Emil Temnyalov joined UTS in September of 2015, after receiving a PhD in Economics from Northwestern University. He works on microeconomic theory, industrial organization and public policy.
Emil's main interests are in mechanism and market design, information economics, and contests. He is motivated by questions with policy implications and significant social welfare consequences, such as for example in the fields of public policy (differential treatment/affirmative action, optimal rationing, and other topics), innovation (R&D incentives and the organization of the patent system), antitrust and regulation.
He is currently working on new information-theoretic models of affirmative action and differential treatment. He is developing several ideas in mechanism and market design, with applications of these frameworks to education and labor markets.
Emil's personal webpage can be found here: https://sites.google.com/site/temnyalov/
Can supervise: YES
Microeconomic theory, industrial organization, public policy, the economics of innovation and R&D.
I study points programs, such as frequent flyer and other rewards programs, as a revenue management tool. I develop a two-period contracting model where a capacity-constrained firm faces consumers who privately learn their valuations over time. The firm cannot commit to long-term contracts, but it can commit to allocate any unsold capacity through a points program. This points scheme creates an endogenous and type-dependent outside option for consumers, which generates novel incentives in the firm's pricing problem. It induces the firm to screen less ex interim, and to offer lower equilibrium prices, reversing the intuition of demand cannibalization.
© 2017, The RAND Corporation. We model “patent privateering”—whereby producing firms sell patents to Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), which then license them under the threat of litigation—in a bargaining game. PAEs can negotiate higher licensing fees than producing firms because they cannot be countersued for infringement. Privateering produces two countervailing effects: it increases the offensive value of patents, whereas it decreases their defensive value and lowers the aggregate surplus of producing firms. Embedding the bargaining game into a Research and Development (R & D) contest for multiple complementary technologies, we find that privateering may increase R & D investments, even as it induces more litigation threats and reduces industry profits.
Lemus, J & Temnyalov, E, 'Pay-for-delay with Follow-on Products'.
Lemus, J & Temnyalov, E, 'Diversification and Information in Contests'.
Lemus, J, Temnyalov, E & Turner, JL, 'Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition'.
Temnyalov, E, 'An Economic Theory of Differential Treatment'.