Anna joined UTS as a full time staff in February 2007. Prior to joining as a full time member, Anna worked as a part-time academic for the school of Accounting, UTS and Insearch. She completed her Bachelor of Business degree in 2005 with Distinction, majoring in Accounting and Financial Planning. In 2006 she completed her Honours degree and obtained a 1st class Honours. In 2011, Anna completed her PhD on the implementation errors made during the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) under the supervision of Professor Zoltan Matolcsy and Professor Peter Wells. Anna's current research focuses on executives compensation and mergers and acquisitions. She has presented widely in academic conferences during her time at UTS.
Anna lectures in both undergraduate and postgraduate subjects and has consistently been voted in the Graduate School of Business top 20 lecturers lists. She has previously received the postgraduate business prize for excellence in teaching and the undergraduate business prize for excellence in teaching.
Can supervise: YES
Financial accounting, executive compensation, corporate governance, mergers and acquisition
Corporate Accounting, Accounting for Business Combinations
Bachmann, RL, Loyeung, A, Matolcsy, ZP & Spiropoulos, H 2020, 'Powerful CEOs, cash bonus contracts and firm performance', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 47, no. 1-2, pp. 100-131.View/Download from: Publisher's site
We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power and the proportion of ex-ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association between CEO power and the relative use of non-financial to financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non-financial targets in cash bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex-ante bonus ratios and higher proportions of non-financial performance targets compared to less powerful CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related non-financial performance targets is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non-financial performance targets is negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. These results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and variable definitions.
This study examines the choice of boutique financial advisors in mergers and acquisitions, and the consequences of this choice on deal outcomes and post-acquisition performance. Boutique advisors often specialize in a particular industry and focus exclusively on providing advice in mergers and acquisitions. The results suggest that boutique financial advisors are preferred when the deal is considered complex and when information asymmetry is high. The study finds that the benefits of hiring a boutique advisor flow to both the acquirers and the target firms. Acquiring firms benefit in terms of improved post-merger performance, while target firms benefit in terms of higher completion of value-enhancing deals and positive cumulative abnormal returns. Overall, these results provide support for the growing popularity of boutique financial advisors in the Australian market.
Bugeja, M & Loyeung, A 2017, 'Accounting for business combinations and takeover premiums: Pre- and post-IFRS', Australian Journal of Management, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 183-204.View/Download from: Publisher's site
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Australia in 2005 resulted in goodwill accounting shifting from systematic annual amortisation to impairment testing. We examine whether IFRS adoption changed the association between takeover premiums and the difference between a target firm's pre-acquisition market and book values (pre-acquisition step-up). Our results show a negative association between takeover premiums and the pre-acquisition step-up of the target firm. This association reduces however, after Australia adopted IFRS and no longer required goodwill amortisation. Consistent with the incentives arising from contracts written around accounting numbers, our results are strongest for bidding firms which compensate their CEO using an accounting-based bonus plan. These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.
Bond, D, Czernkowski, R, Loyeung, AL & Lee, Y-S 2017, 'Market reaction to Non-GAAP Earnings around SEC regulation', Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 193-208.View/Download from: Publisher's site
This study examines the impact of Regulation G in 2003 and the issuance of Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs) in 2010 – on the reporting of non-GAAP earnings. The study finds that (i) both Regulation G and C&DIs are associated with an increase in the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions (i.e. the exclusions are more transitory and have less predictive power for future operating earnings). (ii) Regulation G led to a decrease in the amount of total positive exclusions used to meet or beat analysts' forecasts, but C&DIs partially reversed this result. (iii) Regulation G increases, and C&DIs decrease, the earnings response coefficients (ERCs).
Loyeung, A, Matolcsy, ZP, Weber, J & Wells, P 2016, 'The cost of implementing new accounting standards: The case of IFRS adoption in Australia', Australian Journal of Management, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 611-632.View/Download from: Publisher's site
This paper builds on and contributes to the literature on Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) compensation and turnover. We contend that the accounting talent of CFOs can be measured by accounting errors that occur when CFOs implement accounting standards. We find (i) a positive association between the CFO's accounting talent and the CFO's compensation ex ante in the transition year; (ii) a positive association between the CFO's accounting talent and the CFO's bonus in the subsequent year (adoption year); and (iii) an inverse association between the CFO's accounting talent and CFO turnover in the subsequent year (adoption year). © 2014 AFAANZ.
Bugeja, M & Loyeung, A 2015, 'What drives the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill?', Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 245-261.View/Download from: Publisher's site
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. This study examines the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill after the successful acquisition of a publicly listed firm. Using hand collected data we document that 42% of acquirers record a nil amount for goodwill. We find that the amount allocated to goodwill is generally unrelated to target firm economic characteristics. In contrast, consistent with managerial opportunism, we find a positive association between the use of accounting based bonus plans to compensate acquiring firm CEOs and the amount allocated to goodwill. The amount allocated to goodwill also increases after Australia adopted IFRS which no longer required goodwill to be systematically amortised. Other variables associated with goodwill recognition include the acquiring firm's leverage, the takeover premium, whether the target and the bidder operate in the same industry, existing goodwill in the target firm before the takeover announcement and the method of payment used in the acquisition.
Ghannam, S, Grosse, M, Loyeung, A & Ma, N 2018, 'The Role of Powerful CEOs in the Appointment of Accounting Financial Experts to the Audit Committee', European Accounting Association Annual Congress., Milan.
Ghannam, S, Grosse, MJ, Loyeung, AL & Ma, N 2017, 'The Role of Powerful CEOs in the Appointment of Accounting Financial Experts to the Audit Committee', Accounting Theory and Practice Conference & Asian Accounting Associations conference.
Loyeung, AL, czernkowski, bond & Lee 2016, 'Market reaction to Non-GAAP Earnings around SEC regulation.', Accounting & Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ)- annual conference, Gold Coast, Australia.
Bugeja, M & Loyeung, AL 2013, 'Acquisition date goodwill: Determinants and market reaction', British Accounting and Finance Association Annual Conference 2013, British Accounting and Finance Association, Newcastle, UK.
Loyeung, AL & Wells, PA 2012, 'Implementation errors and earnings quality', British Accounting and Finance Association Annual Conference 2012, British Accounting and Finance Association, Brighton, United Kingdom.
Bugeja, M & Loyeung, AL 2012, 'Goodwill accounting and takeover premiums: pre- and post- IFRS', British Accounting and Finance Association Annual Conference 2012, British Accounting and Finance Association, Brighton, United Kingdom.
Bugeja, M & Loyeung, AL 2012, 'Goodwill accounting and takeover premiums: pre- and post- IFRS', American Accounting Association Annual Meeting and Conference on Teaching and Learning in Accounting, American Accounting Association, Washington, DC.
Loyeung, AL & Bugeja, M 2012, 'Goodwill accounting and takeover premiums: pre- and post- IFRS', 35th Annual Congress European Accounting Association Programme, European Accounting Association (EAA), Ljubljana, Slovenia.
Loyeung, AL, Matolcsy, ZP & Wells, PA 2010, 'The association between talent and compensation: the case of Australian chief financial officers', American Accounting Association Conference on Teaching and Learning in Accounting, American Accounting Association (AAA), American Accounting Association, San Francisco, California.
Loyeung, AL, Matolcsy, ZP & Wells, PA 2010, 'The association between talent and compensation: The case of Australian chief financial officers', 2010 AFAANZ Conference Program, AFAANZ, AFAANZ, Christchurch, New Zealand.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether CFOs are remunerated for their talent, where CFO talent is characterised by the CFOs ability to successfully manage the adoption of new accounting standards (i.e., convergence to the IFRS). This paper is motivated by the lack of evidence on the determinants of CFO compensation and the global controversy surrounding executive compensation. The results are based on sample of 280 Australian firms from 2005 to 2006. Results reveal a positive association between CFO talent and CFO compensation levels and a positive relation between CFO talent and cash bonuses in the subsequent. Further, a talented CFO is more likely to be retained by the firms. Additional analyses suggest that the compensation levels of other executives such as the CEO are not affected by errors in the accounting numbers. Overall the results are consistent with the efficient labour market view, that CFOs are remunerated in manners that attracts, retains, motivates talent and reduces overall costs to the firm.