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Dr Toru Suzuki


Toru Suzuki received his Ph.D. from Boston University in 2009 and joined UTS in 2012. His research filed is microeconomic theory, especially game theory, information economics and models of bounded rationality. For more detail, please visit his personal website.

Lecturer, Economics Discipline Group
+61 2 9514 3083

Research Interests

Microeconomic theory, Game theory, Information economics

Journal articles

Li, K.K. & Suzuki, T. 2016, 'Jury voting without objective probability', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 389-406.
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© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Unlike in the standard jury voting experiment, the voting environment in practice has no explicit signal structure. Voters then need to conceptualize the information structure in order to update their beliefs based on 'pivotal reasoning. This paper investigates whether voters can play a strategic voting under a 'detail-free environment. We obtain non-parametric predictions in terms of the differences in voting behaviors under majority and unanimity rule. Our experimental results suggest that voters can still play the strategic voting as in the existing experiments.
Suzuki, T. 2012, 'Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 1009-1013.
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Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent simultaneously chooses either a safe method or a risky method to solve the problem. This paper analyzes a prize scheme as an incentive to induce the optimal risk-taking level which maximizes the designer's interest. It is shown that whenever the winner-take-all scheme induces excessive risk-taking, there exists a prize scheme which induces the optimal risk-taking. Moreover, the existence of such a prize scheme is guaranteed if the number of competitors is sufficiently large.
Suzuki, T. 2012, 'Complementarity of behavioral biases', Theory and Decision, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 413-430.
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I investigate the complementarity of behavioral biases in a simple invest- ment problem. The agent has incomplete knowledge about the correlation between fitness and the decision environment. Nature endows the agent with a decision pro- cedure so that the induced action can reflect this correlation. I show that the agent with this decision procedure always exhibits (i) present biased time preference, (ii) distorted beliefs, and (iii) cognitive dissonance. The three biases are complements and the absence of one of them destroys the value of the other two. The decision procedure also provides insights into the non-fungibility of savings.