Helen Spiropoulos completed a Bachelor of Science in Information Technology and a Bachelor of Business with First Class Honours at UTS, for which she received the University Medal. During her studies she completed two internships at Deloitte in Auditing and Consulting (strategy and operations). In 2014 Helen completed her PhD in Accounting which examined executive compensation and firm performance within the US setting, for which she received The Chancellor's List Award at UTS and the Best Paper Award at the JCAE Conference 2016. Since then Helen has researched and published in a number of areas including Gender diversity, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, Mergers and Acquisitions, and charities. To date Helen has successfully supervised two PhD students and eight honours students, all of whom received a First Class Honours.
- Member of the Editorial Board of Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Program Director of the Masters of Professional Accounting
- Co-coordinator of the IBES World 3P Innovation Competition
Can supervise: YES
- Corporate governance issues (including Non-Executive Directors)
- Executive compensation
- Mergers & Acquisitions
- Accounting Regulations and Non-for-profits
Helen teaches across a number of postgraduate and undergraduate subjects in the area of financial accounting. Areas include:
Accounting Standards & Regulations 22420
Accounting Skills for Managers 21642
Financial Reporting & Analysis 22748
Business Valuation and Financial Statement Analysis 22743
Ghannam, S, Bugeja, M, Matolcsy, Z & Spiropoulos, H 2019, 'Are Qualified and Experienced Outside Directors Willing to Join Fraudulent Firms and If So, Why?', The Accounting Review, vol. 94, no. 2.View/Download from: UTS OPUS or Publisher's site
Ghannam, S, Matolcsy, Z, Spiropoulos, H & Thai, N 2019, 'The Influence of Powerful Non-Executive Chairs in Mergers and Acquisitions', Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, vol. 15, no. 1.View/Download from: UTS OPUS
Bugeja, M, Matolcsy, Z & Spiropoulos, H 2017, 'The CEO Pay Slice: managerial power or efficient contracting? Some indirect evidence', Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 69-87.View/Download from: UTS OPUS or Publisher's site
This paper uses the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) to provide insight into the managerial power versusefﬁcient contracting debate on CEO compensation. Based on a sample of 9978 U.S. listedﬁrms for the period 2001–2010 our evidence is inconsistent with managerial power. Forinstance, we ﬁnd that the CPS of a newly appointed CEO does not differ to that of the out-going CEO and also does not increase over time. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no relation betweenthe CPS and subsequent ﬁrm performance, or between a measure of excess CPS and subse-quent ﬁrm performance. In addition, we show that most ﬁrms are quick to reduce excessCPS levels. However, for a small subsample in which excessive CPS persists, we observe anegative relation between CPS and subsequent ﬁrm performance. Overall our evidence islargely consistent with an efﬁcient contracting explanation of CEO compensation asopposed to a managerial power explanation
Bugeja, M, Matolcsy, ZP, Mehdi, W & Spiropoulos, H 2017, 'Is non-executive directors' pay or industry expertise related to takeover premiums, abnormal returns and offer price revisions?', Australian Journal of Management, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 355-375.View/Download from: UTS OPUS or Publisher's site
We examine the association between various takeover outcomes and bidding firm non-executive directors' (NEDs) compensation and expertise in the target firm industry. In our sample of 272 acquisitions by ASX listed firms between 2004 and 2011, we find that NEDs' relative compensation and industry expertise have a negative association with the bid premium. We also find that NEDs' relative compensation is positively associated with the bidding firm's market reaction to the takeover announcement, and NEDs' industry expertise is associated with a lower likelihood of an increase in the offer price, particularly for M&As viewed negatively by the market. These results are consistent with higher NEDs' relative compensation and industry expertise leading to more effective board monitoring and advising.
Matolcsy, ZP & Spiropoulos, H 2016, 'Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts - a Rejoinder', Abacus: a journal of accounting, finance and business studies.
Bugeja, M, Matolcsy, Z & Spiropoulos, H 2016, 'The Association Between Gender-Diverse Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation', Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 139, no. 2, pp. 375-390.View/Download from: UTS OPUS or Publisher's site
© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht We examine the association between gender-diverse compensation committees and CEO pay and find that CEO compensation levels are negatively associated with gender-diversity of the compensation committee, but not gender-diversity of the board. Furthermore, we find that excess CEO compensation is negatively related to subsequent return on assets for firms with an all-male compensation committee but not for firms with a gender-diverse compensation committee. These results suggest that CEOs do receive some level of excess compensation which can be mitigated by having one or more females on the compensation committee.
The gender pay gap generates significant political and social debate. This study contributes to this discussion by examining if a gender pay gap exists at the highest level of corporate management, the CEOs. While previous studies have documented a gender pay gap for most levels of executives the findings with respect to CEOs are conflicting. In this paper we focus only on CEO's as it is the most homogenous of executive roles and does not require us to assume that executives with similar titles undertake identical roles. Our evidence is based on 291 US firm-years for the period of 1998-2010. We do not find any association between CEO pay and gender using both the total sample and a sample matched using propensity scores to control for firm characteristics. These insignificant results hold for total pay, salary and bonuses, and for different matching procedures and econometric specifications. Our results therefore indicate that women who rise through the "glass ceiling" to the level of CEO are remunerated at similar levels to their male counterparts.
Bugeja, M, Ghannam, S, Matolcsy, ZP & Spiropoulos, H 2016, 'Who joins a sinking ship and why? Some evidence on independent directors who join fraudulent firms.', AAA - Annual Meeting and Conference, American Accounting Association, New York.
Spiropoulos, H, Bugeja, M, Matolcsy, Z & Ghannam, S 2016, 'Who joins a sinking ship and why? Some evidence on independent directors who join fraudulent firms', EAA - European Accounting Association Annual Congress, Maastricht, Netherlands.
Spiropoulos, H, Bugeja, M & MAtolcsy, Z 2014, 'Some Evidence on the Determinants and Performance Consequences of the CEO Pay Slice', Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand Conference, Auckland, New Zealand.
Bugeja, M, Matolcsy, ZP & Spiropoulos, H 2012, 'Is there a gender gap in CEO compensation?', British Accounting and Finance Association Annual Conference 2012, British Accounting and Finance Association, Brighton, United Kingdom.
Bugeja, M, Matolcsy, ZP & Spiropoulos, H 2012, 'Is there a gender gap in CEO compensation?', 35th Annual Congress European Accounting Association Programme, European Accounting Association (EAA), Ljubljana, Slovenia.
Matolcsy, ZP, Bugeja, M & Spiropoulos, H 2012, 'Women in senior business roles: evidence on two conjectures', 34th Annual Congress - European Accounting Association, European Accounting Association, Rome, Italy.