Kentaro Tomoeda joined the Economics Discipline Group of UTS Business School in July 2016. He received his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 2016. Kentaro works on research in the fields of microeconomic theory, market design, and economics of education. In particular, he is interested in how the theoretical approaches provide insights to the resource allocation problems in education markets.
Can supervise: YES
Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Market Design, Economics of Education
安田洋祐 2010, 学校選択制のデザイン ゲーム理論アプローチ, NTT出版.
This note shows that the first-price auction fully implements efficient investments when agents make not only ex ante but also ex post investments. The essential assumptions of our model are that (i) each agent can invest before and after participating in the auction under the same cost function and (ii) the cost functions are common knowledge among agents. In any equilibrium of our model, the most efficient agent always wins and makes the efficient level of investment.