lowy Institute, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and so on, have devoted to today's topic previously.

Earlier this month, I published an article in Asia Policy, the Journal of the National Bureau of Asian Research about Australia's strategic objectives and challenges related to China. One of the points I made is that Australian perceptions of US reliability as a security ally and strategic presence in Asia has long animated Australia's thinking about relations with China. And it seems to me that there's significant political changes afoot in the US that could impact its foreign policy positions. And I'm just not confident that, that is being digested in the Australian public right now. Dan, I can see you've got your hand up. Let me just see.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Can you hear me now? Okay, good. Let's try that now.

Professor James Laurenceson:

You can hear me now, Dan?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Unfortunately. Yeah, sorry.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Oh, great.

Mr Dan Ryan:

[inaudible 00:04:50] join this entirely, but I do ... If you just want to repeat and I'll respond to that if you don't mind.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Sure. My apologies for that, Dan. Sorry about that. Okay, look, let's get this back on track.

So Dan, I was just overviewing to our audience how I was surprised when preparing for this webinar that other more US-orientated think tanks and university researchers in Australia such as the United States Studies Centre, the Lowy Institute and so on, had little attention that devoted to this topic before. And that's surprising because I think Australia's relationship with the United States obviously has critical implications for our relationship with China. And so that's why I'm delighted to be hosting you today.

Look, let's quickly get into our discussion. Before I do that, let me give our audience today one data point by way of introduction. In September, the United States Studies Centre hosted the Sydney International Strategy Forum 2025. And when I looked at the speakers, I was struck that it appeared to me to be a cavalcade never Trump Republicans and Biden administration officials. I'm sure they're nice people, but the point for me is that those people held no sway in Washington today.

And to punctuate that reality, when Kirk Campbell, the US Deputy Secretary of State in the Biden administration gave an address at the Australian National Press Club in Canberra on the same visit, no one from the US Embassy actually bothered to attend. Pretty striking observation. And with that, let's get to today's discussion.

Dan, it's fairly commonplace, I think, in Australian commentary to portray the second Trump administration as quite chaotic. And the president himself is crudely transactional and inclined to make decisions based on the last person that he spoke to. I'm sure you've heard those lines before, but my first question for you, Dan, is that how you see the second Trump presidency? Or do you see something far more coherent? Over to you.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, it's just such a facile analysis. I mean, in the 1980s, we talked about Reaganism, right? But it wasn't as though he cooked up the philosophy which guided the presidency at that time himself. There was a coherent philosophy which undergirded it. Similarly, it's quite clear that the Trump administration is guided by intellectual framework, which many people have referred to as national conservatism.

It differs from the type of conservatism that's been associated with the Republican Party in recent times, and indeed the center right in Australia as well, which is why it's confused people on both the political right and left. But it's part of a long-standing respectable, although somewhat forgotten intellectual tradition. And essentially, the three areas where it's different or it marks a clear departure are trade, immigration and foreign policy.

On trade, it considered open borders free trade as essentially utopian. It stresses the need for a policy which ensures that nations have their own industrial base, both for national security reasons, but also for broader economic and social reasons.

On foreign policy, it stresses realism. It's hostile to neoconservatism, the forever wars, the reckless evangelicalism of the George W. Bush era, which wanted to turn the Middle East into Sunni democracies. It thinks that American's interests and the conflicts that it's involved in should only be those where their vital interests are at stake and narrowly defined.

And finally, on immigration, it believes that mass immigration poses a serious problem to Western nations. They need to get it under control to ensure it serves the goals of the host nations, but also more fundamentally that America or indeed any nation is not simply an idea, as JD Vance said in his acceptance speech for the vice presidency. That there needs to be a focus on recreating a common united people with a love of a shared past and a common future.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Okay, Dan, so you've just given us the three pillars of national conservative. Trade, foreign policy and immigration. So I guess that leads to my next question. When you look at the second Trump administration, look, any political party leading a country is not necessarily a pure representation of its founding philosophy. I think you could say that about the Australian Labor Party or even the Chinese Communist Party, dare I say.

So my second question for you is, when you look at the second Trump administration, how prominently, I guess, do those three pillars feature in that administration? And there are other significant parts of the Trump administration's policy agenda that aren't so neatly wedded to national conservatism.

Mr Dan Ryan:

I don't know. I think you can definitely recognize those three features as remaining core. Commentators will say things like, "Oh, he abandoned tariffs or adjust them here in particular ways." But there's been no concession that we're returning to the open borders era of George W. Bush, circa 2000, right? There's adjustments that need to be made. There are particular cases where there's nuance that is involved, but there's no fundamental change.

Similarly, on foreign policy, there can be debates about whether bombing Iran was a good or a bad thing or America in the Middle East, but they're not advocating for turning these nations into Jeffersonian democracies, right? Trump goes to Riyadh, and it's much more of a kind of realist perspective that he brings.

Likewise on immigration, there are big debates within this new spectrum about precisely how it should be done. Again, it's not the age of George W. Bush or even Reagan, where they talk about in very gauzy terms, family values don't stop at the Rio Grande or Jeb Bush talking about illegal immigration being an act of love. That's dead as a dodo.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Okay. So for you, these are pretty stable and pretty prominent parts of the second Trump administration's agenda. So I guess my next question, Dan, is if we've got the second Trump administration firmly guided by this national Conservatist ideology, what comes next?

And I guess the background to that is when I listen to commentary from Australia's strategic elite, I think there still remains a fairly high degree of confidence that after Trump, we're going to, "Go back to normal." Suddenly we'll be talking about allies and partners again in foreign policy. So my question to you, Dan, is what legs do you think national conservatism has apart from Donald Trump, the person?

And a different way of putting that would be, say in January 2029, we have an incoming JD Vance Republican administration. In your view, do you think that would look radically different to the second Trump administration, or they would both be guided by those three pillars of national conservatism?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, the three pillars have been there since the escalator speech when he came down. I was just reading it the other day. They're all there from the go get. For example, he doesn't talk about climate change or anything in that speech in a way that sometimes the right in Australia assume Trump is more heavily associated with it. It's trade, immigration, foreign policy, and a few little extra things like of that era, like Obamacare.

And if anything, the whole policy framework has become a lot richer and deeper and more coherent. I mean, JD Vance and Marco Rubio famously were very hostile to Trump initially, and now they're some of his most strongest and articulate proponents and defenders, and they are the future of the presumptive future leaders of the Republican Party.

So no, it's become more sort of locked in than it was, I think. And there's always nuance to these things. There's conferences that are held, people can argue the merits on different angles precisely. How should a more realist trade policy look like with respect to a particular partner? How should adjustments be made? That's all fine, but it doesn't proceed according to the previous assumptions that existed, that the goal that we almost worked towards is an open borders, free trade regime with every country on the planet essentially, which is what they dreamed of back in the day.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. So you mentioned Vance and Rubio, that's interesting. So you're quite convinced that those two voices, Vance and Rubio, they've actually become more strongly convinced by this ideology. So they're just not short-term appeasing Trump, and then they're going to change in a few years. You think they're actually on board with this ideology?

Mr Dan Ryan:

I always say read Marco Rubio's ... Well, read JD Vance's speeches. He's always hitting the right notes. But Marco Rubio in his Senate confirmation speech to be Secretary of State, he just lays it out explicitly and he talks in a very different way to the way he was when he was a candidate against Trump back in the day. So it's not going away.

I think there's a lot of wishful thinking that it would go away back in 2016 when Trump got elected and then it would go away again. And we've had now 10 years plus of it. It's time to start engaging with it and recognize this is going to ... I mean, there's been a bipartisan commitment now in the United States for tariffs on China, right? It's not just a Trump thing. The Democrats have now realized this is politically popular and see a logic in it. They can argue about particular adjustments here and there. That's not moving anywhere anytime soon I think.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, and not only has it been around for 10 years, now we're talking about the next two most obvious leaders of the Republican Party. They're locking in behind it as well. So, yeah, it doesn't seem to have a neat end date. If anything, it just seems to be growing in prominence. So, Dan, that very nicely leads to my next question, and I think you've touched on this already, but I want to draw you out very explicitly. To what extent do you see Australia, and when I say Australia, to be honest, I mean, more the elite. So, I mean, the Australian government, the opposition, university, commentators, think tankers. To what extent do you see them digesting this shift in US politics?

I mean, to put my cards on the table, and I did it in the introduction, although I know you couldn't hear that. But one of the things I said was, in my view, Australia doesn't seem to be adjusting or digesting to this new ideology, political ideology in the US very well at all. But that's me. What's your take, Dan?

Mr Dan Ryan:

I just don't think the political artists in Australia have wrapped their head around it, or properly engaged with National Conservativism. I mean, it's starting to bob up as a term which is used more, but they haven't really properly thought through because at some level, I think it's illegitimate or some sort of, I don't know, moral failing or intellectual bogus sort of thing that's been promoted by a con man from New York. I mean, that's the attitude.

So, when I was in Washington in September for the International NatCon Conference, or not only there were senior members of the administration there, the cabinet ministers were walking around and chatting with them and the rest of it, there were senior staff as the Australian embassy was 15 minutes walked down the road. I was the only Australian there. No political attache or anyone else was there. And I was just thinking this is like if you want to get context or understand it and think about how this might impact on Australia, there should have been someone there.

And I watched on the right Australian opinion page, I think, and Sky News commentators, I still think live in the Howard era, they wish that's what they want to go back to. They support Trump to the extent he promotes things that like a Jeb Bush would've been in favor of cutting taxes and this that and the other. But anytime they venture into the true NatCon stuff, they're inherently resistant to it. Andrew Hasty, I think has a much more of a sense of it. At least he recognizes it's something worth engaging with. He has quite good contacts in the United States, which I think is why he's more tapped into it.

On the left, I think there's just this repulsion about Trump, the figure. He's not to their taste, I fully get it, but again, it just inhibits their intellectual engagement with the underlying policy framework. There are a couple... I mean the John Curtin Center, Nick Dyrenfurth had an article the other day which talked about Andrew Hasty and why he's popular. And he did make mention to things like Blue Labour and the Red Tories, which is a UK national conservative flavor movement that arose a few years back. So, those guys get it to a certain extent. But yeah, no, I wait in vain.

I think it will hit these brain stores eventually, but because it's really quite bizarre how blinkered they are and how they simply, it's just not worth discussing or not worth engaging with or it's an illegitimate tradition. And sorry guys, you can't wish it away.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, well I agree. That's why I'm very happy to be hosting today's webinar. So, Dan, just to follow up on that, so for you, Andrew Hasty would probably be the fairly senior Australian political figure that you would think is most... On the right, when we talk about the National Party One Nation and so on, do you see any other voices there that you think get it?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Yeah, look, I don't speak for Andrew Hasty obviously.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Sure.

Mr Dan Ryan:

He has his own views on different things and they're probably different in many different areas. Look, I think he's obviously the most thoughtful, incredible guy who understands that the new right or something needs to happen change from the Howard era. I mean, he made that famous comment that the dog did textbooks of Hayek. He talked about being a nation that doesn't make flat whites, just flat whites. I mean, that gives a sense that we need to have it be a nation with a bit more of a substantial industrial base than we do now. So, at least in sentiments, he is moving there.

And again, I'm not putting words in his mouth, but given his experience being a soldier in the Middle East, he shares I think the worldview of many of the senior people in the White House who were also Middle East War veterans like JD Vance, Tulsi Gabbard, Jameson Greer, who's the US trade representative, Pete Hegseth. I mean, those guys similar age, similar experience, and also very similar view with respect to the George W. Bush era. They're actively hostile to it, and that's different to Howard era ministers talk.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Indeed.

Mr Dan Ryan:

There's quite a big divide there. Yeah.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, okay. Look, Dan, let's start moving to the topic of conversation to China. Now, of course, this is something that you are very comfortable with, given your own background. And now you've got the National Conservatism element as well, you really are the perfect person to put this question too. My last question was about how you thought Australia is digesting these ideological shifts in the US. So, can I ask you, how do you think China's digesting it, or maybe to get a bit speculative, do you think people in Beijing and Zhongnanhai will be looking upon this shift in a positive or a negative light?

Mr Dan Ryan:

I think I mean just as a preamble, I always thought that China kind takes up different waves from the US more than's appreciated. Back in 2000, Thomas Friedman was talking about the China dream in one of his columns, and then Beijing started to talk about the China dream. Then when Trump first got in with his tweets and the rest of it, that spurred a bit of that so-called wolf warrior diplomacy. They were trying to ape what the US was doing. And now, I mean, in some ways, China was a bit national conservative in its approach to industry policy for a lot long period of time, but I don't think they find it an illegitimate policy framework.

I think they find it very familiar, because that's what they have been doing for a period of time. It's the legacy liberal, which finds it so objectionable in some ways. I also think Beijing, again, I think they're actually more comfortable than most people assume with the Trump administration because the previous, let's call it the George W. Bush, always harbored dreams of regime change and turning Beijing into a Jeffersonian democracy, whereas that doesn't exist to the same extent with the Trump administration, and I think Beijing knows it.

So, at least there's the potential to reach a much more, I don't know, enduring modus vivendi between Beijing and Washington, because both recognize they're acting in their national interests, but they both think that's fair play in a way.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Gosh, talk about irony. I mean, here we are in Australia, a staunch US security ally, but in fact, we may be the ones struggling to accept and recognize this political ideology compared with China. And Dan as you were going through those three points, I haven't heard it put like that before, but you're absolutely right. Industrial policy, well, Beijing's pretty comfortable with that, foreign policy not being engaged in regime change and so on. Yep, Beijing tick immigration, less rather than more, tick. So, in fact, I mean clearly I'm not saying that Chinese Communist Party is National Conservatism, but there are elements that they both can recognize as being legitimate.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Yeah, yeah. No, I think that's fair. I mean, whereas in Australia, JD Vance had that famous line that he said, "The worst possible foreign policy is for China to make all our stuff and to go to war with China." And in Australia, we have a trade agreement which allows a hundred percent of Chinese manufactured goods to come in duty free. But at the same time, on the right, there's a certain bolshiness which wants to... we're looming up to this great conflict, and that's incoherent. If you really do think that gearing up to this great war with China, then you need to change your trade agreement. And if you don't, then you need to have a balance on both fronts.

Again, still repeating myself, but we're still operating in that kind of as though it's 2000.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, no, that's great, Dan, and that's why I think it's so important that we're having this discussion today. Look, I've got a few more questions for Dan and I'm going to keep going through those, but I just want to remind our audience today, jump in with your questions. You'll see the Q and A tab at the bottom of your screen. Don't be shy, I think I can speak for Dan and say he's happy to take any questions. So, put those in there. But while those questions are rolling in, Dan, now I really want to shift the discussion to the impact of National Conservatism on Australia's relationship with China.

I thought one way we could do this, if you don't mind, is I might just run through a series of issues and just get your reaction to each of them from a national conservative perspective. Okay. Here's the first one. What does National Conservatism mean for the future of US Support for multilateral institutions like the UN and the World Trade Organization? And just before you answer that, I did note Penny Wong gave a pretty important speech a few days where she, again, double triple down on the importance of the multilateral rules based order for Australia's interests. So, where's our US security ally going to head on this?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, I think let's take them each in turn, the WTO, that's obviously going to be far less significant going forward. It might still be useful for parties as a dispute resolution forum that don't involve the US, but it's not going to be relevant for anything US related really. The UN, I mean, it seems to be a lot less prominent than it once was. I mean, again, it's not going to be something which the US is going to be particularly bound by, nor probably China. Look, it depends on the way you view the world, but so many of these organizations were ultimately underwritten by a powerful US.

So, from my perspective at least, it's important the US does remain strong because it does underwrite global security, but they're not going to be organizations whose star is rising, put it that way going forward. Australia can still make those arguments. It's good to mouth the platitudes, I suppose, but just recognize where real power lies in the global system.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. And there might be other countries in the region that Australia might be able to build some coalitions around those multilateral institutions. But the US is under the national conserve... And to be fair, we should say that all of this is just about National Conservatism, right? I mean, the World Trade Organization was defunct from a US perspective during the Biden administration as well, but your view under National Conservatism, that trend will remain very strong.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Yeah, I mean it's a realist perspective on foreign policy which is bringing to it. And I mean, again, you might wish it otherwise, but you've just got to recognize the world as it is, not sure as you want it to be.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Okay, okay. I think there'll be a lot of sad faces in Canberra right now, but we better face up to the real world. Okay, Dan, here's the second one, and just a reminder, keep those questions coming in. I think this is a big one, Dan. What does National Conservatism mean for the US continuing to see the Asia Pacific as opposed to the western Hemisphere as a priority strategic theater? Is the Asia Pacific going to be a theater, where you think Washington is still going to consider it worthwhile for US blood and treasure to potentially be spilled? Or do you think it'll really home back to the Western Hemisphere?

Mr Dan Ryan:

By Western Hemisphere, do you mean Europe or North and South America?

Professor James Laurenceson:

I mean the US homeland is really what I'm talking about, sort of the west, yeah.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Okay. So, look, I mean the US still remains overly focused I think from Europe and the Middle East, right? There's been a lot of talks since the days of Obama's pivot to Asia about recalibrating. That hasn't happened to the extent. Now, I know the national conservative perspective would wish. There's a frustration about being bogged down in Ukraine and other parts of the Middle East. So, look, I think the US NatCon stuff, again, in foreign policy terms, it's realist, so it recognizes China as a great power, and it thinks that that's where, to the extent that threats exist, that's what needs to be focused on. But it's not focused on this sort of revolutionary sort of movement to bring democracy to the ends of the earth, which I think was George Bush's second inaugural, right? That's not the perspective.

So it's a more narrow focus, like I said, on vital interests, narrowly defined. And they recognize China as certainly a great power or potential great power, and are going to be focused on that. So yeah, I think the movement would want a move away from these conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and much more of a focus on Asia. But it doesn't mean that they're keen in the same way that the previous era Republicans were about toppling Xi Jinping from power or bringing democracy to China in that way.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Right. So just to get very specific, so if for example, and sorry, everyone does this I know, but so if there was some conflict in the Taiwan Strait for example, we certainly shouldn't count the US out of that conflict, based on national conservatism. So for your view, the realism is still there.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Absolutely.

Professor James Laurenceson:

But that could still be seen as a threat to US vital interests from a national conservative perspective.

Mr Dan Ryan:

A hundred percent, yeah. And it would depend on this exact circumstance at the time. But I think there are different schools of thought about in realism, as you're probably well aware, but there would certainly be a strong perspective that that would be a serious risk to US power and they'll consider it on its merits. I mean, I don't think Taiwan should bank on that sort of emotional tie that the US might have had as a sort of defender of democracy, but I still think it's in the US interest to have Taiwan as an ally, and I think that they don't want to reduce their power, so therefore they would support that.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. So when you were at the NatCon 2025 conference, you mentioned you were there just a couple of months ago, did you raise these sorts of scenarios with the colleagues that you met over there?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, there was a lot of discussion about the Middle East, 'cause that was pretty hot at the time. And there was some quite vigorous debates regarding the strike on Iran, right? Because there were different... there's different perspectives, both sort of firmly put and reasonably put, but that was the issue of the moment. So when things hot up, suddenly the cameras go in one direction and no one really talks about the Taiwan China stuff as much anymore.

But I think, look, again like I said, there would be different realist perspectives on precisely what America's role should be in the event of a conflict in Taiwan, and how it arose would influence the American response. But again, it's not going to be this evangelical, we're doing it because we're in this cold war with Beijing. I don't think that's the [inaudible 00:33:28] of the way they view the lay of the land.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Okay, great. Okay, so it's all about power, right? And I guess, perhaps that's the difference because before there would've been that power lens, but there also would've been that ideological lens, as you said, in previous Republican administrations.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, I mean, again, there's always caveats to these things to [inaudible 00:33:48]-

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, sure.

Mr Dan Ryan:

... as well. 'Cause I do think as part of it there's still a element of the support for the Republicans and Trump in the United States, which is that a older demographic but still sort of-

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yes, got it.

Mr Dan Ryan:

... Whose heart still sings for that sort of freedom everywhere type of stuff. So there may well be situations where Trump and the administration talks up a particular dissident in China and makes waves, and they would do it in a good-natured sort of way, but it's just a different character to what existed in the '90s. You just have to recognize that. Sometimes people see these little snippets that make them think we've returned to normal programming and we haven't.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Perhaps that's the key lesson we need to get out of today's webinar. Dan, let me just run through two other quick scenarios and I see we've got some questions coming in now, so keep those coming in. But I do want to make sure I put those questions to you. So just two more from me. How about this scenario? What does national conservatism mean for Washington's commitment to AUKUS as an exercise in collective deterrence against China becoming more regionally, militarily aggressive?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Again, I think they view it through a much more strict realist lens. So they're not going to... It makes sense for them to have it, it augments their kind of power in the Asia Pacific region. It makes sense for us, and there is support and rhetorical support and I think genuine support for that in Washington, that arrangement. Also, Washington does get a pretty good deal out of AUKUS. I mean, we are paying a lot of money. They are to produce subs. So it's, in financial terms, a net win for them. But we do... they are our security guarantor, so we need them as well.

So again, I don't know whether there's going to be in practice that much change. It's just worth recognizing the new perspective that is being brought to these issues because when different circumstances arise, then you know what kind of reaction they will be more receptive to and ones that they won't be.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, I've noticed the Australian discussion of AUKUS over the last six months. There has been sort of this view that Trump might not be so attached to it. But your message today is that from a realist perspective that is prominent in national conservatism, actually AUKUS aligns pretty well with that.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, there was a review, as you know, Elbridge Colby was reviewing it. He does bring a much more different perspective to lots of different foreign conflicts that the US has been involved with. Again, he's of that generation that grew up during the forever wars in the Middle East sort of democracy crusade, so is much more skeptical about the advantages, that America getting involved in conflicts here, there and everywhere, brings. Because they don't believe that anymore, and they're probably right, I agree with them, that it wasn't productive or popular amongst the public in the US. So it's not going to happen.

But I always think with AUKUS it's not so much whether we should have an alliance with the US. It's really a question of the materiel, military materiel involved and what the deal constitutes. And you can have reasonable arguments about whether the subs are the best use of the money and whether we should be better off spending on something else or whether it can be rejigged in a particular way. It's not a question about whether we should have an alliance with the US, it's the nature and scope of that alliance.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Okay. Okay. Final one from me, Dan, then we're going to Q&A from the audience. Tell me what national conservatism means for US tolerance of Australia relying on and continuing to talk up China as its major trading partner? Is that relevant or is that something that national conservatism would have a particular view on?

Mr Dan Ryan:

I think, my discussions with... I mean, Michael Lind is a name sort of economist who has been for a long time pushing for a more realist trade policy in the US. He thinks it's unsustainable. I mean, I think there were statements even during the Obama era that we had to cut our iron ore exports to China or something. So that's unrealistic and obviously that would be very detrimental to us.

But I would strongly suggest the US... They then should to be informed about because they don't think about us all that often to be honest, so they do need to... And yet there's no obvious solution, because we can't simply send iron ore across the Pacific and through the Panama Canal up the Mississippi to be turned into steel in the industrial Midwest, the economics of it doesn't quite work. But it is an historically unprecedented situation for a nation to have such a strong reliance on one country for its economic needs, China, and then another, rely wholeheartedly on another great power for its strategic needs. I can't readily think, I put this to lots of different people, Andrew Hastie, and no one can quite think of one which works the same way. Some of the East Asian countries arguably, but they're a different kettle of fish as well.

So it's worked for a while, but there does need to be, I think, a rejigging of our arrangements, that the US as it builds up, rebuilds, its industrial base, that we are the raw material and other supply, but also that we rebuild our industrial base, 'cause as we discussed offline, we are even by our peer standards incredibly de-industrialized. I mean, we have less than 5% and arguably going down to 3% with our smelters hanging on by a thread. Nations... and this is a big NatCon theme, nations need to be able to produce things. They're not just an economic zone, they have industrial interests. Interests that aren't simply... that go beyond simply lovely liberal maxims about... That in an ideal world, it would be less economically efficient to do it that way. Well, we don't live in an ideal world, and we never will.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Sure. Yeah. So national conservatism would be skeptical of the position Australia is in, I guess, but does that mean that they would put active pressure on Australia to curtail that relationship, or would they just think we're stupid and silly for getting ourselves in that position?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, if Australia was to make some sort of dramatic decision and say, "We don't care about critical minerals, we're just going to keep selling them to China completely," then I think that would create some bad blood in the US, if they were. And I think there at least needs to be a plan for a rejigging. Because if you're sending all your iron ore to China, and if there was a conflict, ultimately... Robert Menzies still cop flack for selling pig iron to Japan back in the day, right? How would it be viewed from Ohio if Australia was responsible and had been responsible in the lead up to a great conflict in sending the key components, raw materials that China was relying on to support that conflict. That's how it would look.

So this needs to be a rejigging. It needs to be done thoughtfully in a mature way. I think we need to rejig our arrangements with China. We do need to. But it doesn't need to be done in a hostile way with Churchillian statements, and the rest of it, just has to be done in a kind of adult way if that makes [inaudible 00:42:17]-

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, sure.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Because it's not great for us and it doesn't make sense in the new scheme of things.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yep. Okay. Dan, we've got a bunch of questions from the audience. So let me put these to you. If you can try and keep your answers as brief as you can, 'cause there are a lot of, I do want to make sure we get through them all. So the first question is, what do you mean... I think the person is talking to you, but he could also be talking to me... What do you mean when you say China and the US recognize each other's policy as legitimate?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, Beijing has been practicing an industrial policy, whereas in the past 30 years, industrial policy has been seen as out of date in the US. So I think Beijing sees that and goes, "Okay, they're doing it. Probably it would've been beneficial for us if they didn't, but they are, and it's not something completely out of the park that we have never heard of before."

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, right.

Mr Dan Ryan:

So that's kind of what I mean. Washington taking a 10% stake in Intel. Well, the Chinese government also takes stakes in its companies. So that's the type of thing that they would, I think, recognize.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yep. Okay. Got it. All right, next question. This is a good one, this actually, maybe you might want to spend a couple of minutes on this. What kind of Australian defense policy best suits a national conservative lens? So if Australia was to head down this route, and actually I do have a question, I'm not sure if I'll get to it, but that was something I wanted to ask about as well. So let me put that question to you in that form. What Australian defense policy do you think would best suit a national conservative lens if Australia goes down that route?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Well, I mean, it's sort of a very, very big question. But it has to be one where we have an industrial base to support our defense industries. Because a national conservative perspective or a realist perspective would say it's crazy to be completely reliant on a defense partner, even one that you've had a long-standing relationship with like the United States. 'Cause you never know, they act in their interests, we're an independent state, we act in ours. And you won't get an industrial base rebuilt in Australia as long as you continue with the trade policies that exist that were put in place in the 1990s.

So yeah, I think we are going to have to sort of be a little bit more clear-eyed and cold-eyed and a bit mean about the true state of the world out there. But it's in our interest to keep the relationship with the United States from a strategic perspective, really strong. So, we will give a lot and take a lot to ensure that that continues. That's a sort of very short answer to I think a very broadly question.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah, no, that makes sense. Okay, so if I could try and summarize it. So, self-reliance would definitely take on a... That'd be a real core part of a national conservative perspective.

Mr Dan Ryan:

[inaudible 00:45:27]-

Professor James Laurenceson:

Although of course, we would maintain ties with the US.

Mr Dan Ryan:

That's right. Yeah. You would have to be more self-reliant and more act in your own interests while maintaining the relationship with your great and powerful friend.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Okay. Next question, Dan. It's kind of an expansion on one I ask. So, how might the worldview of national conservatism alter American expectation of Australia? So, I just sort of put a particular one to you before in terms of Australia's trade relationship with China. But, when you think about this, are there particular parts of Australian foreign policy or industrial policy that you think are particularly right for Washington that's influenced by national conservatism to start putting the finger on Australia a bit?

Mr Dan Ryan:

There will be different political constituencies in the United States that will... Commercial constituencies that probably won't like the fact that we're in many cases an open market for Chinese manufactured goods that the US also wants to produce. For example, think read a stat the other day saying that China sells more electric vehicles in Australia than it does in the whole United States.

Professor James Laurenceson:

It did.

Mr Dan Ryan:

So, if they're trying to build up that area, then there will be, I imagine, commercial interest there that will say, "Hey, you're our ally. We should get closer together and you should be buying more American EVs." And that's one example. Or American made drones. Why you're using Chinese drones? Or American made CCTV cameras, and other technologically advanced manufactured product. I think there will be a tendency towards that. The way this plays, and this is a lot people like Michael Lynn have said, is that we are going to be moving in a direction where we do have to more closely integrate with the United States, because at the moment we're out of sync. Now, that can be done well or done poorly, but that's the direction of travel.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Okay. Well that's a great sound I think for this webinar. That's a fantastic summary. Next question, Dan, and this is a good one. This is getting away a bit from national conservatism, but I think you'll still be well-placed to answer it. The question is, do you see this new realism lens? So, we've talked a lot about realism being a prominent feature of national conservatism. But, do you see that new realism lens for geopolitics on the up and up amongst the Democratic Party, maybe particularly young people, or what do you see on the other side of US politics on that particular strand?

Mr Dan Ryan:

It's just funny. I think that, again, polls bounce around all the time. I think there is a constituency in the Democratic Party, which was certainly anti for a long period of time, interventions in the Middle East. There were protests led by Barack Obama. One of the things that distinguished him from Hillary Clinton was he said the Iraq war was terrible. And, I think, sometimes when the party gets into power, then they're obliged to get then support the policies that are in place.

But, I can see the young turning against the Ukraine conflict in due course, potentially the young Democrats. I can certainly see that happening. You got to remember the crazy... Bernie Sanders, the socialist candidate, I think he's rejoined the Democratic Party. He was against free trade. He was against actually open borders, mass immigration as well. He was against the forever wars. So, in some ways there was a... Even though they come from very different... He would not associate himself with the Trump at all. But, there actually is far less vibe than you think between those guys and the legacy left and right on both the Democratic and the Republican side.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Yeah. That's a good point. Dan, here's another one. I want to get this in, because it puts into a third country perspective in, so the question is a very specific one, but maybe you can sort of reflect on the concept more generally. It says, "In the context of what you've said about Trump's foreign policy. Do you think he will support Japan in the current spat between China and Japan over the Japanese PM's remarks about Taiwan?" So, I guess, the question is the US likely to lob into a dispute between third countries under national conservatism?

Mr Dan Ryan:

Yeah. Again, we do use the label "National conservatism." And I would just say foreign policy realism is an element.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Okay.

Mr Dan Ryan:

It's worth just analyzing it purely in realist terms. And again, it depends on the school. But, the relationship between Japan and the United States is very, very strong. And the personal relationship, and the new prime minister there, and actually with the former prime minister Trump was very close with as well. I think they kind of recognize each other as kindred spirits. Japan also has somewhat of a kind of Nakani perspective when it comes to industrial policy and other things as well. And yet it's democratic, so it has the additional sort of-

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yes.

Mr Dan Ryan:

It's a much more closer aligned in that sense. Yeah, look, and they're doing all the right things, I think, Japan in recalibrating. But, as to whether... Part of why I think the Trump presidency is often characterized as chaotic, like I think you said at the outset, is that he does like to keep the options open to strike a potentially innovative deal at a time, depending... And in fact, if you read him closely, he often says one of his criticisms of previous administrations is they telegraph too much their intentions in advance, either with respect to trade deals or military conflict.

And what we often see is Trump making statements on both sides of the line, and then all of a sudden surprise, surprise, there's this quite comprehensive and reasonably thought out text and deal, which comes to the fore. That pattern seems to be repeated again and again. I just think people need to recognize the trick that's going on there.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah.

Mr Dan Ryan:

The chaos is in some ways a strategic tactic.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Sure.

Mr Dan Ryan:

So, as to what will happen precisely with respect to Japan [inaudible 00:52:03] it all just depends precisely on the circumstances, but it's... I'm just surprised how closely aligned in many ways the Japanese and the Americans are today.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Okay. Dan, this is one more question from the audience. We might just have one time for one more, but this is a big one. Again, this is something I was going to ask you. The question is very simple, could Australia become a national conservative country and what would it look like? So, how much legs do you think this ideology has in Australia?

Mr Dan Ryan:

It's not just a US in the Anglo sphere. As viewers are well aware, the Reform party is well ahead of the polls in the UK and the existing legacy, Tory party is down, as is Labor. Now, Nigel Farage is senior advisor now is a guy called Dr. James Orr, who leads the national conservatives in Europe. So, it's going to be the governing ideology for a form takeover in London as well. Although, Farage has a bit more sort of Thatcherite tendencies, but he wouldn't employ someone if he didn't recognize that this was a sort of wave of the future.

So, I just think it defies belief to think that you can have [inaudible 00:53:20] presidency in Washington-

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah.

Mr Dan Ryan:

... PM in London, and Australia sticking to hawk powered era sort of trade foreign policy sort of framework here. This has to change. But, precisely how that occurs... Hastie has more of a sense of it than most, but I certainly don't speak for him. But, hopefully from my perspective at least the penny will drop across the scene in a bipartisan way and people will start to think in new about how things need to change here. Because, you can't wish it away. It's not going away.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. It would be quite extraordinary. Thinking of the Orcas partnership, if we have a national conservative bent in Washington and London, and we're sort of like a shag on a rock in a completely different place. That would... I'm not saying it's impossible, but it would be a pretty bizarre situation.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Things will go on, but it will just be as we have continued to be, sort of misinterpreting why things are occurred and not being able to appropriately respond in, I think, the way we should.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Yeah. Dan, that's exactly why I'm delighted we have to you today. And Dan, I've got one final question to round things out. But, I did just want to make sure to apologize for the technical difficulties-

Mr Dan Ryan:

No, that's all right. No problem.

Professor James Laurenceson:

... we had at the start of the call. I think certainly the guts of the conversation has been recorded, and I think our audience will appreciate it. So, let me finish with this before throwing back to Amy. Where can we find out more information about your work and that at The National Conservative Institute of Australia? Because, I think there'll be a lot of interest, particularly in the coming months.

Mr Dan Ryan:

Sure. Sure. So, the site in Australia is nationalconservatism.org.au. The site of the organization in the US is nationalconservatism.org. And I always point people to the works of Yoram Hazony who wrote a book called The Virtue of Nationalism, as well as another book called Conservatism Rediscovered. They're good standard texts to jump into. But, there's people like Patrick Deneen who have been critical of liberalism and certainly... They certainly understand this, they spoke at the conference. And there's many others. Listen closely to JD Vance and you'll pick up... It will all start to make sense, I think, if you approach it from an [inaudible 00:55:51].

So, there's plenty of podcasts on that website that we have in Australia that from guests both here and abroad. There's plenty of articles. And I think it's not that hard to get. Once you wrap your head around it, I think people will start to see how it makes sense. But, we certainly need to move on from this idea that it's madman in the White House, transactional, radic. That's such a poor way of understanding what's going on.

Professor James Laurenceson:

Thanks very much, Dan. Amy, I'm just now going to throw it back to you. But, I've thoroughly enjoyed this conversation. I'm glad that the Australia-China Relations Institute has been able to raise a bit of awareness about this, because I think it's critical not just for Australia US relations, but Australia's relationship with China too.

Mr Dan Ryan:

And can I just say, thanks, James. We come from things from slightly different perspectives, but I appreciate your inviting me on and our discussions. And I think both of us learn things from doing so. Yep.

Professor James Laurenceson:

100%. 100%. Okay. Back to you Amy.

Ms Amy Ma:

Thank you to Mr. Dan Ryan and Professor James Laurenceson for today's discussion. Members of the audience, we'll be sending an email to everyone here asking for your thoughts on how this webinar went. If you could please fill out that feedback form, we'd really appreciate it so that we can make future events a better experience for everyone involved. If you wanted to know more about the Australia-China relationship and about UTS ACRI's research, more details are available on uts.edu.au/acri. The discussion today will also be made available there soon. Please follow @acri_uts on X for the latest news. Thanks again to our speakers and to all our attendees. See you next time.