THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF US STOCK MISPricing 1 2

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ABSTRACT
The USAGE model for the United States is used to quantify economic costs due to stock mispricing, made operational by shocking Tobin’s q. The simulations quantify a potentially large impact even in the most favorable environment, where export demand holds up, and, the dollar is pro-cyclical. A two-year investment boom in two sectors increases consumption by a Net Present Value (NPV) amount of nearly one per cent, due to a positive investment externality onto the US terms of trade. If the investment is wasted, however, the consumption loss is nearly one-half of a per cent. A 5 year ‘capital strike’ across the whole economy subsequent to the boom – mimicking financial distress from a burst bubble – shaves around 10 per cent off consumption. Given these significant costs associated with “boom” and “bust” equity markets, we consider some, policy options that might result in greater stability in these markets.

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1. Introduction

This paper uses a contemporary policy model of the United States (US International Trade Commission, 2004 & 2007) to quantify the effects of a rapid boom and bust associated with asset price bubbles. We begin, in section 2, by reviewing the debate about the impact of mispricing. The literature focuses on two distinct mechanisms which can affect the real economy – misallocation and financial sector distress.\(^3\) This sets the stage for designing three stock mispricing scenarios which are applied to the US economy. Section 3 explains the model qualitatively, drawing on the canonical Mundell-Fleming and optimal capital stock diagrams. The findings with respect to the economics costs of stock mispricing are discussed in Section 4 and the policy implications of these findings are surveyed in Section 5. Section 6 provides a conclusion to the paper.

2 Asset Mispricing in the Literature

Asset price bubbles are commonly associated with an increase of debt. During the boom phase of the bubble, the large distortion in relative prices induces investors to increase their debt burden. Shiller (2003) provides an example of this mania when he relates the story of university students ‘maxing out their credit cards’ to buy shares during the height of the internet bubble, and Posen (2006) describes American households utilizing cash-out refinancing on the equity in their house during the housing booms. Once the bubble bursts, many investors default on what prove to be unsustainable loans.

However, when investors default en mass, some believe that the instability of the banking/financial system, rather than the stock market crashes per se, is the major macro-economic concern. Mishkin and White (2002) marshal history for the defence of

\[^3\] With regards to financial stress following a bubble, the literature on these effects presumes the ability to econometrically test for bubbles, yet this is no trivial matter. Gürkaynak (2008) provides a comprehensive survey on the tests including variance bound tests (as in Shiller, 1981), West’s two-step test (1987), integration/co-integration tests (Dibba and Grossman 1987, 1988) and intrinsic bubble tests (Froot and Obstfield 1991). After canvassing the strength and weakness of each type of tests, Gürkaynak summed up the state of econometric testing: "...[This] survey of econometric tests of asset price bubbles shows that, despite recent advances, econometric detection of asset price bubbles cannot be achieved with a satisfactory degree of certainty. For each paper that finds evidence of bubbles, there is another one that fits the data equally well without allowing for a bubble. We are still unable to distinguish bubbles from time-varying or regime-switching fundamentals, while many small sample econometrics problems of bubble tests remain unresolved." (Gürkaynak 2008, p.166)
this distinction. They show that there was severe economic damage only for 8 of 15 US stock market crashes in the last 100 years. And, only some of these 8 episodes resulted in recessions. They conclude that in the absence of financial instability, stock market crashes had negligible effects on the economy. In this, they concur with Posen (op. cit.) who cautions against central banks bursting bubbles.4

While perhaps dispelling the notion of inevitable economic distress, historical analysis may provide only limited insight into a rapidly evolving financial system. Indeed, as a result of increasing competition and financial deregulation, financial institutions have aggressively sought income from non-core lines of business, such as asset trading (International Monetary Fund, 2000).5 As a consequence of this, they have significantly increased their exposure to the real economy as the sub-prime crisis is making abundantly clear.

Mispricing of assets may also effect the real economy by disrupting the optimal allocation of resources: “[They] create wedges which could distort both inter-temporal investment decisions and cross-sectional capital allocations” (Chrinko and Schaller 2007, p.84).

However, the issues are subtle, as Barlevy (2007) skillfully shows. He outlines a number of situations where bubbles have redeeming features. First, he draws a surprising link between the literature on the theoretical justification for money, and bubbles. The fundamental consumption value of money varies moment by moment without a change in price, so its unchanging value can be interpreted as an ongoing speculative bubble!6 This theoretical curiosity serves as a reminder that imperfections in the economy – here the socio-economic frictions that necessitate money – can sometimes be fixed by other

4 He writes: ‘In the end, there is no monetary substitute for financial stability, and no market substitute for monetary ease during severe credit crunch’ (op. cit. page 1)

5 To quote them: “Greater exposure to asset market developments implies that sharp swings in stock and property prices, such as those observed over the last two decades, tend to have a major impact on the balance sheets of financial institutions. One direct channel is through revaluations of non-loan assets and changes in earnings accruing from brokerage fees on the value of asset transactions...” (op. cit., p.102).

6 No central bank wishes to prick this inexhaustible source of seigniorage.
distortions, a point related to the Theory of the Second Best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).  

The literature descending from Diamond (1965) gives the same story. The whole underlying economic environment that led to the emergence of the bubble will have large bearing on its likely costs and benefits. In Diamond’s model, agents may either buy an intrinsically worthless asset, or invest. Under certain technical conditions, the price of the intrinsically worthless asset is positive, implying a bubble. In the particulars of his environment, a bubble is socially beneficial, because it draws resources away from already over-accumulated capital. Naturally, as Oliver (2000) points out, bubbles in assets that are complements to capital accumulation may be optimal if capital is under-accumulated.

Bubble externalities are plausible in a number of real-world contexts. Barlevy (op. cit.) shows how a housing bubble can lead to better allocation of houses. In the US, the tax liability on one’s house is based on historic cost. This discourages trading, because in an environment of real dwelling appreciation, staying put forestalls the unfavorable re-valuation of the tax liability. A housing price bubble, with its associated increase in trading, encourages the social benefits of relocation, even though it has other costs.

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7 To quote them (op. cit. pg. 11) ‘It is well known that the attainment of a Paretian optimum requires the simultaneous fulfillment of all the optimum conditions. The general theorem for the second best optimum states that if there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable. In other words, given that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum situation can be achieved only be departing from all the other Paretian conditions. The optimum situation finally attained may be termed a second best optimum because it is achieved subject to a constraint which, by definition, prevents the attainment of a Paretian optimum.’

8 The condition is that the economy grows faster than the rate of interest, which implies over-accumulation of capital.

9 The result is reversed in Saint-Paul (1992) and Grossman and Yanagawa (1993). In their extensions of Diamond’s model, there is an under-accumulation of capital and so the drawing away of resources exacerbates the problem.

10 He gives the example of a neighbourhood which is perfect for young families, where the residents stay longer than is socially optimal (after their children grow up) because of the tax disadvantages of re-locating.
It is not hard to imagine other situations of investment externalities. The difficulties of capturing profits from innovation lead to under-investment of R&D in the economy. A speculative bubble, if it encourages R&D investment, may lead to advantages which at least mitigate the obvious disadvantages of such a bubble.

In this paper, it turns out that there is an investment externality on the terms of trade, via the exchange rate. A stock market boom leads to investment which, in turn, appreciates the real exchange rate. The appreciating US dollar, ceteris paribus, improves the terms of trade.

3 The USAGE Model and its Application

3.1 The Usage Model

USAGE is a dynamic Computable-General-Equilibrium model of the US economy, with a structure similar to the MONASH model for the Australian economy (Dixon and Rimmer, 2002). Usage can be run with up to 500 industries, 700 occupations 23 trading partners and 51 regions (50 states plus D.C.).

The version of the model used in this paper lacks a monetary and fiscal authority. As we shall explain presently, this softens the blow of Lucas (1976) somewhat. Without policy to stabilize the economy, we rely upon a pro-cyclical exchange rate to stabilize the economy.

That is, the Mundell-Fleming assumption of perfect capital mobility means that infinitesimal interest rate changes move the nominal exchange rate. Equilibrium is attained via expenditure-switching adjustments in the real exchange rate. With all the macroeconomic adjustment coming through this channel, the required movements in the real exchange rate required to obtain equilibrium are probably larger than in reality.

11 It was developed starting in 2001 as a joint project between the Centre for Policy Studies, Monash, and the US International Trade Commission. To date, its main uses have been for trade, energy, environment and immigration policy.
These simulations therefore share a feature of all macro models that rely on expenditure switching as an equilibrating channel; the margin of simulation error must mirror, unfavorably, the longstanding and well-documented volatility of nominal exchange rates (Frankel and Rose 1995).

However, despite all these caveats, we see a considerable advantage in using a CGE model during times of turbulent policy making and structural change. The USAGE model is well-founded on non-policy parameters\(^\text{12}\), in contrast to models that are driven by somewhat arbitrary specifications of policy rules. Thus, our results are less at the mercy of the critique of Lucas (1976). Indeed, it was precisely times of turbulent policy making (the 1970s) which spawned the development of CGE models in the first place.\(^\text{13}\)

USAGE includes three types of dynamic mechanisms: capital accumulation; liability accumulation; and lagged adjustment processes.

Capital accumulation is specified separately for each industry. An industry’s capital stock at the start of year t+1 is its capital at the start of year t plus its investment during year t minus depreciation. Investment during year t is determined as a positive function of the expected rate of return on the industry’s capital.\(^\text{14}\)

Liability accumulation is specified for the public sector and for the foreign accounts. Public sector liability at the start of year t+1 is public sector liability at the start of year t plus the public sector deficit incurred during year t. Net foreign liabilities at the start of year t+1 are specified as net foreign liabilities at the start of year t plus the current

\(^{12}\text{USAGE contains variables describing: primary-factor and intermediate-input-saving technical change in current production; input-saving technical change in capital creation; input-saving technical change in the provision of margin services; and input-saving changes in household preferences. We assume that our shocks do not affect technology or household preferences.}\)

\(^{13}\text{Naturally, we cannot rule out structural change along the lines of Koo (2008) where agents minimize indebtedness rather than maximize utility, but we also suspect there is some overlap of these goals, which re-legitimizes our modeling (or any modeling) to a degree.}\)

account deficit in year $t$ plus the effects of revaluations of assets and liabilities caused by changes in price levels and the exchange rate.

Lagged adjustment processes are specified for the response of wage rates to gaps between the demand for and the supply of labor by occupation. There are also lagged adjustment processes in USAGE for the response of foreign demand for U.S. exports to changes in their foreign-currency prices.

In a USAGE simulation of the effects of shocks, we need two runs of the model: a basecase or business-as-usual run and a shocked run. The basecase is intended to be a plausible forecast while the shocked run generates deviations away from the basecase caused by the shock under consideration. The basecase incorporates trends in industry technologies, household preferences and trade and demographic variables. These trends are estimated largely on the basis of results from historical runs in which USAGE is forced to track a piece of history. Most macro variables are exogenous in the basecase so that their paths can be set in accordance with forecasts made by expert macro forecasting groups such as the Congressional Budget Office. This requires endogenization of various macro propensities, e.g. the average propensity to consume. These propensities must be allowed to adjust in the basecase run to accommodate the exogenous paths for the macro variables.

The shocked run in a USAGE study is normally conducted with a different closure (choice of exogenous variables) from that used in the basecase. In the shocked run, macro variables must be endogenous: we want to know how they are affected by the shock. Correspondingly, macro propensities are exogenized and given the values they had in the basecase. More generally, all exogenous variables in the shocked run have the values they had in the basecase, either endogenously or exogenously. Comparison of results from the shocked and basecase runs then gives the effects of moving the shocked variable(s) away from their basecase values.

For this paper, we assume that expected rates of return are generated by projecting current information. This is convenient because it allows the model to be solved
recursively (in a sequence, one year at a time). We do not consider that the alternative, rational expectations, would add realism.

USAGE contains functions specifying the supply of funds for investment in each industry as an upward-sloping function of the industry’s expected rate of return. Our shock consists of shocking the functions so that (in the case of optimism) a given expected rate of return results in higher investment, and (in the case of pessimism) the same given rate of return results in lower investment compared with the basecase\textsuperscript{15}.

\subsection*{3.2 The Scenarios}

We now focus on three particular bubble scenarios. We simulate these scenarios by shocking Tobin’s \( q \).\textsuperscript{16}

Our measure of \( q \) is dominated by movements in the market value of ordinary shares,\textsuperscript{17} so, a positive shock to \( q \) in USAGE is the same as a share market boom. In the model, this leads to extra investment as the value of capital rises relative to its required return. Since expected returns in the model can be related to Tobin’s \( q \), we have the necessary positive connection between share prices and investment\textsuperscript{18}.

The basic shock in this paper is an increase in \( q \) for two years in a boom sector (Telecommunications and Technology combined). Notionally, the shock happens over the years 2006 & 2007, but the deviation-from-control results are transferable to any baseline forecast at any point in time.\textsuperscript{19} This shock is common to all scenarios which differ in terms of the aftermath to the shock and these are set out in more details below:

\textsuperscript{15} A more detailed description of the ‘capital supply’ function used in this model can be found in Appendix 2.

\textsuperscript{16} A more detailed explanation of how this shock is implemented in the model and a diagrammatical representation of how this ripple through the system is to be found in Appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{17} The following formula is used to calculate Tobin’s \( q \):

\[ \frac{(\text{Market Value of Ordinary shares} + \text{Book Value of Preference Capital} + \text{Total Debt})}{\text{Total Assets}} \]

The numbers are based on over 100,000 US firms in the Datastream database.

\textsuperscript{18} For a more detailed development of this relationship, see Appendix 3.

\textsuperscript{19} This follows from the approximate linearity of USAGE.
(i) Scenario 1 where there is an initial two bubble where investors hold overly optimistic expectations as to the returns that will be generated by investing in the Telecommunication and Technology industries which is then immediately followed by a return to normality where the investors have realistic expectations.

(ii) Scenario 2 has the same two years of optimistic expectations followed by a return to normality as in Scenario 1 but in this case the additional investment that flows from these unrealistic expectations are completely wasted. In other words, the investments are completely wasted in that they have a present value of zero and do not add to the capital stock. This is an instance of a misallocation of capital attributable to the pricing that flows from false expectations in equity markets.

(iii) Scenario 3 which is identical to Scenario 2 except that the aftermath of the bubble is not only capital wastage but also an extended period of pessimism where investors under-estimate the returns that will be generated across all firms. In other words there is a capital strike which may reflect extreme caution by investors who have just had their finders burnt and/or a lack of access to capital attributable to a meltdown in financial markets. Under this Scenario, we investigate capital strikes that extend over three years, five years and perpetuity.

3.3 A Simple Insight

In this sub-section we provide a simple introduction to the workings of the model in order to provide some intuition for the findings that we present in the next section. The basic shock that we introduce into the model to replicate an asset bubble can be illustrated by the standard diagram for the choice of capital in the neoclassical economy, where \( \text{rental} = p_{\text{output}} \cdot (\text{marginal productivity of capital}) \).

**Figure 2 Desired Capital Stock for a Reversed Shock**
Consider the economy described by $p.mpk_1$. Since we want to allow people to be wrong sometimes, we will think of this as the *expected* value-of-capital schedule. The desired capital stock is shown on the K axis at point $a$, where the last installed unit of capital creates exactly enough output, worth $p.mpk_1$, to pay its rental rate $r$. In a stylized way, one may think of $(p.mpk)/r$ as a type of Tobin’s $q$, since it is the value of capital divided by its cost. If capital is at its desired level, this measure of $q$ is clearly unity.

Now, consider a shift up in the expected value-of-capital schedule – from $p.mpk_1$ to $p.mpk_2$. This corresponds to a boom in the value of a sector’s stock prices driven by optimism about future profits. We assume capital doesn’t adjust in the first instant, so $q$ rises above unity. It is, in fact, the vertical distance between point $a$ and the new value-of-capital schedule $p.mpk_2$, divided by $r$.

Over the two years of the higher expected value-of-capital stock, this optimism translates into investment expenditure, shown on the K axis by the movement from $a$ to $b$. To simplify the exposition, assume that it reaches the new desired level of $b$ in the two years.

The shock is withdrawn in the third year. The capital stock now has to be dis-invested, since it is ‘stuck’ at too high a value of $b$. In the instant following the reversal capital is extra-marginal, $q$ being the vertical distance between point $b$ and the restored value-of-capital schedule $p.mpk_1$, divided by $r$. We assume dis-investment happens through a process of capital-stock depreciation.\(^{20}\) This occurs for a number of periods and eventually capital returns to its desired level.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{20}\) The capital stock cannot fall by more than the depreciation rate.

\(^{21}\) By making a levels statement we implicitly ignore steady-state growth in the diagram, though this is dealt with in the USAGE model.
How does investment and disinvestment transmit to the macro-economy? The USAGE model does not have a feedback rule whereby monetary policy stabilizes the economy via interest rates. Instead, the real exchange rate stabilizes the model through net exports, via the standard Mundell-Fleming mechanism.

**Figure 3 Investment and Net Exports**

For every occasion in Figure 2 when autonomous investment\(^{22}\) increases or decreases, the IS curve in Figure 3 moves out or in. The real exchange rate, \(s\), shifts IS via net exports.\(^{23}\)

If autonomous investment increases (IS\(_{+\text{invest}}\)) the equilibrium interest rate and income point ‘\(+\)’ is unsustainable. The real exchange rate rapidly appreciates since interest rates are higher than foreign rates, hurting export competitiveness, and driving the IS curve back to its starting equilibrium. Similarly, if autonomous investment decreases (dashed IS\(_{-\text{invest}}\)), the point ‘\(-\)’ is unsustainable and the real exchange rate depreciates restoring the initial IS.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{22}\) In terms of the ISLM model, this is an increase in investment for a given interest rate, which is precisely what is seen in Figure 2 when the value-of-capital schedule moves.

\(^{23}\) An increase in \(s\) is an appreciation. In the simplest model with autonomous consumption and unit marginal impact of interest rates on investment, \(y = c + i + g + \text{netx} = c + [i_{\text{aut}} - r] + g + \text{netx}\) leading to an IS curve of \(r = (c+i_{\text{aut}}+g+\text{netx}) - y\). The intercept of this IS curve will move in proportion to changes in autonomous investment \(i_{\text{aut}}\) or changes in netx, the latter being determined by the real exchange rate.

\(^{24}\) In USAGE, interest rates do not change, so we have to imagine an infinitely flat LM curve, which will deliver the exchange rate change for an infinitesimally small change in the domestic interest rate. More formally, in logs suppose \(m-p = y-b(r-r^*)\). This can be re-written as \(r = (1/b)(p+y-m)+r^*\). This is an LM curve, but it can also be interpreted as a quasi-Taylor rule. A flat LM curve means \(b\) is infinite, which means a very lax monetary authority. However, provided the interest rate is at the Wicksellian neutral rate, and there are no monetary shocks, inflationary/deflationary spirals are ruled out a priori.
Algebraically \( Y = C + I(\text{autonomous}) + G + NX(s) \) can return to the initial equilibrium with unchanged \( Y, C \) and \( G \) (\( \Delta Y = \Delta C = \Delta G = 0 \)) only if \( \Delta I + \Delta NX = 0 \). This can be brought about by an increase/decrease in investment being exactly offset by a decrease/increase in net exports, which in turn implies an appreciation/depreciation in \( s \).\(^{25}\) With regard to the vanishingly small increase in interest rates, we may say that international capital has an infinite supply elasticity, so no increase in world returns is necessary to fund the increase in the exchange rate.

With the aid of these two diagrams, we may describe the effects of three bubble scenarios.

In the **scenario 1**, a bubble in the share market leads to productive investment being brought forward in time, as the expected value-of-capital schedule shifts out. There is a boom in investment for two years (Figure 2).\(^{26}\) The positive investment each year leads to real exchange rate appreciation and a fall in net exports. When the shock is reversed, investment falls for two years, the exchange rate weakens and net exports recover (Figure 3).

In the **scenario 2**, a bubble in the share market leads to *unproductive* investment, so there is no sense in which investment is being brought forward. To be precise, the expected value-of-capital schedule shifts out, as before, but the supposed additions to the capital stock are in fact useless. Capital remains at point \( a \) in Figure 2, even though the IS curve shifts out in Figure 3.\(^{27}\) That is, the boom in investment for two years still occurs and the real exchange rate appreciates, since *the productivity or otherwise of spending is irrelevant in the demand-driven IS/LM framework*. Importantly, when the shock is reversed, *investment has no need to adjust down*, since it is realized that the (un-augmented) capital stock is actually the desired one at the end of the shock. Without

\(^{25}\) This is an intuition, not a proof, which requires that we know that a final stable equilibrium exists, and that consumption and income are returned to their initial value. The Mundell-Fleming model provides a framework in which this is true.

\(^{26}\) Though capital adjusts does not fully adjust to its new desired level as it did in Figure 2.

\(^{27}\) Strictly, we must assume that the investment to cover depreciation is not wasted.
the decline in investment the subsequent depreciation in the exchange rate does not occur because net exports do not need to rise (Figure 3).

**Figure 4: Investment is more stable from year 3 with wastage**

Figure 4 makes these mechanisms clear. The percent deviations from control for investment and capital are contrasted in the ‘no wastage’ and ‘wastage’ scenarios. The build up in capital in scenario 1 (see the line closest to the x axis) must be dis-invested following year 3, leading to a cycle in investment. No such cycle is evident in the right panel, however, because the investment boom in years one and two doesn’t add to capital.

In **scenario 3**, we recognize the importance of ‘capital strikes’ whereby a spectacular unwinding of a bubble leads to a flight to cash, and a difficulty in obtaining funding for investment. We model this as a decline in the expected value-of-capital schedule in Figure 2, but for the whole economy. Investment falls, the exchange rate depreciates, and net exports fill the vacuum in demand.

**4 Quantitative Results**

**4.1 Overview**

We begin by summarizing the main results of the different scenarios, before providing detailed descriptions of the mechanism by which each shock works its way through the model.
In **scenario 1**, communications & technology $q$ rises by one standard deviation for two years, before returning to baseline. Capital expenditure is brought forward, the exchange rate temporarily appreciates, and the net present value (NPV) of the consumption deviations is positive; equivalent to a one-off increase of 0.9 per cent, assuming a 5 per cent discount rate. This (small) positive benefit to consumption is consistent with Oliver (2000), and is driven by an exchange rate investment externality. In USAGE, an investment boom appreciates the $US$ which in turn improves the terms of trade. In Figure 5, the exchange rate deviates from control by nearly 8 per cent, lifting the terms of trade by 2 per cent compared with control. This externality is un-exploitable for decision makers in the model, who regard the currency as fixed for their choices. There is also an additional effect on consumption from increased factor usage. The size of the benefit is small, reflecting the envelope theorem.

**Figure 5: Appreciation improves the terms of trade**

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28 It should be noted as well that if the bursting of the bubble is associated with a general downturn in world demand, export prices may weaken further from year 3 onwards.

29 Extra employment increases GDP and therefore consumption. At the margin, extra investment is funded by foreigners, but US residents capture the increased tax revenue (26% of the product).

30 The envelope theorem implies that if capital is (close to) its inter-temporally optimal path, then small perturbations in timing of investment will have (close to) zero impact on consumption.
Scenario 2 has the same communications and telecommunications bubble as scenario 1, but the resultant capital expenditure is wasted. The consumption deviations are equivalent to a one-off loss of 0.4 per cent. Compared with scenario 1, the wasted investment costs consumers a one-off amount of 1.3 per cent.

This is a highly intuitive result. Using the model database for 2006, the wasted capital in scenario 2 is worth about $150 billion. Only about 82 per cent of this belongs to U.S. residents. Thus the wastage of capital belonging to U.S. residents is worth about $123 billion. With private consumption in the U.S. being about $8739 billion in 2006, we would expect the capital wastage to ultimately impose a loss in consumption of about 1.4 per cent, closely in line with our result.

Scenario 3 is identical to scenario 2 except that a ‘capital strike’ (Tobin’s $q$ is one-half of one standard deviation lower) follows the boom of the first two years. The NPV of private consumption deviations are equivalent to a one-off loss of 31 per cent of consumption in year one. To understand this loss, we note that the pessimism infects the whole economy, rather than just two sectors, even though a one-half per cent decline in $q$ can scarcely be described as an extreme assumption.
Nevertheless, we experimented with different capital strike durations. We allowed the market to return to normal after 3 years, 5 years, or never at all. The one-off consumption loss, together with all the results of scenarios 1 to 3, is expressed as a share of Year 1 consumption, and Year 1 GDP.

Figure 6: NPV of Consumption Deviations, Scenarios 1-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenarios</th>
<th>One-off %C NPV</th>
<th>One-off %GDP NPV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3 p ∞</td>
<td>-31.0</td>
<td>-21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3 p 5</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3 p 3</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7 summarizes the deviations from control (as a per cent of consumption) for the three scenarios, and the additional simulations for differing capital strike durations.
5. Policy Implications

This paper establishes that the main costs associated with mispricing in equity markets are not a consequence of the distortions that they cause in investment. Even extraordinary wastage (Scenario 2) leads to losses that are small in comparison to incurred in a macroeconomic recession (Scenario 3). The main cost is attributable to the turmoil caused in financial markets in the aftermath of an extended period of irrational exuberance in equity prices. This is encapsulated in following observation made by Allan Greenspan in 1959:

"Once stock prices reach the point at which it is hard to value them by logical methodology, stocks will be bought as they were in the late 1920s not for investment but to be unloaded at a

17
still higher price. The ensuing break could be disastrous because panic psychology cannot be summarily altered or reversed by easing money policies." 31

Of course, this comment was followed many years later by Greenspan’s famous reference to “irrational exuberance”32 made in the early days of what was to be called the dotcom boom, on which the scenarios in this paper are loosely based. This boom was a case in point where both practitioners and academics had to resort to non-traditional methods to justify the prices that existed for dotcom stocks in the late 90’s before it all began to fall apart in early 2000.33

In this section of the paper, we briefly survey some of the policies that might be pursued to ameliorate the boom and implosions in equity markets and so avoid the significant economic costs attributable to the aftermath of extremes of mispricing in equity markets. However before proceeding to the policy issues, it is best to first identify the circumstances that give rise to the extremes of pricing in equity markets. The foundation for this mispricing well encapsulated by the words, irrational exuberance, which reflect a period when emotions take over and valuation plays at best a limited role in determining equity prices.

The raises the questions as to (i) what gives rise to the exuberance and (ii) what other conditions need to be present to translate it into a stock market boom. With respect to (i), the one thing that is necessary for this enthusiasm to be established is a prolonged period of rising equity markets during which a significant proportion of the population realises large increases in their wealth. Besides the obvious wealth effect, this induces many others into the market and so has a substantial effect on the demand for stocks and drives up their price. As an example, the dotcom boom came at the end of an 18-year rising market in the U.S. which began to gain greater momentum in 1995 and really took off in the last two years (1998 and 1999). Three conditions that were very important in facilitating this growth were a benign economy (stable growth and low inflation), a

31 This quote is drawn from C. Hudson (2001).
33 Buckley, Adrian, Tse, Kalun, Rijken, Herbert and Eijgenhuijsen (2002)
corporate sector able to meet the markets’ earnings expectation, and investors with ready access to relatively cheap funds

The major policy implication of our paper address the need to ameliorate the boom and bust cycles in capital markets that would appear to becoming more an everyday aspect of our economic life. The factors identified above as being prime contributors to the genesis of bubbles in equity markets, although not exhaustive, provide some useful insights into what actions might be most likely to contribute to greater stability in equity markets. The first line of attack would be to address the factors which contribute to the establishment of asset bubbles. We discuss some of these options below:

a. To try and curtail the development of exuberance in markets

From the early 1990’s onwards we saw increasing use by management of accounting GAAP to produce earnings numbers consistent with market expectations (Bird and McKinnon, 2001; Degeorge et al, 1999). Evidence is that the market is “fooled” by this manipulation and it played an important role in establishing and prolonging the bubble.34 This suggests a need for accounting bodies to both reconsider the discretion that it gives companies when drawing up their accounts and also the extent that they require companies to use inflated market valuations when drawing up their financial reports.

b. To limit the incentives for company management to ramp up market valuations

The increasing use of executive stock options during the 1990’s had the perverse effect of switching management attention from maximising the fundamental value of the company to maximising its market valuation. In financial institutions it had the impact of encouraging the taking of excessive risk.. This suggests that we need to find alternative remuneration structures which address the void between the interests of the owners and management of companies with having the perverse effects of current remuneration systems. One consideration being to cause management to

34 Richard Sloan (1996)
take a longer term view by paying out any performance based components of remunerations over extended periods of time.

c. To restrict the types of investment behaviour which fuels bubbles

Bubbles encourage herd behaviour which is one of the major contributors to spirals in stock prices. This has given rise to momentum investing which involves investing in those stocks that have realised the best recent performance. Although momentum investing typically performs well, it has been shown to be the prime force in causing markets to experience the excesses of pricing in both directions (Bird et al, 2005). Although it is impractical to outlaw momentum investing, it is desirable to limit the extent to which it is utilised. As momentum is a high turnover style of investing, one way of making this style less attractive to investors is to place a tax on turnover which will reduce the returns on momentum investing.

d. To limit the excesses of risky loans made by financial institutions

One common feature of a bubble is that it is accompanied by increases in financial leverage in both the corporate and household sectors with the access to debt being provided by financial institutions willing to take risks supported by the inflated asset values. There has been much discussion of this point in recent years with a focus of increasing the capital requirements of banks with reference to the degree of risk in their loan book. Another proposal is that the capital requirements of banks should be adjusted through time in line with the economic cycle. Of course, more restrictive regulation may just cause financial regulation outside the domain of the regulator so it may also be necessary to increase the spread the regulatory net,

e. To stifle expectations of the financial institutions bailouts

We have just seen the largest bailout of financial instructions where the US Government choose to support many investment banks that otherwise would have failed. Of course this can be justified on a number of grounds such as the impact that failure would have on innocent parties and/or on
the stability of the financial market. However by fostering the expectation of such bailouts, the government is effectively providing the institutions with a put option which will have a maximum value to the institution where management takes on extreme risks. This suggests that alternatives to bailouts have to be found which do not encourage this damaging behaviour. One possibility is for governments to be much more involved in the day-to-day operations of financial institutions with the option of stepping in when there is a early sign of any potential financial distress. Another is for governments to continue to “underwrite” only deposit-taking institutions that are precluded from involvement in any risky activities.

The list of policy options available to limit bubbles discussed above is far from exhaustive. However it is unlikely that we will ever be able to completely rid ourselves of asset bubbles which leads to the question as to what to do about them once they are being established. In the past they have largely been left to run their own course with arguments being put forward that they are hard to identify and/or they do no real damage. In this paper, we have established that they have the potential to cause severe economic damage with the magnitude of the damage being related to the size of the bubble. This being the case there is growing interest in governments (typically through their central banks) playing a more interventionist role in controlling asset bubbles. With bubbles being more global in current times, it is likely that there would have to be a high level of coordination across central banks to this end.

6 Conclusion

This paper has examined the impact of modest stock market mis-pricing in the US economy, focusing on the non-policy parameters of the US economy, in keeping with Lucas (1976). By ‘modest’ we mean that Tobin’s q is only away from its baseline value by one standard deviation.

Our analysis therefore eschews the spectacular swings in asset prices associated with recent bubbles, though it has been natural to stick to the word ‘bubble’. We have
deliberately kept the magnitude of our shocks to \( q \) small (no more than one standard deviation) because mis-pricing of this magnitude is quite likely to persist for extensive periods. While this may not be as newsworthy as, say, recent oscillations in US house prices, it drives home the point that large mis-pricing is likely to be even more serious.

As our review of the literature demonstrates, the impact of this mis-pricing depends to a great extent upon the presence or otherwise of distortions in the whole economic system. Indeed, aligning assets with their fundamental values will not necessarily improve welfare – measured here as the NPV of consumption – if there are other distortions in the economic environment (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). The approach of this paper is to face the implications of the theory of the second best head-on, by using a full scale model of the US to calculate the welfare costs of bubbles numerically.

Modeling allows – indeed requires – that one stipulate any externalities. As it happens, the USAGE model has an investment externality, whereby the exchange rate appreciation leads to an improvement in the terms of trade. Such an externality is subject to the full set of worldwide demand and supply elasticities, and the condition of the cycle overseas, but it is not implausible. Naturally, this improved terms of trade assumes a benign international environment; a point we will return to presently.

If the investment of the bubble is wasted, there is a loss borne by consumers, equivalent to just over one per cent of consumption. However, in a Keynesian fashion, the spending need not be productive to stimulate activity or (as we have just noted) improve the terms of trade.

By experimenting with economy-wide pessimism following the bursting of the bubble, which mimics the (un-modeled) effect of financial distress, we have demonstrated that a mild capital strike (associated with only a one-half of a percentage point decline in \( q \)) can have large negative consumption costs if it is widespread and long-lived.

What implications, if any, does our work have for an evaluation of the global financial crisis? It turns out that our model simulations represent conservative losses, even apart from the fact that our asset mis-pricing has been small relative to reality.
First, the invidious position of the US economy is apparent from the importance of net exports in the Mundell-Fleming model, and is highlighted by our simulations. At the onset of the crisis – mid-2007 to early 2008 – the dollar depreciated, shielding GDP from the attenuated domestic expenditures.\textsuperscript{35} During this phase, the economy was behaving as USAGE would predict. However, over the subsequent year the dollar \textit{appreciated}, perhaps reflecting a ‘Safe Haven’ status of the currency (Figure 8). The estimated consumption losses in USAGE are therefore likely to be much lower than what they will be with a ‘safe haven’ currency.

Put another way, the pro-cyclical (or, more correctly, pro-IS) exchange rate of the Mundell-Fleming model, which has assured many an undergraduate of the inherent stability of the macro-economy, may fail us in a world of unruly currency markets.

\textbf{Figure 8: The Safe Haven Curse}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{safe_haven_curse}
\caption{US TWI Index from January 2007 to January 2009, showing the decline in the US dollar index during the onset of the crisis and its subsequent recovery.}
\end{figure}

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, accessed at rba.gov.au

Another reason why losses were greater in the GFC is that export demand for US goods was significantly lower, due to the world recession. Thus sellers of US wares overseas face both an unfavorable price (via the dollar) and an unfavorable quantity shock.

\textsuperscript{35} Time here is real time, not model simulation time as before.
Taking these three factors together – the modest mis-pricing, the exogenous demand for world exports, and, the procyclical currency in USAGE – our simulations understate the impact of the GFC-style crisis on the US economy. However, the contribution of this paper has been to highlight the serious nature of more modest mis-pricing in equity markets.

Finally, events over the last decade suggest that we may not be able to rely on markets to solve the problems identified in this paper due to excess volatility in equity markets. In the paper we considered a number of policies designed to reduce the likelihood of bubbles becoming established. Some of these involved accounting bodies reducing the flexibility available to companies when drawing up their financial statements, the introduction of different remuneration packages in companies, the introduction of tighter capital requirements for banks, and the closer monitoring of the activities of financial institutions by government. If all else fails, there is a good case for coordinated action by central banks to stifle bubbles in the early stage of their development.

**Bibliography**


Appendix 1: Model Simulations by Aggregate Expenditure Components

Shock to Tobin’s q\textsuperscript{36}

The shock is operationalized through shifts in the investment function in equation (21.1) in Appendix 2. We shock F\_ERROR\_I\_j, when we want to simulate the effects of changes in expectations about industry j, and F\_ERROR, when we want to simulate the effects of changes in expectations generally.

Shocks to these two shift variables cause shifts along the curve shown in Figure 21.1. For a ‘fundamental’ rate of return (EQ\_ERROR in 21.1) a positive shock in either variable delivers more investment. This is equivalent to assuming that the expected rate of return has increased.

We have information on Tobin’s Q for 10 U.S. sectors for the years 1980 to 2007. As shown in Appendix 3, the expected rate of return, ER\_ERROR(j), in industry j in USAGE can be related to Tobin’s Q by the formula:

\[
ER\_ERROR(j) = \left[ \frac{RINT + D(j)}{1 + RINT} \right] \ast (q(j) - 1) \tag{1}
\]

where RINT is the real rate of interest and D(j) is the depreciation rate in industry j. Assuming that real interest rates are 5 per cent and the rate of depreciation is about 7 per cent, (1) gives

\[
ER\_ERROR(j) = 0.114 \ast (q(j) - 1) \tag{2}
\]

The standard deviations for the annual q series for the Communications and Technology industries in the U.S. are 0.27 and 0.42.

In our simulations we assume that investors become exuberant in 2006 about Communications and Technology.\textsuperscript{37} This moves q for these two industries up by one standard deviation. Thus the ER\_ERRORs in (21.1) increase by 0.03078 and 0.04788 via the shock terms in (21.1).

We assume that exuberant expectations are maintained in year 2007. That means that we maintain the shift variables at their new positions.

\textsuperscript{36} Readers uninterested in technical details of the shock calibration might like to jump two pages.

\textsuperscript{37} This covers the Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) of 48, 491, 4931, 357, 358 and 36.
In year 2008 the exuberant period ends. In simulations 1 and 2, the shift variables for Communications and Technology return to their initial positions. In simulations 3 the shift variables of the two industries return to their initial position but the general shift, F_EROR, moves up by 0.01026. Since this appears in (21.1) with a negative sign, this retards investment.

Why 0.01026? The average standard deviation in q across all industries is 0.18 (capital stock weighted average). In simulation 3 we assume that the unfulfilled expectations in Communications and Technology lead to widespread pessimism. We simulate this as a half of a standard deviation fall in q, so via equation (2) the appropriate shock across all industries is a downward shift of 0.01026 (= 0.114*0.09).

The difference between simulations 1 and 2 is that in simulation 2 the extra investment in Communications and Technology resulting from exuberance does not lead to extra capital in these two industries. The extra investment is wasted. The wastage assumption is continued in simulation 3. We now provide the detailed descriptions of the shocks.

**Scenario 1: exuberance in Communications and Technology followed by return of expectations to normality**

Chart 1.1 shows that combined investment in the two sectors moves about 40 per cent above control in 2006. It stays above control in 2007 by about 30 per cent. The smaller deviation in 2007 (about 30% compared with 40%) is caused by the extra capital that is available at the beginning of 2007. When expectations return to normal, investment sinks below the base. With normal expectations capital needs to return to its basecase level.

Chart 1.2 is the macro version of Chart 1.1. Technology and Communications accounts for about 9% of the economy’s investment. Consequently, Chart 1.2 is close to a 9% scaled down version of Chart 1.1.

Chart 1.3 shows the paths of aggregate capital, employment and GDP. For each year, the deviation in GDP is approximately 0.7 times the deviation in employment plus 0.3 times the deviation in capital: 0.7 and 0.3 are the factor shares in GDP. Chart 1.5 shows the expenditure components of GDP. The initial boom in investment stimulates
imports and retards exports. This happens via the exchange rate (Chart 1.6): an increase in investment generates real appreciation. Once the investment boom is over, exports move above control and imports move below control. In the long run, the effects on all macro variables is indistinguishable from zero.

The most interesting aspect of Chart 1.3 is the behaviour of employment. A helpful equation for explaining this behaviour is

\[
\frac{W}{P_c} = \left(\frac{P_g}{P_c}\right) * MPL \left(\frac{K}{L}\right)
\]

where
- \(W\) is the average wage rate;
- \(P_c\) is the price of consumption goods;
- \(P_g\) is the price of GDP, that is the price of goods produced in the U.S.; and
- \(MPL\) is the marginal product of labour which is a function of \(K/L\), the capital/labour ratio.

If we cancel out \(P_c\), (3) says that the wage is the value of the marginal product of labour.

As mentioned already, the positive deviation in aggregate investment in 2006 reduces exports. This improves the terms of trade (movement up the foreign demand curve). Against this, there is also an increase in imports which has a negative effect on the terms of trade (movement up the foreign supply curve). However, the net effect turns out to be positive (Chart 1.6). With an improvement in the terms of trade, \(P_g\) increases relative to \(P_c\): the price deflator for GDP includes the price of exports but not imports whereas the price deflator for consumption includes the price of imports but not exports. In USAGE we assume sticky adjustment in real wage rates. That is, the left hand side of (3) moves slowly. Hence, with an increase in \(P_g/P_c\) we get an initial decrease in MPL. In the short run, \(K\) is fixed. Thus \(L\) must increase, giving the positive deviation in employment shown for 2006 in Chart 1.3.

With employment above control, wages gradually rise, forcing employment back towards control in 2007 (Chart 1.4). In 2008, when investment dips below control, the terms-of-trade gain for the earlier years is eliminated. However, wages have been elevated in these earlier years and take a while to adjust downwards. This produces a negative deviation in employment in 2008. In terms of equation (3), \(W/P_c\) is above
control, $P_e/P_C$ is back to control and so MPL must be above control. This produces a negative deviation in employment despite $K$ being above control.

A surprising feature of Charts 1.3 and 1.4 is the failure of labour to return to control. Labour will eventually get back to control, but not until capital stops declining. Under our labour market specification, wages adjust down relative to control whenever employment is below control. This normally brings employment back to control. An exception is when there is some continuing bad news for employment. Then wages mightn’t decline quickly enough to bring employment back to control. In the present simulation, the bad news is the downward adjustment in capital.

The behaviour of the exchange rate and the terms of trade in Chart 1.6 needs further elaboration. As mentioned already, the exchange rate appreciates in response to the increase in investment and devalues when investment contracts. Notice however that the exchange rate is already below control in 2007, even though aggregate investment is still about 2 per cent above control. Also, at first glance it seems curious that the real trade balance (exports minus imports) is still well below control in 2007 despite the exchange rate being below control.

How can the exchange rate go so low in 2007? It is easy to understand that the exchange rate must be weaker in 2007 than in 2006: investment is weaker in 2007 than in 2006. But how can it go below control?

To understand how this can happen, let us assume to start with that the exchange rate in 2007 is back to the basecase. What would happen to exports? We think in terms of a diagram with foreign-currency prices on the vertical axis and export quantities on the horizontal axis. In USAGE, export volumes in year $t$ are determined at the intersection of the short-run foreign demand curve and the U.S. supply curve. Appreciation in 2006 has the effect of moving the short-run foreign demand curve for 2007 to the left of its control position.\(^{38}\) If the exchange rate in 2007 is back at control, then the U.S. supply curve for 2007 will also be approximately back at control. Consequently, exports in 2007 would be below control. What would happen to imports? This time, we think in terms of a diagram with foreign-currency prices on the vertical axis and import quantities on the

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\(^{38}\) See Appendix 4 for an expanded explanation
horizontal axis. Again import volumes are determined in year $t$ at the intersection of the foreigners short-run supply curve and the U.S. demand curve. Appreciation in 2006 has the effect of moving the short-run foreign supply curve for 2007 to the right of its control position. If the exchange rate in 2007 is back at control, then the U.S. demand curve for 2007 will also be approximately back at control. Consequently, imports in 2007 would be above control. Thus we can conclude that if the exchange rate in 2007 were at control, then the real balance of trade would be below control: lower exports and higher imports. Now we see the possibility (which actually occurs in our simulation) for the exchange rate to go below control in 2007 even though the trade balance is below control.

Chart 1.7 shows the deviations for private consumption (previously shown on a different scale in Chart 1.5). It is clear that the model does not pick up any penalty on consumption from having investment slightly mistimed. The present value of the consumption deviations is positive: a one-off increase of 0.9 per cent. One explanation is that the U.S. makes an early gain from the extra investment via the terms of trade effect. Another factor is that the early investment means that the U.S. has extra capital income throughout the simulation period. While most of this belongs to foreigners, the U.S. benefits from extra tax collections associated with the extra capital income.

**Scenario 2: exuberance and capital wastage in Communications and Technology followed by return of expectations to normality**

Comparison of results from simulation 2 with those from simulation 1 shows the effects of wasting the extra capital put in place in 2006 and 2007 in the Communications and Technology industries.

The first two years in Chart 2.1 look similar to those in Chart 1.1. Beyond 2007, investment in Communications and Technology is close to control. There wasn’t any build up of usable capital in the first two years. Consequently the two industries can’t save on investment in the later years.

Chart 2.2 is the macro version of Chart 2.1. There is a small positive deviation in aggregate capital in 2007 despite the wastage of capital in the Communication and Technology industries. This reflects the benefit to the U.S. economy of the terms-of-

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39 See Appendix 4 for an expanded explanation
trade improvement associated with increased investment in the early years. For understanding this, it is helpful to write the marginal productivity condition for capital as:

\[
\frac{R}{P_i} = \left( \frac{P_g}{P_i} \right) \cdot MPK \left( \frac{K}{L} \right)
\]  

where

- R is the rental per unit of capital;
- \(P_i\) is the price of investment goods;
- \(P_g\) is the price of GDP, that is the price of goods produced in the U.S.; and
- MPK is the marginal product of capital which is a function of \(K/L\).

As explained for simulation 1, the positive deviation in aggregate investment in 2006 improves the terms of trade. This causes an increase in \(P_g\) relative to \(P_i\). In addition, the terms-of-trade improvement increases employment in the short run (as explained for simulation 1) thereby increasing the marginal product of capital. Thus, via (4), we see that rentals increase relative to the replacement cost of capital with a resulting increase in investment and capital across the economy.

In Chart 2.3, the employment effect in 2006 is similar to that in Chart 1.3. For the next few years the employment effects in Chart 2.3 are less positive or more negative than those in Chart 1.3. This reflects the lower capital stock in simulation 2 compared with simulation 1. Towards the end of the simulation period, employment is less negative in simulation 2 than in simulation 1. In simulation 2, capital stock is rising at the end of the simulation period, exerting a positive influence on employment, whereas in simulation 1 it was falling, exerting a negative influence on employment.

Chart 2.7 compares the consumption deviations from simulation 2 with those from simulation 1. Capital wastage imposes a cost on U.S. households. In simulation 2 the consumption deviations (using a 5 per cent discount rate) are equivalent to a one off loss of 0.4 per cent. In simulation 1, the consumption deviations were equivalent to a one off gain of 0.9 per cent. Thus capital wastage imposes a once-off loss of 1.3 per cent of consumption.

Why does capital wastage impose a loss on households equivalent to about 1.3 per cent of a year’s consumption? Inspection of the simulation results shows that the wasted capital in simulation 2 is worth about $150 billion. Only about 82 per cent of this
belongs to U.S. residents. Thus the wastage of capital belonging to U.S. residents is worth about $123 billion. With private consumption in the U.S. being about $8739 billion in 2006, we would expect the capital wastage to ultimately impose a loss in consumption of about 1.4 per cent, closely in line with our result of 1.3 per cent.

**Scenario 3: exuberance and capital wastage in Communications and Technology followed by general and permanent pessimism**

The results for 2006 and 2007 in this simulation are the same as those in simulation 2. Beyond 2007 the results are dominated by the assumption of generalized pessimism. This causes aggregate investment in 2008 to fall about 20 per cent below control (Chart 3.2), generating a sharp decline in the exchange rate (Chart 3.6). Exports are stimulated (Chart 3.5) and the terms of trade fall (Chart 3.6). The decline in the terms of trade causes employment to fall, about 3 per cent below control in 2008 (Chart 3.4). Decline in real wages eventually allows employment to return to control. As shown in Chart 3.7, there is a considerable cost in terms of lost consumption. The deviations in private consumption (using a 5 per cent discount rate) are equivalent to a permanent loss of about 1.6 per cent.
**Chart 1.1. Exuberance in Communications & Technology followed by normality:**
Investment and capital in Communications and Technology industries
(percentage deviation from basecase)

**Chart 1.2. Exuberance in Communications & Technology followed by normality:**
Aggregate investment and capital
(percentage deviation from basecase)
Chart 1.3. Exuberance in Communications & Technology followed by normality: GDP and aggregate labour and capital (percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 1.4. Exuberance in Communications & Technology followed by normality: Real wage and aggregate employments (percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 1.5. Exuberance in Communications & Technology followed by normality: GDP and expenditure-side aggregates
Chart 1.6. Exuberance in Communications & Technology followed by normality: 
The terms of trade and the exchange rate (positive means appreciation) 
(percentage deviation from basecase)
Chart 1.7. Exuberance in Communications & Technology followed by normality:
Private consumption
(percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 2.1. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by normality:
Investment and capital in Communications and Technology industries
(percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 2.2. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by normality:
Aggregate investment and capital
(percentage deviation from basecase)
Chart 2.3. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by normality:
GDP and aggregate labour and capital
(percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 2.4. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by normality:
Real wage and aggregate employment
(percentage deviation from basecase)
Chart 2.5. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by normality: GDP and expenditure-side aggregates (percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 2.6. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by normality: The terms of trade and the exchange rate (positive means appreciation) (percentage deviation from basecase)
Chart 2.7. Comparison of private consumption in simulations 1 and 2
(percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 3.1. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by pessimism:
Investment and capital in Communications and Technology industries
(percentage deviation from basecase)
Chart 3.2. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by pessimism: Aggregate investment and capital (percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 3.3. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by pessimism: GDP and aggregate labour and capital (percentage deviation from basecase)
Chart 3.4. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by pessimism: Real wage and aggregate employment (percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 3.5. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by pessimism: GDP and expenditure-side aggregates (percentage deviation from basecase)
Chart 3.6. Exuberance and wastage in Com & Tech followed by pessimism:
The terms of trade and the exchange rate (positive means appreciation)
(percentage deviation from basecase)

Chart 3.7. Comparison of private consumption in simulations 1, 2 and 3
(percentage deviation from basecase)
21.1. Capital-supply functions

In MONASH, the capital-supply function for industry \( j \) \([f_{\text{K}} \text{ in (2.3) and } \psi_{\text{KGj}} \text{ in (16.49)}]\) describes the relationship between \( j \)'s expected rate of return \((\text{EROR}_j)\) and the proportionate growth in \( j \)'s capital stock between the beginning and end of the year \([\text{K}_{\text{GRj}} = \text{K}_{\text{j}(t)} / \text{K}_{\text{j}(t-1)} - 1]\). MONASH contains two specifications of expected rates of return: static and forward-looking. These will be discussed in the next subsection.

Under both specifications, expected rates of return in year \( t \) are composed of two parts:

\[
\text{EROR}_j = \text{EQEROR}_j + F_{\text{ERROR} - J_j} - F_{\text{ERROR}} + \text{DIS}_j \quad \text{(21.1)}
\]

where

- \( \text{EQEROR}_j \) is the equilibrium expected rate of return in industry \( j \), i.e., the expected rate of return required to sustain indefinitely the year-\( t \) rate of capital growth in industry \( j \); and
- \( \text{DIS}_j \) is a measure of the disequilibrium in \( j \)'s expected rate of return in year \( t \), set to zero in this paper.
- \( F_{\text{ERROR} - J_j} \) is a shock to expectations about industry \( j \)
- \( F_{\text{ERROR}} \) is a shock to expectations generally.

As illustrated by the AA' curve in Figure 21.1, we specify the equilibrium expected rate of return in industry \( j \) as an inverse logistic function of the proportionate growth in \( j \)'s capital stock:

\[
\text{EQEROR}_j = \text{RORN}_j + \left( \frac{1}{C_j} \right) \left[ \ln(\text{K}_{\text{GRMIN}_j}) - \ln(\text{K}_{\text{GRMAX}_j} \cdot \text{K}_{\text{GR}_j}) ight] - \ln(\text{TRENDS}_j \cdot \text{K}_{\text{GRMIN}_j}) + \ln(\text{K}_{\text{GRMAX}_j} \cdot \text{TRENDS}_j). \quad \text{(21.2)}
\]

In this equation,

- \( \text{K}_{\text{GRMIN}_j} \) is the minimum possible rate of growth of capital and is set at the negative of the rate of depreciation in industry \( j \).
- \( \text{TRENDS}_j \) is the industry’s historically normal capital growth rate. This is an observed growth rate in capital over an historical period. Its value is data.
- \( \text{K}_{\text{GRMAX}_j} \) is the maximum feasible rate of capital growth in industry \( j \). In recent applications of MONASH, we have avoided unrealistically large simulated growth rates for capital and investment by setting \( \text{K}_{\text{GRMAX}_j} \) as

\section*{Figure 21.1. The equilibrium expected rate of return schedule for industry \( j \), assuming \( F_{\text{ERROR} - J_j} \) and \( F_{\text{ERROR}} \) are zero}
TREND_Kj plus 0.06. Thus, for example, if the historically normal rate of capital growth in an industry is 3 per cent, we impose an upper limit on its simulated capital growth in any year t of 9 per cent.

Cj is a positive parameter the setting of which is discussed below.

RORNj is the industry’s historically normal rate of return. The values of RORNj are data. For each industry j, RORNj is an estimate of the average rate of return that applied over the historical period in which the industry’s average annual rate of capital growth was TREND_Kj).

F_ERROR_Jj and F_ERROR allow for vertical shifts in the capital supply curves (the AA’ curves in Figure 21.1).

To Explain, (21.1) and (21.2) mean that for industry j to attract sufficient investment in year t to achieve a capital growth rate of TREND_Kj, it must have an expected rate of return of RORNj. For the industry to attract sufficient investment in year t for its capital growth to exceed TREND_Kj, its expected rate of return must be greater than RORNj. Similarly, if the expected rate of return in the industry is less than that observed in the historical period, then provided that there is no disequilibrium, (21.1) and (21.2) imply that investors will restrict their supply of capital to the industry to below the level required to generate capital growth at the historically observed rate.

Finally, we consider the evaluation of the parameter Cj in (21.2). In simulations in which (21.2) plays an active role, the sensitivity of j’s capital growth to variations in its equilibrium expected rate of return is controlled by the parameter Cj. Our first step in choosing the value for Cj was to note that

$$C_j = \left[ \frac{\partial EERROR_J}{\partial K_{GR,J}} \right]_{K_{GR,J}=\text{TREND}_K}^{-1} \ast \left[ \frac{K_{GR,MAX_J} - K_{GR,MIN_J}}{(K_{GR,MAX_J} - \text{TREND}_K)(\text{TREND}_K - K_{GR,MIN_J})} \right]. \quad (21.3)$$

Formula (21.3) allows us to evaluate Cj if we can assign a value to the reciprocal of the slope of the AA’ curve in Figure 21.1 in the region of K_GR = TREND_K.
We have no data for individual industries to give us a basis for such an assignment. However, by looking at the investment functions in Australian macro models\(^{41}\), we obtained an estimate, denoted by SMURF, of the average value over all industries of the sensitivity of capital growth to variations in expected rates of return. Then, we computed the value of \(C_j\) via (21.3) with

\[
\left( \frac{\partial \text{EqEROR}_j}{\partial \text{K_GR}_j} \right)_{\text{K_GR}_j = \text{TREND}_K_j}^{-1} = \text{SMURF} \quad \text{for all } j \in \text{IND.} \tag{21.4}
\]

### 21.2. Actual and expected rates of return

The MONASH definition of actual rates of return starts with the calculation of the present value (\(PV_{j,t}\)) of purchasing in year \(t\) a unit of physical capital for use in industry \(j\):

\[
\text{PV}_{j,t} = -\Pi_{j,t} + \left[ Q_{j,t+1}*(1-T_{t+1}) + \Pi_{j,t+1}*(1-D_j) \right] / \left[ 1 + INT_t*(1-T_{t+1}) \right] \tag{21.5}
\]

where
- \(\Pi_{j,t}\) is the cost of buying or constructing in year \(t\) a unit of capital for use in industry \(j\);
- \(D_j\) is the rate of depreciation;
- \(Q_{j,t}\) is the rental rate on \(j\)'s capital in year \(t\), i.e. the user cost of a unit of capital in year \(t\);
- \(T_t\) is the tax rate applying to capital income in all industries in year \(t\); and
- \(INT_t\) is the nominal rate of interest in year \(t\).

In this calculation we assume that the acquisition in year \(t\) of a unit of physical capital in industry \(j\) involves an immediate outlay of \(\Pi_{j,t}\) followed in year \(t+1\) by two benefits which must be discounted by one plus the tax-adjusted interest rate \([INT_t*(1-T_{t+1})]\). The first benefit is the post-tax rental value, \(Q_{j,t+1}*(1-T_{t+1})\), of an extra unit of capital in year \(t+1\). The second is the value, \(\Pi_{j,t+1}*(1-D_j)\), at which the depreciated unit of capital can be sold in year \(t+1\).

To derive a rate of return formula we divide both sides of (21.5) by \(\Pi_{j,t}\), i.e., we define the actual\(^{42}\) rate of return, \(\text{ROR}_{\text{ACT},j,t}\), in year \(t\) on physical capital in industry \(j\) as the present value of an investment of one dollar. This gives

\[
\text{ROR}_{\text{ACT},j,t} = -1 + \left[ (1-T_{t+1})*Q_{j,t+1}/\Pi_{j,t} + (1-D_j)\Pi_{j,t+1}/\Pi_{j,t} \right] / [1 + INT_t*(1-T_{t+1})]. \tag{21.6}
\]

The determination of capital growth and investment in MONASH depends on expected (rather than actual) rates of return. In most simulations, we assume that capital growth and investment in year \(t\) depend on expectations held in year \(t\) concerning \(\text{ROR}_{\text{ACT},j,t}\).

Under static expectations, we assume that investors expect no change in the tax rate (i.e., they expect \(T_{t+1}\) will be the same as \(T_t\)) and that rental rates (\(Q_t\)) and asset prices (\(\Pi_t\)) will increase by the current rate of inflation (INF). Under these assumptions, their expectation (\(\text{EROR}_{\text{ST},j,t}\)) of \(\text{ROR}_{\text{ACT},j,t}\) is given by

\[
\text{EROR}_{\text{ST},j,t} = -1 + [(1-T_t)*Q_{j,t}/\Pi_{j,t} + (1-D_j)]/(1+R_{\text{INT PT SE}_t}), \tag{21.7}
\]

where \(R_{\text{INT PT SE}_t}\) is the static expectation of the real post-tax interest rate, defined by

\[
1 + R_{\text{INT PT SE}_t} = [1 + INT_t*(1-T_t)]/[1+\text{INF}_t]. \tag{21.8}
\]

Under forward-looking or rational expectations, we assume that investors correctly anticipate actual rates of returns, i.e., their expectation (\(\text{EROR}_{\text{FL},j,t}\)) of \(\text{ROR}_{\text{ACT},j,t}\) is \(\text{ROR}_{\text{ACT},j,t}\).

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\(^{41}\) For example, the Murphy model (Powell and Murphy, 1997) and TRYM (Taplin et al., 1993).

\(^{42}\) We use the adjective \textit{actual} to emphasise that here we are defining the outcome for the rate of return, not a prior expectation held about that outcome.
Appendix 3: Relating the MONASH expected rate of return to Tobin’s Q

Our starting point is (21.7) in Appendix 2, where EROR_ST is now written EROR and R_INT_PT_SE is R_INT (as we ignore ‘Post Tax’ effects).

\[ EROR_{jt} = -1 + [(1-Tt)* Q_{jt}/\Pi_{jt} + (1-D_j)]/(1+RINT), \]  

(1)

In what follows, we will use lower case \( q \) to denote Tobin’s \( q \), to avoid confusion with the rental rate. We can define this for industry \( j \) (leaving out \( j \) for convenience) via the equation:

\[ q = \frac{Q_{t+1} (1-T)}{\Pi_t (1+INT)} + \frac{Q_{t+2} (1-T)(1-D)}{\Pi_t (1+INT)(1+INT)} + \frac{Q_{t+3} (1-T)(1-D)^2}{\Pi_t (1+INT)(1+INT)^2} + \ldots \]  

(2)

In this equation \( Q \) is viewed as the present value of the stream of profits flowing from a unit of capital divided by the book value of a unit of capital (note: the book value is historic cost, so \( \Pi \) does not grow for future periods). We have made the assumption that the tax, discount and nominal interest rates are constant. If we make the additional assumption that the rental rate grows with (constant) inflation we can write \( q \) as follows:

\[ q = \frac{(1+INF)Q_t (1-T)}{\Pi_t (1+INT)} + \frac{(1+INF)Q_t (1+INF)(1-T)(1-D)}{\Pi_t (1+INT)(1+INT)} \]

\[ + \frac{(1+INF)Q_t (1+INF)^2 (1-T)(1-D)^2}{\Pi_t (1+INT)(1+INT)^2} + \ldots \]

\[ = \frac{Q_t (1-T)}{\Pi_t (1+RINT)} + \frac{Q_t (1+INF)(1-T)(1-D)}{\Pi_t (1+RINT)(1+INT)} \]

\[ + \frac{Q_t (1+INF)^2 (1-T)(1-D)^2}{\Pi_t (1+RINT)(1+INT)^2} + \ldots \]

where \( RINT=INT-INF \). This is a geometric progression with ratio \( (1+INF)(1-D)/(1+INT) \approx 1-(RINT+D) \) Summing to infinity we obtain a simplified \( q \).

\[ q = \frac{Q_t (1-T)}{[1-(1-(RINT+D))]/\Pi_t (RINT+D)} \approx \frac{Q_t (1-T)}{\Pi_t (RINT+D)}. \]  

(3)

Hence, after straightforward manipulation we may connect EROR to \( q \).

\[ EROR_t = \frac{(RINT + D)}{[1 + RINT]} \{q - 1\} \]  

(4)
Appendix 4: Adjustment of exports and imports

Exports

In USAGE policy simulations, exports of commodity i are determined according to the equation:

\[
\frac{X_p^p(i)}{X_b^b(i)} - 1 = \alpha \left( \frac{PEL_p^p(i) - PE_p^p(i)}{PE_b^b(i)} \right) + \frac{X_{t-1}^p(i) - X_{t-1}^b(i) - 1}{X_{t-1}^b(i) - 1},
\]

(1)

where

- \(X_p^p(i)\) and \(X_b^b(i)\) are the quantities of exports of commodity i in year t in the policy and basecase runs;
- \(PE_p^p(i)\) and \(PE_b^b(i)\) are the foreign-currency prices of exports of commodity i in year t in the policy and basecase runs;
- \(\alpha\) is a positive parameter; and
- \(PEL_p^p(i)\) is the foreign-currency price on the long-run export demand curve for commodity i in year t in the policy run. This price is determined by

\[
PEL_p^p(i) = \left( X_p^p(i) \right)^{1/\eta} * H_t,
\]

(2)

where

- \(H_t\) is an exogenous variable reflecting the position of the foreign long-run demand curve for U.S. commodity i; and
- \(\eta\) is a negative parameter (the long-run foreign elasticity of demand for U.S. exports of commodity i).

Under (1), foreign demands of U.S. commodity i in policy runs will move further and further above their basecase path whenever foreign willingness to pay, reflected by \(PE_p^p(i)\), is above the actual price, \(PE_b^b(i)\). One way to see how this adjustment works is via Figure 1 in which we assume that basecase quantities and prices are one for all years (a steady state) so that (1) simplifies to

\[
\frac{X_p^p(i)}{X_b^b(i) - 1} = \alpha \left( \frac{PEL_p^p(i) - PE_p^p(i)}{PE_b^b(i)} \right).
\]

(3)

Assume that the policy causes a once-off movement in year 1 in the U.S. supply curve from \(S_b\) to \(S_p\). This would be the sort of shift associated with a permanent appreciation of the U.S. currency.

In Figure 1, DL is a convenient diagrammatic representation of the foreign demand curve for U.S. product i and is a linear version of equation (2). We assume that DL has slope \(-\gamma\) where \(\gamma\) is a positive parameter, so that

\[
PEL_p^p(i) - PEL_{t-1}^p(i) = -\gamma * \left( X_p^p(i) - X_{t-1}^p(i) \right).
\]

(4)

Combining (3) and (4) we obtain

\[
PE_p^p(i) = PEL_{t-1}^p(i) + \beta * \left( X_p^p(i) - X_{t-1}^p(i) \right).
\]

(5)

where \(\beta\) is the negative parameter given by \(-\gamma + 1/\alpha\). Equation (5) defines what we call the short-run demand curve in the policy run for year t. It is represented in Figure 1 for year 1 by the line DS1.
quantity and price solution in the policy run for year 1 is determined at point 1, the intersection of the policy supply curve, $S^p$, and the short-run demand curve, $DS_1$. For year 2, the short-run demand curve, $DS_2$, is to the left of the short-run demand curve for year 1: it is the straight line with slope $\beta$ passing through the point $(X^p_1(i), PEL^p_1(i))$, point a in Figure 1. With no further movement in the supply curve, the quantity-price solution for year 2 is at point 2. In the next year the quantity-price solution moves to point 3, eventually arriving at point F.

For a once-off appreciation, Figure 1 implies that the U.S. will experience a significant short-run increase in the foreign-currency prices of its exports and a mild reduction in quantity. Eventually, foreigners find new sources of supply causing quantities to decline and prices to fall back to their initial levels. This sort of adjustment is consistent with the J-curve hypothesis, usually expressed in terms of a devaluation. Under this hypothesis, a devaluation (appreciation) causes little initial quantity increase (decrease) and an adverse (favourable) foreign currency price movement with a net deterioration (improvement) in foreign-currency export earnings. Eventually, however, the devaluation (appreciation) causes a considerable quantity improvement (deterioration) and little change (depending on the slope of the long-run demand curve) in the foreign-currency price. Thus, in the long run, the devaluation (appreciation) normally generates an improvement (deterioration) in export earnings.

Now consider the case in which the appreciation in year 1 is immediately followed by a devaluation in year 2 that returns the supply curve to its basecase position. Then the solution in year 2 is at point $2'$. In subsequent years the solution moves up the $S^b$ curve, eventually returning to point 0.

Notice that at point $2'$ both the export quantity and price are below their basecase levels despite the exchange rate being at its basecase level. This is the curious result noted in our discussion of simulation 1.

**Imports**

In USAGE policy simulations, imports of commodity $i$ are determined according to the equation:

$$\left( \frac{M^p_t(i)}{M^b_t(i)} - 1 \right) = \left( \frac{M^p_{t-1}(i)}{M^b_{t-1}(i)} - 1 \right) + \delta \cdot \left( \frac{PML^p_t(i) - PML^b_t(i)}{PM^b_t(i)} \right),$$

(6)

where

$M^p_t(i)$ and $M^b_t(i)$ are the quantities of imports of commodity $i$ in year $t$ in the policy and basecase runs;

$PM^p_t(i)$ and $PM^b_t(i)$ are the foreign-currency prices of imports of commodity $i$ in year $t$ in the policy and basecase runs;

$\delta$ is a positive parameter; and

$PML^p_t(i)$ is the foreign-currency price on the long-run import supply curve for commodity $i$ in year $t$ in the policy run. This price is determined by

$$PML^p_t(i) = \left( M^p_t(i) \right)^{1/\mu} \cdot G_t,$$

(7)

where

$G_t$ is an exogenous variable reflecting the position of the foreign long-run supply curve for commodity $i$ to the U.S.; and

$\mu$ is a positive parameter (the long-run foreign elasticity of supply for imports of commodity $i$ to the U.S.).

Under (6), foreign supplies of commodity $i$ to the U.S. in policy runs will move further and further above their basecase path whenever the foreign-currency import price, $PM^p_t(i)$, is above the long-run
price, PML\(^P\)(i), that would elicit the existing supply. One way to see how this adjustment works is via Figure 2 in which we assume that basecase quantities and prices are one for all years (a steady state) so that (6) simplifies to

\[
M_P^P(i) = M_{t-1}^P(i) + \delta^*(PM^P_P(i) - PML^P(i)) .
\]  

(8)

Assume that the policy causes a once-off movement in year 1 in the U.S. demand curve from \(D^b\) to \(D^p\). This would be the sort of shift associated with a permanent appreciation of the U.S. currency.

In Figure 2, SL is a convenient diagrammatic representation of the foreign supply curve for commodity i to the U.S. and is a linear version of equation (7). We assume that SL has slope \(\epsilon\) where \(\epsilon\) is a positive parameter, so that

\[
PML_P^P(i) - PML_{t-1}^P(i) = \epsilon^*\left(M_P^P(i) - M_{t-1}^P(i)\right) .
\]  

(9)

Combining (8) and (9) we obtain

\[
PM^P_P(i) = PML_P^P(i) + \phi^*\left(M_P^P(i) - M_{t-1}^P(i)\right)
\]  

(10)

where \(\phi\) is the positive parameter given by \((\epsilon + 1/\delta)\). Equation (10) defines what we call the short-run supply curve in the policy run for year \(t\). It is represented in Figure 2 for year 1 by the line \(SS_1\). The quantity and price solution in the policy run for year 1 is determined at point 1, the intersection of the policy demand curve, \(D^p\), and the short-run supply curve, \(SS_1\). For year 2, the short-run supply curve, \(SS_2\), is to the right of the short-run supply curve for year 1: it is the straight line with slope \(\phi\) passing through the point \((M^P_P(i), PML^P_P(i))\), point a in Figure 2. With no further movement in the demand curve, the quantity-price solution for year 2 is at point 2. In the next year the quantity-price solution moves to point 3, eventually arriving at point F.

For a once-off appreciation, Figure 2 implies that the U.S. will experience a significant short-run increase in the foreign-currency prices of its imports and a mild increase in their quantity. Eventually, in response to high foreign-currency prices, new foreign suppliers will emerge causing foreign-currency prices to fall back towards their initial levels and quantities to increase. This sort of adjustment is consistent with the partial pass-through hypothesis, usually expressed in terms of a devaluation. Under this hypothesis, an \(x\) per cent devaluation (appreciation) causes little initial change in U.S. dollar prices of imports and thus little change in quantities. Foreign-currency prices decrease (increase) by nearly \(x\) per cent. Eventually, however, the devaluation (appreciation) causes withdrawal (expansion) of supply by foreigners and return of foreign-currency prices towards their initial levels. There is considerable long-run quantity contraction (expansion) and little change (depending on the slope of the long-run supply curve) in the foreign-currency price. Thus, in the long run, the devaluation (appreciation) normally generates a significant decrease (increase) in foreign-currency import payments.
Figure 1. Export price and quantity adjustment

Figure 2. Import price and quantity adjustment
Now consider the case in which the appreciation in year 1 is immediately followed by a devaluation in year 2 that returns the demand curve to its basecase position. Then the solution in year 2 is at point $2'$. In subsequent years the solution moves up the $D^b$ curve, eventually returning to point 0.

Notice that at point $2'$ the import quantity is above its basecase level despite the exchange rate being at its basecase level. This is the curious result noted in our discussion of simulation 1.

Finally notice from Figures 1 and 2 that a reversed appreciation has an ambiguous effect on the terms of trade in year 2: the foreign-currency prices of both exports and imports are reduced below their basecase levels.