Bettina Klose has joined the Economics Discipline Group in February 2016 as a Chancellor's Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Lecturer. She has been awarded the fellowship for her project entitled "Advancement of contest theory and design for applications in policy". Prior to joining UTS, Bettina completed her PhD at Purdue University (Indiana, USA) and worked as a Post-doc at the University of Zurich (Switzerland).
Bettina's research interests span the fields of microeconomic theory, industrial organization, game theory, and political economy with a particular focus on auction and contest theory. She is interested in developing new theoretical models and putting them to the test in laboratory experiments. Bettina has published her research in Economic Theory and Social Choice and Welfare and obtained research grants from Purdue University and the Swiss National Science Foundation.
For more details please view Bettina's CV.
Auctions and Contests, Industrial Organization, Political Economy, Microeconomic Theory, and Experimental Economics
- 23565 Mathematics for Economics and Business, Autumn 2016
- 23565 Mathematics for Economics and Business, Spring 2016
© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This article examines the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. Centrists and radicals are defined using a willingness-to-pay criterion that admits preferences more general than a simple ordering on the line. Extremism, characterized by a higher per capita expenditure by radicals than centrists, may persist and generate higher aggregate expenditure by radicals, even when they are relatively small in number. Our results demonstrate the importance of the institutions of conflict in determining the role of extremism and moderation in economic, political, and social environments.
© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of 'small identity-dependent externalities. In general, however, the presence of identity-dependent externalities invalidates well-established qualitative results concerning the set of equilibria of the first-price all-pay auction with complete information. With identity-dependent externalities, equilibria are generally not payoff equivalent, and identical players may earn different payoffs in equilibrium. These observations show that Siegel's (Econometrica 77(1), 71–92, 2009) results characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs in all-pay contests, including the all-pay auction as a special case, do not extend to environments with identity-dependent externalities. We further compare the all-pay auction with identity-dependent externalities to the first-price winner-pay auction with identity-dependent externalities. We demonstrate that the equilibrium payoffs of the all-pay auction and the 'undominated strategy equilibrium payoffs of the winner-pay auction (Funk in Int J Game Theory 25(1), 51–64, 1996) cannot be ranked unambiguously in the presence of identity-dependent externalities by providing examples of environments where equilibrium payoffs in the all-pay auction dominate those of the undominated strategy equilibria in the winner-pay auction and vice versa.