Dr. Adrian Camilleri is a consumer psychologist who holds a bachelor’s degree in psychology, a Master’s degree in organizational psychology, and a PhD in cognitive psychology, all from the University of New South Wales’s School of Psychology. He completed postdoctoral training in marketing and organizational behaviour at Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business. Currently, he is a senior lecturer in consumer psychology at the University of Technology Sydney’s Business School.
Dr. Camilleri uses experimental and survey research methods to understand the cognitive processes underling judgment and decision-making, and the application of this knowledge to organizational, financial, and consumption contexts. He is an expert in behavioural economics and behavioural decision theory. His research has been published in top academic journals in the fields of psychology, management, marketing, and public policy including Management Science. His work has also been written up in the media including Time and Scientific American articles.
- 2013-2014: Awarded the Alcoa Foundation Fellowship from the American Australian Association.
- 2012: Awarded an Endeavour Research Fellowship from the Australian Government.
- 2015: Awarded an Academic Research Grant from the Australian Centre for Financial Studies with R. Hoffmann, M. Cam, and M. Tan.
- 2015: Awarded a travel scholarship from the Ian Potter Foundation.
Can supervise: YES
Areas of Interest
- Judgment and decision making; behavioural economics, choice architecture; choice under uncertainty; word-of-mouth; goals; sustainability; incentives.
- Experiments; surveys.
Consumer behaviour; market research; business statistics.
Camilleri, A 2019, 'The Collective Aggregation Effect: Aggregating Potential Collective Action Increases Pro-Social Behavior', Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
Camilleri, A & Newell, BR 2019, 'Better calibration when predicting from experience (rather than description)', Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, vol. 150, no. January, pp. 62-82.View/Download from: Publisher's site
Camilleri, AR, Larrick, RP, Hossain, S & Patino-Echeverri, D 2019, 'Consumers underestimate the emissions associated with food but are aided by labels.', Nature Climate Change, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 53-58.View/Download from: Publisher's site
Ungemach, C, Camilleri, AR, Johnson, EJ, Larrick, RP & Weber, EU 2018, 'Translated attributes as choice architecture: Aligning objectives and choices through decision signposts', Management Science, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 2445-2459.View/Download from: UTS OPUS or Publisher's site
© 2017 INFORMS. Every attribute can be expressed in multiple ways. For example, car fuel economy can be expressed as fuel efficiency ("miles per gallon"), fuel cost in dollars, or tons of greenhouse gases emitted. Each expression, or "translation," highlights a different aspect of the same attribute. We describe a new mechanism whereby translated attributes can serve as decision "signposts" because they (1) activate otherwise dormant objectives, such as proenvironmental values and goals, and (2) direct the person toward the option that best achieves the activated objective. Across three experiments, we provide evidence for the occurrence of such signpost effects as well as the underlying psychological mechanism. We demonstrate that expressing an attribute such as fuel economy in terms of multiple translations can increase preference for the option that is better aligned with objectives congruent with this attribute (e.g., the more fuel-efficient car for those with proenvironmental attitudes), even when the new information is derivable from other known attributes. We discuss how using translated attributes appropriately can help align a person's choices with their personal objectives.
Camilleri, AR 2017, 'The Presentation Format of Review Score Information Influences Consumer Preferences Through the Attribution of Outlier Reviews', Journal of Interactive Marketing, vol. 39, pp. 1-14.View/Download from: UTS OPUS or Publisher's site
© 2017 Review score information can be presented in different formats. In three online experiments, we examined consumers' behavior in the context of review scores presented in a disaggregated format (individual review scores observed sequentially and individually), an aggregated format (review scores summarized into a frequency distribution chart), or both together. Participants tended to attribute outlier review scores to reviewer rather than product reasons. This tendency was more prevalent when reviews were presented in disaggregated format. Moreover, reviews attributed to reviewer reasons tended to be perceived with low credibility. When presented with a choice between two products with equal average review scores but different variances, participants chose as if outlier review scores were discounted when scores were presented in the disaggregated format. This tendency emerged even when disaggregated and aggregated formats were presented together. The number of review scores moderated the effect of format on choice. We argue that disaggregated information allows consumers to better track the number of outliers and, when the number of outliers is small, prompts them to attribute these outliers to reviewer reasons, and subsequently discount them.
Powell, AE, Camilleri, AR, Dobele, AR & Stavros, C 2017, 'Developing a scale for the perceived social benefits of sharing', Journal of Consumer Marketing, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 496-504.View/Download from: UTS OPUS or Publisher's site
© 2017, © Emerald Publishing Limited. Purpose: The purpose of this research was to create a brief scale to measure perceived social benefit that would be appropriate for use in future research aiming to explore the role of this variable in determining word-of-mouth (WOM) behaviour. There is evidence that perceived social risk negatively impacts the willingness to share, but the role of perceived social benefit has not yet been explored. Understanding how perceived social risk and benefit interact to determine WOM will inform social marketing campaign design. Design/methodology/approach: This paper outlines two studies: Study 1 was concerned with the development of the perceived social benefit of sharing scale (PSBSS), including the construction of preliminary items and the reliability and discriminant validity of the final scale. Study 2 involved an investigation of the concurrent validity of the PSBSS in relation to the likelihood to share. Findings: Study 1 demonstrated that the perceived social benefit associated with WOM was related to social approval, impression management and social bonding. The results of Study 2 established that scores on the PSBSS predicted self-reported likelihood to engage in both face-to-face WOM and electronic WOM. Originality/value: The PSBSS can be used to examine the role of perceived social benefit, including how the interaction between perceived social risk and benefit determines where, when and with whom people will share WOM.
Interest is increasing in using behavioral decision insights to design better product labels. A specific policy target is the fuel economy label, which policy makers can use to encourage reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from transport-related fossil-fuel combustion. In two online experiments, the authors examine whether vehicle preferences can be shifted toward more fuel-efficient vehicles by manipulating the metric (consumption of gas vs. cost of gas) and scale (100 miles vs. 15, 000 miles vs. 100, 000 miles) on which fuel economy information is expressed. They find that preference for fuel-efficient vehicles is highest when fuel economy is expressed in terms of the cost of gas over 100, 000 miles, regardless of whether the vehicle pays for its higher price in gas savings. The authors discuss the underlying psychological mechanisms for this finding, including compatibility, anchoring, and familiarity effects, and conclude that policy makers should initiate programs that communicate fuel-efficiency information in terms of costs over an expanded, lifetime scale. © 2014, American Marketing Association.
Camilleri, AR & Newell, BR 2013, 'Mind the gap? Description, experience, and the continuum of uncertainty in risky choice.', Progress in brain research, vol. 202, pp. 55-71.View/Download from: Publisher's site
The description-experience "gap" refers to the observation that choices are influenced by whether information about potential alternatives is learnt from a summary description or from the experience of sequentially sampling individual outcomes. In this chapter, we traverse the cognitive steps required to make a decision-information acquisition, storage, representation, and then choice-and at each step briefly review the evidence for sources of discrepancy between these two formats of choice. We conclude that description- and experience-based choice formats lie along a continuum of uncertainty and share important core features, including the explicit representation of probability, the combining of this probability information with outcome information, and utility maximization. The implication of this conclusion is that the differences between description- and experience-based choices emerge from how uncertainty information is acquired and stored rather than how it is represented or used.
Camilleri, AR & Newell, BR 2013, 'The long and short of it: closing the description-experience "gap" by taking the long-run view.', Cognition, vol. 126, no. 1, pp. 54-71.View/Download from: Publisher's site
Previous research has shown that many choice biases are attenuated when short-run decisions are reframed to the long run. However, this literature has been limited to description-based choice tasks in which possible outcomes and their probabilities are explicitly specified. A recent literature has emerged showing that many core results found using the description paradigm do not generalize to experience-based choice tasks in which possible outcomes and their probabilities are learned from sequential sampling. In the current study, we investigated whether this description-experience choice gap occurs in the long run. We examined description- and experience-based preferences under two traditional short run framed choice tasks (single-play, repeated-play) and also a long-run frame (multi-play). We found a reduction in the size of the description-experience gap in the long-run frame, which was attributable to greater choice maximizing in the description format and reduced underweighting [corrected] of rare events in the experience format. We interpret these results as a "broad bracketing" effect: the long-run mindset attenuates short-run biases such as loss aversion and reliance on small samples.
Camilleri, AR & Newell, BR 2011, 'Description- and experience-based choice: does equivalent information equal equivalent choice?', Acta psychologica, vol. 136, no. 3, pp. 276-284.View/Download from: Publisher's site
Does the manner in which people acquire information affect their choices? Recent research has contrasted choices based on summary descriptions (e.g. a 100% chance of $3 vs. an 80% chance of $4) with those based on the 'experience' of drawing samples from environments that do (or should) match those provided by descriptions. Intriguingly, decision-makers' preferences differ markedly across the two formats: the so-called description-experience "gap" - but debate over the cause of this gap continues. We employed novel techniques to ensure strict control over both external and internal biases in the samples of information that people used to make decisions from experience. In line with some other recent research, we found a much diminished gap in both experiments suggesting that the divergence in choices based on description and sequentially acquired (non-consequential) samples is largely the result of non-equivalent information at the point of choice. The implications for models of risky choice are discussed.
Camilleri, AR & Newell, BR 2011, 'When and why rare events are underweighted: a direct comparison of the sampling, partial feedback, full feedback and description choice paradigms.', Psychonomic bulletin & review, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 377-384.View/Download from: Publisher's site
Two paradigms are commonly used to examine risky choice based on experiential sampling. The feedback paradigm involves a large number of repeated, consequential choices with feedback about the chosen (partial feedback) or chosen and foregone (full feedback) payoffs. The sampling paradigm invites cost-free samples before a single consequential choice. Despite procedural differences, choices in both experience-based paradigms suggest underweighting of rare events relative to their objective probability. This contrasts with overweighting when choice options are described, thereby leading to a 'gap' between experience and description-based choice. Behavioural data and model-based analysis from an experiment comparing choices from description, sampling, and partial- and full-feedback paradigms replicated the 'gap', but also indicated significant differences between feedback and sampling paradigms. Our results suggest that mere sequential experience of outcomes is insufficient to produce reliable underweighting. We discuss when and why underweighting occurs, and implicate repeated, consequential choice as the critical factor.
Camilleri, AR & Newell, BR 2009, 'The role of representation in experience-based choice', Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 4, no. 7, pp. 518-529.
Recently it has been observed that different choices can be made about structurally identical risky decisions depending on whether information about outcomes and their probabilities is learned by description or from experience. Current evidence is equivocal with respect to whether this choice gap is entirely an artefact of biased samples. The current experiment investigates whether a representational bias exists at the point of encoding by examining choice in light of decision makers' mental representations of the alternatives, measured with both verbal and nonverbal judgment probes. We found that, when estimates were gauged by the nonverbal probe, participants presented with information in description format (as opposed to experience) had a greater tendency to overestimate rare events and underestimate common events. The choice gap, however, remained even when accounting for this judgment distortion and the effects of sampling bias. Indeed, participants' estimation of the outcome distribution did not mediate their subsequent choice. It appears that experience-based choices may derive from a process that does not explicitly use probability information.